Pure speculation, and this and the previous LA Times article have the underlying "it's safer in a Boeing" bias.
Oddly, the other LA Times article was complaining (inaccurately) that the computerized controls in the Airbus would limit the pilot's ability to use the controls. This article complains that the controls don't limit the pilot's ability to mess things up.
What's needed is the truth, not this speculation. Perhaps the vertical stabilizer did rip off. If it did we need to know why.
Indeed. I saw a documentary on Flight 587 a while ago, and seem to distinctly remember that both Airbus and Boeing planes suffer from this "rudder reversal" issue.
Rudder reversal is a different issue. It's where hydraulic problems cause sudden rudder movements, or cause control inputs to the rudder to have the opposite of the expected effect. The problem here is with the structural strength of the vertical stabilizer under full (pilot-commanded) rudder deflection. The stabilizer is not strong enough to handle full ruder deflection in the whole flight envelope, so /if/ the fly-by-wire system is not functioning for some reason, the pilot's rudder inputs could cause a structural failure.
> The bulletin also stated that a rudder reversal was also known as a "rudder doublet" and was defined as "a large rudder deflection input in one direction followed immediately by a rudder deflection input in the opposite direction." In addition, the bulletin stated that "large 'rudder reversals' or 'rudder doublets' must be avoided on Transport Category Aircraft" because "these inputs can result in loss of control or structural failure of the aircraft."
The problems on the Boeing planes resulted from /uncommanded/ rudder reversal due to a problem in the hydraulic systems. There's no suggestion that an uncommanded rudder reversal occurred in this crash. The suggestion is that pilot-commanded rudder inputs put the rudder beyond its structural limits. Thus, the issue is one of the structural strength of the vertical stabilizer. This was not the primary issue in the Boeing incidents (the stabilizer remained in tact in most cases but the planes were in serious trouble anyway since they were pretty much uncontrollable).
In short, while Boeing and Airbus both have rudder-related problems, they are different problems. Boeing have an issue with uncommanded rudder movements, whereas Airbus' older models (if the author is correct) have the problem that it is too easy for pilot-commanded rudder inputs to put the plane beyond its structural limits. This problem can surface on the newer models if the fly-by-wire systems go down.
"The suggestion is that pilot-commanded rudder inputs put the rudder beyond its structural limits."
I know - my point was that, as far as I can remember from the documentary I saw, this danger wasn't/isn't peculiar to Airbus planes. And as I think the above quote from the Flight 587 report shows, this issue can correctly be called "rudder reversal".
"Rudder reversal" is just a particular kind of rudder movement. There are many different problems with an aircraft which could lead to rudder reversal occuring.
As mentioned in the article, pilot-commanded rudder reversal is relatively easy to obtain on older airbus models because they have very sensitive rudder pedals. This is not an issue on Boeing aircraft. As I said, I think you are recalling the problem that certain Boeing aircraft have with uncommanded rudder reversal, but although this is an equally serious problem, it is not the /same/ problem. In particular, there is no evidence that boeing aircraft have insufficiently strong vertical stabilizers. (In the rudder reversal incidents, the stabilizer remained in tact IIRC, it was the loss of control that was problematic.)
Well. OK. I'm willing to concede that either the programme, or my memory of it, could be wrong.
[Edited to add: Wikipedia backs you up on the very sensitive rudder controls on an Airbus. I think what I was remembering was that, if a pilot of any large plane did this deliberately, the same problem could occur. But yes, it seems it might be easier to do accidentally on an Airbus.]
"As I said, I think you are recalling the problem that certain Boeing aircraft have with uncommanded rudder reversal"
If I thought the point of the article was crash speculation, I wouldn't have posted it.
Instead to me the point was the difference in what the pilots thought of the design of the airplane and how the airplane was actually designed.
That's an important point. I'm sorry he used this crash to make it, but I think it deserves to be discussed, especially with fly-by-wire (but really with any FAA-approved airframe)
Agreed. I don't see how this article serves anyone's interests other than LA Times traffic numbers.
It offers nothing but further rampant speculation on top of the usual news cycle on airline crashes. Worse, it offers zero closure to the families of the crash victims nor relief to the air crews and passengers of the 100s Airbus A330s now flying on a daily basis.
At least it's labeled as "opinion" and the author clearly demarcates this line of reasoning as pure speculation. That's far more disclosure than most "professional" journalists do these days.
This is pure -- and premature -- speculation. But it is not speculative to observe that some vertical fins are weaker than they should be, and that this is because of the regulations that govern how airplanes are built. The FAA, together with its international counterparts, should amend certification requirements for future aircraft to restore to the maneuvering speed the safety status that pilots always believed it had. The rules that govern the structural integrity of airliners should not include asterisks.
Peter Garrison has a long history of writing and editing aviation pieces. He's written a fair number of accident reports for the aviation community. He understands the nature of premature speculation. He made the call that this issue is important enough to use the crash as a vehicle to bring up.
I agree.
The purpose is not to speculate on the crash, provide closure to the crash victims or relief to the air crews. The purpose is to bring up a regulatory issue that needs further attention. In this case, I think it's a worthwhile cause. In 99% of the other stories, I did not. In fact, I blogged about how terrible it was to use a crash just to drive traffic. http://www.whattofix.com/blog/archives/2009/06/funeral-home-...
Can we please give the silly "it's just speculation" cliche a rest?
Of course it is speculation. The NTSB experts (or at least, their equivalent) are doing the same thing at this point. I guarantee that the way root causes for aviation accidents are established is exactly via speculation (aka hypothesis), followed by rigorous testing of that speculation where possible.
Peter Garrison is well-known in the aviation community and may well be considered an expert on flight safety. He is a pilot with thousands of hours of flight time. He designed and built several airplanes himself, and for decades has written Flying's "Aftermath" section, which takes a hard look at general aviation's accidents.
Should Feynman have avoided "speculating" when he compressed an O-ring in ice water on television during the Challenger safety board inquiry, when NASA and the Rogers' board were plodding along? Or did it help lead to a rigorous and open inquiry?
Oddly, the other LA Times article was complaining (inaccurately) that the computerized controls in the Airbus would limit the pilot's ability to use the controls. This article complains that the controls don't limit the pilot's ability to mess things up.
What's needed is the truth, not this speculation. Perhaps the vertical stabilizer did rip off. If it did we need to know why.