Rudder reversal is a different issue. It's where hydraulic problems cause sudden rudder movements, or cause control inputs to the rudder to have the opposite of the expected effect. The problem here is with the structural strength of the vertical stabilizer under full (pilot-commanded) rudder deflection. The stabilizer is not strong enough to handle full ruder deflection in the whole flight envelope, so /if/ the fly-by-wire system is not functioning for some reason, the pilot's rudder inputs could cause a structural failure.
> The bulletin also stated that a rudder reversal was also known as a "rudder doublet" and was defined as "a large rudder deflection input in one direction followed immediately by a rudder deflection input in the opposite direction." In addition, the bulletin stated that "large 'rudder reversals' or 'rudder doublets' must be avoided on Transport Category Aircraft" because "these inputs can result in loss of control or structural failure of the aircraft."
The problems on the Boeing planes resulted from /uncommanded/ rudder reversal due to a problem in the hydraulic systems. There's no suggestion that an uncommanded rudder reversal occurred in this crash. The suggestion is that pilot-commanded rudder inputs put the rudder beyond its structural limits. Thus, the issue is one of the structural strength of the vertical stabilizer. This was not the primary issue in the Boeing incidents (the stabilizer remained in tact in most cases but the planes were in serious trouble anyway since they were pretty much uncontrollable).
In short, while Boeing and Airbus both have rudder-related problems, they are different problems. Boeing have an issue with uncommanded rudder movements, whereas Airbus' older models (if the author is correct) have the problem that it is too easy for pilot-commanded rudder inputs to put the plane beyond its structural limits. This problem can surface on the newer models if the fly-by-wire systems go down.
"The suggestion is that pilot-commanded rudder inputs put the rudder beyond its structural limits."
I know - my point was that, as far as I can remember from the documentary I saw, this danger wasn't/isn't peculiar to Airbus planes. And as I think the above quote from the Flight 587 report shows, this issue can correctly be called "rudder reversal".
"Rudder reversal" is just a particular kind of rudder movement. There are many different problems with an aircraft which could lead to rudder reversal occuring.
As mentioned in the article, pilot-commanded rudder reversal is relatively easy to obtain on older airbus models because they have very sensitive rudder pedals. This is not an issue on Boeing aircraft. As I said, I think you are recalling the problem that certain Boeing aircraft have with uncommanded rudder reversal, but although this is an equally serious problem, it is not the /same/ problem. In particular, there is no evidence that boeing aircraft have insufficiently strong vertical stabilizers. (In the rudder reversal incidents, the stabilizer remained in tact IIRC, it was the loss of control that was problematic.)
Well. OK. I'm willing to concede that either the programme, or my memory of it, could be wrong.
[Edited to add: Wikipedia backs you up on the very sensitive rudder controls on an Airbus. I think what I was remembering was that, if a pilot of any large plane did this deliberately, the same problem could occur. But yes, it seems it might be easier to do accidentally on an Airbus.]
"As I said, I think you are recalling the problem that certain Boeing aircraft have with uncommanded rudder reversal"
