I love that Kagi now uses Privacy Pass, and they look like a cool company in general.
That being said, they essentially took the IETF draft I worked on for a while [1] and also my Rust implementation [2]. They built a thin wrapper [3] around my implementation and now call it "Kagi’s implementation of Privacy Pass".
I think giving me some credit would have been in order. IETF work and work on open-source software is mostly voluntary, unpaid, and often happens outside of working hours. It's not motivating to be treated like that. Kagi, you can do better.
Honestly, I think what TFA calls "Kagi’s implementation of Privacy Pass" is the integration of the feature into their server and clients, not the RFC (which they acknowledge), or the protocol implementation.
Indeed, this is the intended interpretation of "Kagi's implementation of Privacy Pass" - we're talking about building out the server infrastructure, the UX, the browser extensions, the mobile applications, the Orion browser integration, the support and documentation, the Tor service, etc. The cryptography is obviously an extremely important piece, but it is far from the only piece.
As other commenters have noted, the code in question is MIT licensed [1] and we're pulling it in as a standard dependency [2], it's not like we've gone out of our way to obscure its origin. The MIT license does not require us to do anything more.
That said, I can understand the author wanting more visible attribution, and that's very reasonable, we'll add a blurb to the blog post acknowledging his contribution to Kagi's deployment of Privacy Pass.
Understood, and thanks for updating the blog post. The discussion in the comments was interesting, and I'd like to clarify a few points. From my side, there never were any doubts about licensing compliance. I picked MIT precisely so that folks can use the implementation without further obligations, I wanted the implementation to be as useful as possible. What startled me was the combination of a for-profit company writing a blog post about a new feature (that will likely further increase profit in the future), using my implementation as the core of the feature (and therefore likely save a bunch of money) and not giving any credit to either the IETF batched tokens draft or the implementation. Anyway, the blog post has been amended now – thanks for that. Case closed.
PS: If you want to go above and beyond, you can spell my last name right in the blog post – it's Robert, not Roberts.
So if they add “credit to raphaelrobert”, or a copy of your license to their code somewhere, Kagi will be compliant?
I’ve never had any of my open source software used, and I typically license it with MIT, so I’m curious how other groups and organizations actually comply with the license.
Yeah I'm as big of a FOSS fan as the next guy on here but you really can't complain about how someone uses your code if you used the MIT License...one of the most permissive licenses in existence.
If someone wants attribution or something then they should use a license that requires that thing.
There’s a gap between what is legally required and what is common courtesy.
I’m under no obligation to thank someone for holding a door for me; if I fail to do so it does not mean that person should switch to a different door-holding license in the future. It just means I’m a bit of a jerk.
When lifting an entire (permissive licensed) implementation it’s good form to say thanks.
You're not wrong. But the door-holding example isn't really a good one because there's no such thing as a license for door-holding.
For FOSS, on the other hand, licenses are a well-established thing. And developers have free reign to pick a license for their code and they very commonly pick MIT...totally on their own volition. Which strips them of all privileges. It's like writing a book and explicitly setting it into the public domain. If that's what you want to do, that's great, but very commonly I don't think it's what developers actually want to do.
In the world of copyright, the long-standing legal default is for the author to own their work for a certain amount of time, whether or not the copyright is explicitly claimed. Because making public domain the legal default would be utterly insane.
I guess what I'm saying here is my beef isn't with entities that choose to be jerks—that's annoying and always gonna happen to some extent—it's more with the all-too-common decision to use the MIT License. And when I see people complain about it...I understand the sentiment but I also can't help but think that the folks complaining had it coming and it was totally avoidable.
I knew door holding was weak, but I think the principle holds. To me, it is reasonable to release under MIT with expectation of helping lots of people, and also to expect (not require) some credit if a notable company adopts kit and kaboodle.
I guess I kind of disagree. Some projects might pull in 50-800 deps, and then they will run on servers with utilities written by folks. Who are you supposed to thank and who not? You could literally thank thousands of people after writing a ten-line Python script.
I like that the Kagi folks stepped up and thanked you when you requested it, and I like that you wrote this code and made it available. But going around the internet trying to get explicit thanks seems more like the norm breaking here.
You can if they don't include the copyright header: "The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software."
Which, as far as I can tell they haven't done. Their MIT licence claims their own copyright. No reference to the library used in readme.
Usually when using apps that use MIT licensed libs they also implement a notice in a user-facing way. Google maps for instance has a (albeit hidden) section in their settings menu referencing at least one MIT licensed library.
MIT licence explicitly requires maintaining the original copyright header, and licence.
>Copyright (c) <year> <copyright holders>
>Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
>*The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.*
Captured 14 Feb 2025 ~12:15pm EST from README header
> This repository contains the source code of the core library implementing the Privacy Pass API used by Kagi.
Yeah... that doesn't feel great. Though I do think the folks at Kagi would be open to more accurately reframing that as "core library implementing a Crystal Lang wrapper for raphaelrobert/privacypass". It's likely unintentional, they were probably just focusing on getting it working and didn't get someone to reread this stuff.
Neat! It's rare to see that a service you use actually does something that benefits the user rather that itself. An unexpected, but a really pleasant surprise.
I wish this extension would integrate better with the browser by automatically understanding the context. That is, if I'm in a "regular" mode it'll use my session, but if I'm in a "private browsing" mode (`browser.extension.inIncognitoContext`) it'll use Privacy Pass to authenticate me, without me having to explicitly do anything about it.
(I don't use Orion, as there's no GNU/Linux version.)
> It's rare to see that a service you use actually does something that benefits the user rather that itself
The reason it's become so rare is most companies in this space (heck tons of tech companies period) have used a business model of offering a thing to one group of users and then turning around and selling the results of that thing to another group of users, where the latter group is the one actually driving your revenue. This by default almost assumes a hostility towards the former group because their interests will of course be at odds with the interests of the latter group.
What's refreshing about Kagi and other new tech companies is they have dumped this model in favor of having just one group that they serve and drive revenue from (ie. the 'old' model).
The other part to this is that the internet accelerates network-effects, which you can further supercharge by making your product as cheap as possible or free to the former group in your example.
It’s hard to make money by charging a lot to a small group of people since now you’re dealing with anti-network effects. Doubling the price of a product will likely more than halve your user base.
Yeah, the ad supported model has its problems, but it also makes the internet way more accessible. If we think about it, companies and people with more money are basically subsidizing these services for everyone else. They're the ones seeing the ads that keeps the lights on for users who can't afford to pay.
If everything was subscription only, a ton of people like students, low income families, people in developing countries would be shut out. "Free" services, even with their flaws, create a kind of digital subsidy. It's not perfect, but it means way more people can use these tools.
There's no reason why a subscription model could not also be used to subsidize people who can not pay, other than that companies are structured to extract as much as possible (by law, if they are public).
There are good network effect arguments about why this strategy can be effective, not simply 'altruistic.'
Ads simply make the extraction happen across the board, except that the ad model somewhat privileges technical users who know how to circumvent ads.
Our only recourse is that we punish them with our wallets, advice and habits and reward good actors.
I'm a firm believer of this but we need more people to join in.
And it already works to some degree.
I've now had a working search engine for almost 3 years.
My last 3 jobs (9 years) haven't forced me to use Windows.
I can chat and organize events without Facebook knowing.
And it is not like the quality has gone down either. My choices have mostly given me better experiences in a number of ways.
Edit:
If more people start
- advocating for better hardware and software,
- canceling subscriptions and memberships when it becomes clear they are reducing value or increasing price,
- building skills both to get independent from their current cloud (so you can move around or at least having a credibile possibility to do so)
- and for individuals to get better jobs
then I think things will change.
For inspiration: at least here in Norway, with several gym memberships, if you cancel they will quickly approach you with good offers, and they can get really good: I got several months free, a friend got offered free months and a sizable gift card.
Bonus: if more people join in this will get picked up by Wall Street and they will begin punishing this nonsense too ;-)
My base salary has doubled and I enjoy my work a lot more now that I don't have to accept all kinds of MS shenanigans to play a part in how I work.
Having a working search engine shouldn't be underestimated either: living from 2012 to 2022 knowing that search used to be a solved problem but wasn't anymore was really annoying.
Indirectly by pushing down the stock price. CEO compensation is usually tied to the stock price through options, bonuses, etc.
Directly through activist investors and shareholder groups (which nowadays usually are institutional investors) who vote to change company policies, fire the CEO, or in some cases fire the whole board.
> structured to extract as much as possible (by law, if they are public).
This is not true and it’s not what fiduciary duty means. Stop repeating it, it’s really dumb.
Companies very frequently do not monetize things that they could under the guise of “building brand recognition” or “establishing a user base”. It’s even as easy as “raising the price will alienate customers we think are important to long term revenue”.
It’s trivial to justify not extracting maximum price and public companies do it all of the time.
Look at Costco’s business model if you want an example
Think of Discord. Anyone can create and participate in a discord server. There are no ads. People with money pay for the premium features and perks and that is how the company makes money [1].
Not every product category is amenable to such business models but many are.
[1] To be fair, Discord likely sells user data to advertisers to make additional money.
I mean, we could also just direct-pay websites (for example with Brave's Basic Attention Token model).
Imagine a utopian world where you just pay per site visit, and in return all companies selling stuff don't have an inflated advertising budget and free market effects force them to pass the savings on to you, meaning the net cost increase for you is zero. And as a side-effect, quality products float to the top, since you hear of them mostly by word-of-mouth, meaning products compete on value-per-dollar.
Sadly human psychology and economics does not work that way haha. We pay what the market will bear, and increasing sales via a torrent of ads is cheaper than increasing the value-per-dollar ratio of the product.
> Yeah, the ad supported model has its problems, but it also makes the internet way more accessible. If we think about it, companies and people with more money are basically subsidizing these services for everyone else. They're the ones seeing the ads that keeps the lights on for users who can't afford to pay.
The problem (other than the obvious privacy and noise issues) is that it's not a neutral subsidy. It introduces a lot of biases.
Since advertisers are subsidizing the platform, they tilt the content toward things they want and away from messages they don't. Messages that criticize advertisers products (which include things like governments and political ideologies since they are advertisers) are de-emphasized and marginalized.
Since impressions / clicks / eyeballs are the goal, an inherent bias is introduced toward emotionally triggering and/or addictive or hypnotic content. The reason social media for example is so divisive and negative is that this keeps people engaged by triggering simple powerful emotions.
We can still provide subsidized services and media to people with low income via other means which don't have the negative consequences of ad-tech. This is why we have libraries rather than free textbooks with engagement optimizing short comics and full-page advertisements.
However, most of current fremium games are precisely based on this model (Fortnite, LoL, TF2, most of mobile games, etc...)
The service is subsidized by "whale players" that regularly spend a lot of cash, but they are a lot of freeloaders (to entertain the whales and to build brand popularity).
I think this supports my point and the OP’s example. Video game makers have figured out how to segment their customers into two groups (former and latter in the OP’s example), and this only works because they’ve made their games extremely cheap or free.
A cheap/free game supercharges network effects to amass players, each of which incrementally adds value to every other player. Most players will never directly pay enough to offset their own cost to the game maker. However, they will create a real community that draws in a small number of whale players who will directly pay for themselves and indirectly pay for all of the free players.
Not so different from the two-sided markets on Facebook and Instagram.
> This by default almost assumes a hostility towards the former group because their interests will of course be at odds with the interests of the latter group.
I would generally agree that that's the "default".
However, there are cases where two sides of a market need an intermediary with which they can both independently transact, and a net benefit of that interaction is felt on both sides. The key is to construct the solution such that the intermediary depends on the goodwill of both sides of the market.
I think Kagi is somewhat flipping the script. By "taking" data from publishers for free, they are then selling it to readers at a cost. However, there is a trade off. Kagi needs to make sure publishers continue to make their content available so that it can be searchable, or used in their Assistant product. In order to do that, they need to do the opposite of what Google is doing by trying to sequester traffic on Google.com: Kagi's best interest is to make sure that they provide good value to both sides.
Indeed, using the Assistant product, the way it is structured, I very often find myself clicking through to the referenced original sources and not just consuming the summarized content.
How this evolves over time, from a product design standpoint, will be interesting to watch.
The main driver of hostility to users is due to ad-based business models. I think we would see a much more healthy internet if we had regulation which prohibited companies from choosing ads based on any information associated with the user that the ad is shown to. That is, any data collected in the past and any data associated with the session and request must not be taken into account when choosing the ad; two requests by different users in different locations should have the exact same ad probability distributions.
I know we are never getting this because it would kill or severely harm the business models of some of the most profitable businesses in the world.
I remember the announcement for Orion but I haven't followed closely at all - any support for container proxies like in Firefox? Can't lose that feature
If you mean Firefox containers[0], the closest you'll get is Profiles[1] since Orion is based on WebKit. Its location in settings is different from the Safari docs, and that's the only difference in Orion's implementation as far as I can tell. You can't open a tab in a certain profile, instead each profile opens in its own window, which is a lot more cumbersome than Firefox containers.
Arc, another Webkit-based browser, has an interesting implementation combining Profiles and Arc Spaces[2]. Instead of switching between windows, you switch between "Spaces" in the sidebar that are linked to a profile.
I'd agree, at least partially in my case: Container Tabs is a killer feature for me with Firefox. Especially compared with the Temporary Containers extension on automatic mode, basically each new tab is like a fresh browser profile with zero cookies/local-storage.
I might consider demoing Orion on Linux even if it doesn't have container tabs, but at this time I wouldn't consider a full switch without that feature.
The downside of this is that if you are not on a larger network, the IP address will probably deanonymise you. Kagi knows you are logged in, and if you open a private browsing window to do a spicy search, they could link the searches. Fast switching between modes is undesirable.
Tor has its flaws and criticisms, but it's really not on Kagi to fix them. With the combination of tor and their privacy pass, Kagi has gone further in allowing their paid users access to their services than anyone else.
Disclaimer: Not associated with Kagi in anyway other than being a very happy user.
Tor has nothing to do with what GP said, which is, the flexibility offered by Kagi (to turn privacy pass on / off) is actually self defeating. If (even technical) users walk away thinking "why don't other platforms offer this", then that tells you all about the foot-gun that this flexibility brings.
(Privacy Pass in fact doesn't make sense outside of an anonymizing transport, which makes the current announcement an exercise in marketing, at best)
> Privacy Pass in fact doesn't make sense outside of an anonymizing transport
This kind of thinking is pervasive in the discussion of privacy enhancing technologies. It might not make sense against the most sophisticated attacker, but it lays the groundwork of a complex system that will be able to do so.
Allowing more users will provide herd privacy at the token generation phase. Searches being decoupled from user account primary key offers privacy in all kinds of scenario's, comparable with a browser private tab.
With kagi you'll get used to them making the correct choice. It's been stunning how they haven't really had any missteps
I wish my kagi t-shit could say the same. Bottom hem unraveled on the second wash, and so it's been consigned to the sleep and yard work shirts. They issued me a coupon for a free shirt as replacement, but it's yet to ship
Kagi has its share of issues. The whole shirt thing was a debacle and I wish they'd just sunk the absurd amount of money back into the product. I just often find the criticism from non-users to be disingenuous.
Just adding a $0.02 here - I placed an order for the free/gifted-with-subscription Kagi shirt and received it about a month later. Worn twice so far. Largest complaint? It shrank quite a bit in the dryer on medium heat.
The search engine works great for me. I will almost certainly renew my subscription when it's time to. Glad to see them continually delivering user-benefiting features.
yeah, same. I would only use privacy pass for icognito searches COUGH P0RN COUGH mainly (let's be honest). Feel free to submit the idea on kagifeedback.org
So....is this privacy through assumed lack of logging? Not trying to be a dick, just legit don't understand a part of this.
User A asks kagi for tokens. Kagi says "sure, here's 500 tokens". If kagi then logs the 500 tokens it just gave to user A, it now will know if any of those tokens is redeemed at a later date, that they're assigned to user A?
Of course if Kagi just doesn't retain this data, then yeah all is good because the token itself is only marked as valid, not valid and given to user A on date Y, but....that's it right? Or am I misunderstanding something?
The server does not generate the tokens, the client generates the tokens. The server is supposed to be able to verify that they were generated by a client who was granted the authority to generate them, but not which client did so. At least, not without side-channel information.
> The main building block of our construction is a verifiable oblivious pseudorandom function (VOPRF)
I am not sure how well tested that primitive is, but it definitely appears to be more than the server handing clients tokens and then pretending not to know who it gave them to.
What I find confusing is: Given that the server is essentially authorizing each subsequent client request (eg: For Kagi: search queries after a Kagi user has already been authenticated) in a way whereby the client is anonymous, what is the difference between Privacy Pass and simply providing a common authorization token to each user (and thus skipping all this cryptography)?
Update: On some thought, for the approach of the server providing a common authorization token that there is no guarantee to the client that the server is actually providing a common token and thus not just simply providing a unique identifier to each user. Thus, the Privacy Pass's cryptography ensures that the client knows that it is still anonymous. Update 2: But, what guarantee exists that the server doesn't generate a unique public key (i.e. public-private key pair) for each user and thus defeat anonymity this way? Update 3: They use zero-knowledge proofs to prove that all tokens are signed by the same private-key, from their paper: "The work of Jarecki et al. [18] uses a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof of discrete log equality (DLEQ) to provide verification of the OPRF result to the user. Their construction is hence a ‘verifiable’ OPRF or VOPRF and is proven secure in the random-oracle model. We adapt their construction slightly to use a ‘batch’ DLEQ proof allowing for much more efficient verification; in short this allows a user to verify a single NIZK proof that states that all of their tokens are signed by the same private key. This prevents the edge from using different key pairs for different users in an attempt to launch a deanonymization attack; we give more details in Section 3.2.".
Privacy Pass docs [0] cover this, but it is mostly referenced deeper in the paper. I believe the idea is that the tokens returned by the server are "unlinkable" to the (modified) tokens passed back by the client. So the server knows it passed back tokens A, B and C to some users, and later receives tokens X, Y and Z. It knows that X, Y and Z are valid, but not their correspondance to the tokens it issued. It uses elliptic curve cryptography for this.
After reading your comment I still didn't quite understand how the server couldn't just simply log the tokens A, B, C issued to user X. So I had a look at the website you linked: IIUC the key is that the tokens are actually generated by the user and the server never sees them (unblinded) before their first usage:
> When an internet challenge is solved correctly by a user, Privacy Pass will generate a number of random nonces that will be used as tokens. These tokens will be cryptographically blinded and then sent to the challenge provider. If the solution is valid, the provider will sign the blinded tokens and return them to the client. Privacy Pass will unblind the tokens and store them for future use.
> Privacy Pass will detect when an internet challenge is required in the future for the same provider. In these cases, an unblinded, signed token will be embedded into a privacy pass that will be sent to the challenge provider. The provider will verify the signature on the unblinded token, if this check passes the challenge will not be invoked.
> the tokens are actually generated by the user and the server never sees them (unblinded) before their first usage
Here is how I see it:
1. The user generates a token/nonce => T
2. The user blinds the token with secret blinding factor b => Blinded token TB = T*b
3. The user sends the blinded token for signing. The server signs it and returns it to the user => Signed blinded token TBS = Sign(TB)
4. The user unblinds the token (this does not break the signature) => Signed Unblinded token TS = TBS/b
5. The user sends TS for its search query.
The server signed TB, then received TS. Even if it logged that TB = user, it cannot link TS to TB, because it does not know the blinding factor b. Thus, it cannot link the search query with TS to the user.
Ah thank you. That's the part I was missing. I know this example is wrong in 100 different ways, but something like "yeah we know a key with prime factor X is valid, and this has one", but there's thousands of those out there, so it can't tie out to whom.
Kagi accepts bitcoins but Vlad (the founder) mentioned on their forum that so few people use this option that it does not make sense to work on accepting Monero.
(vlad here) Rather, we are opportunistic about it and we want to focus on things that make impact (which most of the time is search, not billing). If there is enough demand, we will work on Monero support - and yes I agree, buying privacy pass tokens, without even needing an account, is one of those super-cool use cases.
You can but its not only more effort and increases the price but also reduces privacy and anonymity because you introduce a possible point of tracking with most likely KYC exchanged BTC and a publicly viewable blockchain.
You can, but to retain anonymity you'll need to go through decentralized exchange (DEX). This is extra hassle, especially if you have never done this before.
In addition to what u/akimbostrawman said, I feel like doing that would undermine long-term privacy by slowing adoption of a tool (monero in this case) in favor of something less private.
I'd love to pay for Kagi with crypto, the main thing for me is the steep transfer fees. Nevertheless those can be offset somewhat with bulk payments. How about ability to buy like 3 years of Kagi at a time with crypto?
When I try to go into billing in Kagi I just get forwarded to Stripe. Does Stripe process the crypto payments?
Lightning just isn't a good option as you first have to pay the expensive Bitcoin fees just to be able to use it... (And hope that you'll find a route otherwise you'll have to do it again.)
If $0.27 is an expensive fee then I don't have any answers to that.
Yeah routing can suck. First timers should use a lightning wallet with built in LSP support like ZEUS, BitKit, Phoenix, etc. Then routing is a non-issue.
People regularly overpay, so I'm not sure looking at average fees it the right lens. Monero is great, but it's trivial to get an excellent user experience with lightning nowadays that doesn't require custodians.
The reason people overpay is that it's impossible to foresee what fee will get you into the next block, so they overpay to not get stuck potentially for hours or more.
Not requiring custodians is just one part, having to rely on third-party services for basic functionality is another.
Nobody wants to use BTC because of high fees and at this point its less a usable exchange of value than speculative asset. I personally would only ever use and trust a online service advertised as private/anonymous if it actually supported a private and anonymous currency (like some vpns do).
Kagi's privacy guarantee is more of a "trust me bro" and I say that as a Kagi subscriber. While they may claim that they preserve privacy or anonimity as long as it's tied to a user account, or payment information nothing prevents them from associating searches with user. Even protonmail enabled logging for a particular user at one point. Their guarantee is on the same level.
At the same time, privacy pass is a very foreign concept to me. If they are transferable between devices, one could generate a couple and resell them over some other medium (even in person).
We implemented Privacy Pass exactly so that you do not need to trust any claims we make but as a user have a (provable, cryptographically) mechanism that guarantees this, with one click, whenever you need it.
the privacy pass extension is open source exactly because users can then verify the process. and yeah, to prevent reselling they've made it so you can't get infinite tokens.
I agree that third party stores selling tokens without any account at all would be the ideal solution, but without an account you'd be missing out on many of the features that make kagi worth using like being able to remove certain domains from results or prioritizing types of results over others.
Add the ability to export your account config (yaml?) and use it with privacy pass. Maybe even sync it with git.
To avoid fingerprinting by config, have a page where the community can share and vote on best configs, then clone and use a popular one that suits your needs.
Their suggestion is that when using Privacy Pass you'd also send "&config=XX" where XX is an ID of a publicly shared config, so that you get the customisation of whatever config you choose without tying the config to yourself, just tying it to the searches you're doing with Privacy Pass.
So while it does add a data point that could help track you, it's not defeating the whole point.
Though the post doesn't touch on "community configs", it does touch on "the ten most popular configs", which would seem to be similar enough for this discussion.
The biggest flaw I always saw in Kagi has now been addressed by this. Thank you for listening and working to make the product appealing to (almost) everyone!
One of the biggest complaints about Kagi from people who have not yet adopted it is their privacy concerns around having to login and have payment information.
I'm not one of the people that has been concerned about that, but I'm curious to what extent this alleviates those concerns among those that have had them.
> I'm not one of the people that has been concerned about that, but I'm curious to what extent this alleviates those concerns among those that have had them.
I am, it's mind-blowing to me that anyone would login to a search engine (yes, I know how many do it, now).
After a brief verification of the system, I'm pretty sure I'll sign up, now
Logging in to a search engine weirded me out at first, but after about a week I was so pleased with the results that I’ve been happily paying for almost a year now.
I honestly feel like any major free search engine is probably doing more to try to track you anyway.
And if you’re going to search something you want to be anonymous, you can just like use another search engine. I honestly haven’t run into the situation where I needed to.
I do worry that some day someone will be able to see how often I forget basic syntax for some JavaScript or Python method - or how often I can’t be bothered to type out a full domain and just search to navigate to it - but that’s a price I’m also willing to pay.
Assuming the cryptography does what they say it does (am not a cryptography expert, so I can't verify that part), this would completely disjoin a search request from any account info. The account generates several "search tokens", and for each search request, one of those tokens is spent. The tokens are generated on-device, and until spent, never leave the device, so in theory there's no way for Kagi to know which account generated the token just from the token alone. This doesn't fix fingerprinting or IP associations (though the plugin for Firefox and Chrome supposedly takes efforts to try and limit fingerprinting too), but this isn't any better/worse than simply using Google or Duckduckgo, and functions on Tor if you really want some privacy.
Again, not sure on how the tokens are proven legit without ever sharing them, but there's probably some ~~zero-knowledge proof~~ stuff going on that covers that.
Edit: Not zero-knowledge proof. Seems to be Blind Signature?
> This doesn't fix fingerprinting or IP associations
It solves the problem of using a paid service without compromising customer’s privacy which is a breakthrough. The rest are different problems and they are universal issues with various existing solutions as you already pointed out.
What's to stop someone on the Kagi side from just adding a new column to the token table that has the user (with their SessionCookie) who generated the token next to it? I don't see how this can't be trivially connected to the original token generator.
Implementor here. During the Privacy Pass "issuance" protocol, the client will generate a "message" that the server will process. The output from the server is returned to the client, that further modifies this output to produce the final tokens. The last client modification randomises these tokens in such a way that the server will be unable to identify to what issuance they belong.
The very cool thing is that this is the case even if the server tries to misbehave during their phase. This means that users only need to trust the client software, which we open sourced: https://github.com/kagisearch/privacypass-extension
Some posters are mentioning blind signatures, and indeed Privacy Pass can utilise these as a building block. To be precise, however, I should mention that for Kagi we use "Privately Verifiable Tokens" (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9578.html#name-issuance-pr...) based on "oblivious pseudorandom functions" (OPRFs), which in my personal view are even cooler than blind signatures
Oh, interesting. Maybe it's just on mobile, but no authors are rendering on the article for me.
Anywho, the person I replied to seemed to be willing and able to go a technical level deeper than the article, and that's something I'm also interested in reading. It sounds like they'd be allowed :)
The tokens are "generated" on the client, and the server just gives the client enough information to make that locally generated token become "valid", without being able to link that token to a specific validation attempt
looking at it from a high level, it doesn't appear the final token ever leaves the client till it's being redeemed. There's a middle step that does get signed, but this part is not what is sent.
I believe "Privacy Pass" uses blind signatures, so the token that the TokenResponse contains can't be correlated to the one provided in the search query, if I understand it correctly.
Does this actually work, though? The token can only be redeemed once, which means that, realistically, the client is going to be in a loop generating and redeeming tokens in a given search session, which makes the pairs trivial to correlate. The article even states it:
> For this reason, it is highly recommended to separate token generation and redemption in time, or “in space” (by using an anonymizing service such as Tor when redeeming tokens, see below).
Sure, Tor will random the space. But what about the time? I then went to "see below" and didn't see anything relevant. Or is the idea that, with sufficient request volume, clients mask each other in time?
Also, Tor will only randomize the space insofar as you keep re-establishing a session; the loop remains static for the duration of a session afaik. And re-establishing a session takes like 10 seconds. So is it really randomizing the space?
> The token can only be redeemed once, which means that, realistically, the client is going to be in a loop generating and redeeming tokens in a given search session, which makes the pairs trivial to correlate.
One token request can produce N tokens. We have it configured where N = 500, so most users will be requesting more tokens fairly infrequently.
I have built blind signature authentication stuff before (similar to privacy pass) and one thing I’m curious about is how you (will) handle multi device access?
I understand you probably launched with only unlimited search users in order to mitigate the same user losing access to their tokens on a different device. But any ideas for long term plans here? When I built these systems in the past, I always had to couple it with E2EE sync. Not only can that be a pain for end users, but you can also start to correlate storage updates with blind search requests.
Either case, this is amazing and I’m gonna be even more excited to not just trust Kagi, but verify that I don’t need to trust y’all. Congrats.
Yes, multi-device is definitely not easy. We've played with a few ideas, but it is definitely not a question with an obvious answer. For now, our rate-limiting allows you to use Privacy Pass on a few different devices by having each generate tokens independently. We will see how this goes and listen to user feedback before going back to the drawing board.
Is this the same Privacy Pass that Cloudflare was using to allow clients to bypass CAPTCHAs? If so, this is a really neat application of that system; it never occurred to me that it could be used to anonymously authenticate to a paid service.
I'm not affiliated with the Tor Project organization, but I have some questions.
From Tor docs [0]:
> Add-ons, extensions, and plugins are components that can be added to web browsers to give them new features. Tor Browser comes with one add-on installed: NoScript. You should not install any additional add-ons on Tor Browser because that can compromise some of its privacy features.
How does Kagi square this with Privacy Pass, which requires a browser extension rejected by Tor [1]? Did Kagi analyze whether it is possible to bucket users of Tor into two distinct groups depending on whether the extension is installed? Do I need to trust another organization other than the Tor project to keep the signing keys for the extension safe? Was there any outreach to the Tor community at all prior to releasing this feature?
It's great that they're Torifying the service, but depending on a 3rd party extension is not ideal.
I sat down on my desktop to take a closer look at how Kagi implemented this. It turns out that the privacy pass extension isn't the one implemented by CloudFlare (and rejected by Tor), but a new extension called Kagi Privacy Pass.
// ./scripts/privacypass.js
/*
* Privacy Pass protocol implementation
*/
import init, * as kagippjs from "./kagippjs/kagippjs.js";
...
// load WASM for Privacy Pass core library
await init();
I opened ./kagippjs/kagippjs.js and was, of course, greeted with a WASM binary.
I personally would not install unknown WASM blobs in Tor browser. Source and reproducible build, please!
Let's continue.
// get WWW-Authenticate HTTP header value
let origin_wwwa_value = "";
const endpoint = onion ? ONION_WWWA_ENDPOINT : WWWA_ENDPOINT;
try {
const resp = await fetch(endpoint, { method: "GET", headers: { 'X-Kagi-PrivacyPass-Client': 'true' } });
origin_wwwa_value = resp.headers.get("WWW-Authenticate");
} catch (ex) {
if (onion) {
// this will signal that WWWA could not fetch via .onion
// the extension will then try normally.
// if the failure is due to not being on Tor, this is the right path
// if the failure is due to being on Tor but offline, then trying to fetch from kagi.com
// won't deanonymise anyway, and will result in the "are you online?" error message, also the right path
return origin_wwwa_value;
}
throw FETCH_FAILED_ERROR;
}
What?? If the Onion isn't reachable, you make a request to the clearnet site? That will, in fact, deanonymize you (although I don't know if Tor browser will Torify `fetch` calls made in extensions). You don't want Tor browser making clearnet requests just because it couldn't reach the .onion! What if the request times out while it's bouncing between the 6 relays in the onion circuit? Happens all the time.
The extension is open-source [1], including the Rust code that produces the WASM [2]. You should be able to produce a bit-compatible binary from these repos, and if not, please file a bug!
If account settings are not possible because you could fingerprint users, then client-side filtering or reordering might be a solution.
Safe-search or not, just transfer both result lists and make the client only show the one you want. The same could be done with languages, where you at least get the results for the bigger ones. Blacklists would hide your blocked crap sites. It may even be possible to implement the ranking adjustments to some extend.
Client-side filtering would put more load on the server and search sources, but I hope the cost increase is tolerable. Blacklisting and reordering could be virtually free. This could make Privacy Pass available to many more users who don't have overly complex account rules.
I love this company and product. I noticed another great feature today: the ability to filter AI slop in image search! It's the right-most filter: "AI Images".
I don’t really understand how the protocol can ensure that the server can’t identify the client.
As far as I understand, the client sends some information A to the server, the server applies some private key X and returns the output B to the client, which then generates tokens C from the output.
If the server uses a different X for every user and then when verifying just checks the X of every user to see which one is valid, couldn’t the server know who created the token?
Here's a resource I found that walks through the ideas of the protocol, starting with simple implementations that have a problem, and then solving the problem one by one: https://privacypass.github.io/protocol/
I think that's the best conceptual overview of a crypto protocol I've ever seen.
See section 5.5 of the linked paper https://petsymposium.org/popets/2018/popets-2018-0026.php. I'm not sure if/how Kagi implemented this, but the idea is that Kagi's "public" component can be committed to publicly (e.g., in the browser extension itself).
And you can validate this, if you try to issue a Privacy Pass search without a private token, you'll get a `WWW-Authenticate` header that kicks off the handshake, and that should be the same for all users for a given epoch (month). E.g.
But how do I validate that I’m actually getting the same value as everyone else? Is the value I should get published somewhere (in a verifiable and not editable way) so I can see that I’m not being tracked?
Or does the extension validate this and the correct value is hardcoded in the extension like stebalien suggested?
There's no auth required at this stage of the handshake, so you can test from any number of devices/locations/networks/etc and confirm you get the same value. We could publish it, but it will change every epoch/month. Plus, if you don't trust the service to not issue special key pairs to track you, you probably won't trust us to not do the same when publishing the key material. There are schemes involving third-parties we could employ, but it's trust and turtles all the way down.
A malicious server could maintain separate key pairs for users it wanted to track, but you can't do it for every user because 1) it'd be clear from the WWW-Authenticate header changing, and 2) you'd have to validate tokens against every key, which would quickly get too slow to work.
Makes sense in general, but to make sure I understand it:
> Plus, if you don't trust the service to not issue special key pairs to track you, you probably won't trust us to not do the same publishing the key material.
You could publish it on some sort of blockchain to make sure it can’t be changed and is public for everyone, right?
> A malicious server could maintain separate key pairs for users it wanted to track, but you can't do it for every user because 1) it'd be clear from the WWW-Authenticate header changing, and 2) you'd have to validate tokens against every key, which would quickly get too slow to work.
In the simplest terms, the token generation process B->C is done with the user's private key. So even if the server knows A,X,B they can't link it to the token C.
But if the server is allowed to vary X, it can basically act like different servers to each client, and can then when given a token check for which server would have been valid. The solution I got from the other replies is to make sure that the server uses the same X for everyone by verifying it as a client.
It appears that the public side of X is sent as the first part of the handshake, without any login info yet, and can be verified as part of B, thus a varying X would be easy to detect... I think.
My understanding is, it's analogous to writing a note to your manager.
That note is a random number written in ink your manager can't actually read; all they can do with that note is sign it. They ask God (used here to represent math itself) how to sign this note, and God gives them a unique signature that also theoretically cannot be used to calculate the number that's written. This signature also proves what you're authorized to do. And then your manager hands the note back to you.
The note's sole function past that point is so you can point to the signature thereon and say "this signature proves I can do this, that, etc."
I mean, invoking God kind of works for describing the idea that “math” sometimes knows a secret and can tell someone how to act on that secret without telling them the secret.
I still cannot get iOS to reliably use Kagi as my default search engine. I've tried the extension, etc. but nothing works reliably.
It's madness - how is it market fairness when iOS literally forces you to use Google? I know Google is paying Apple to do exactly that, but it's so beyond anti-consumer I can't believe it.
I have been a Kagi subscriber for a while now, but this new addition finally convinced me to start using Kagi in incognito mode! Thank you very much for adding this!
That's a cool idea! Seeing the screenshot I almost immediately figured this would be related to Chaum's digital cash and blind signatures, and it seems to be cited in the linked paper. I had thought of using blind signatures for anonymous authorization, but I was not aware that there was an actual design for that application.
I think government issued digital identities should also use this.
Amazing! I used kagi at the very beginning, but my biggest concern was always this (that logging in is inherently less private than using something like duckduckgo, so I'm just forced to trust Kagi's will). This is the kind of thing that will force me to take a second look again.
This is very cool. I'm curious about why there is a limit on the number of tokens generated per month, when this is only currently offered to unlimited accounts. Since the tokens all expire at the end of the month, tokens can't be horded to use Kagi after a subscription ends. Perhaps it is instead a resource issue where token generation is expensive. In that case though, I would think limiting tokens/day would be more appropriate - there is already going to be a spike to generate new tokens on the first of the month, so if the server can handle that they can handle some users generating a batch of tokens each day.
This is not intended as criticism, just inquisitive.
Since we have no idea who is issuing search requests in Privacy Pass mode, if there was no limits on token issuance, you could simply generate infinite tokens and give them out (or use them as part of some downstream service), and we'd have no other recourse for rate-limiting to prevent abuse.
Setting a high, but reasonable limit on issuance helps prevent abuse, and if you run out of tokens, you can reach out to support@kagi.com and we'll reset your quota.
Ah, that makes sense. It would be harder to detect sharing with this system than with account sharing. My thoughts went in a completely different direction when I read "abuse" the first time.
Being able to use this feature while hiding my ip while I browse. It’s not that I want to hide my ip from Kagi it’s more that it’s not convenient to use Kagi for search on chrome while browsing in safari
Can someone make a case for Kagi? I'm using Google + Claude for all my websearch needs. I don't feel like there's a gap there, but maybe that's because I've never experienced anything better and can't imagine it?
I do value privacy, but I wouldn't pay extra for more private search results. I might pay extra for __better__ search results, but that's hard to measure.
Just curious if anyone has had a legitimately great experience with this product and can communicate its benefits. Bonus points if you're in software dev.
For me the killer kagi feature is that I can manually up and down weight domains in results. I can "pin" and always get wikipedia results or "block" and never get pintrest or raise or lower as needed. Brave search has a similar feature, but they only seem to support "block" not "lower", which is what I use a lot more often.
This is the exact sort of QOL feature that could convert me. I get tired of seeing the same recycled AI listicles for certain search genres, and it sounds like Kagi could help me manage that for my preferences.
Ditto, for me is that I can take the damn geekforgeeks and facebook to "lower". Raise the python official docs since that is most of the time what I want.
This is so true. I've been on Kagi since March 2024. On the occasion that I find myself on Google on someone else's computer, I find it completely unusable from a search result perspective. It's all just junk. Kagi has me as a paying customer forever.
If you can't imagine a gap then I think it might not be for you.
I tried kagi after finally getting sick of some of my google results. Kagi was able to deliver on some of those results.
It's not like, shockingly better results. I do think they're better on average, but I'm not sure.
However, in the cases where I couldn't find what I was looking for on google and could on kagi, well, that's a binary result. I'll take the success and not the failure.
I was surprised by how much better I found the UI. That's actually the thing that sold me on the subscription to begin with. Going in, I would not have expected UI to sell me on such a thing.
I have since customized it somewhat; there are sites I usually really like results from and they are upranked, and sites I don't care for which are downranked. I've felt like this has lead to even better experience, but I haven't gone back to google to compare.
Very interesting experience. Thanks for sharing. I’m a sucker for good UX/UI, and it sounds like the product is legitimately useful long-term. I wonder how well it integrates into Firefox/Chrome, since I see extensions for both browsers. I’ll check it out!
Other than the things others mentioned, with the ultimate plan you can use Claude with Kagi web-search, which is not something that the Claude web app supports, I believe.
That’s interesting — Claude WITH web search. Like Claude makes suggestions about search terms? Or maybe helps to navigate the results? I’m struggling to picture how google search is a 2-“person” job
For me, Kagi felt like a godsend as my Google searches had become polluted, and I had to dig way deeper in the search results to get anything decent. They also have an AI assistant that gives you access to all the major AI models and integrates with their search in a way that I have found very useful.
I would recommend at least giving it a try to see if you notice a difference. For my job, the monthly fee more than pays for itself
I want a search engine to return useful results. Right now, google has been captured by revenue generating results. It wouldn't be so bad if useful results were making money, but that doesn't seem to be the case.
Auto filter for sources, downrank sources you dislike, sort results by recency, have an engine that actually respects what country or language you're trying to search into, and finally present results visually the way you want them.
It's worth trying to use it actively for a month or so, and you'll see if you need it or not. I would not to back to google even if Google paid me.
Is that his device or his search term? Either way, my view of the internet is probably different than the average with pihole + ublock. Three pages of ads is kind of unbelievable.
I’m not insinuating for even a second that Kagi actually do this, but as a general rule, isn’t any privacy claim dubious at the moment given that more and more governments appear to be able to compel companies to identify their users (especially those searching for illegal content) and further forcefully insist they not disclose it?
It’s disheartening to think the great progress we’re making in this sector could be undermined in a few seconds against any companies efforts with a trivial backdoor.
It depends on how hard those companies work beforehand to prevent themselves from being able to comply with such requests beforehand. Signal is a good example of this, Kagi seems to be onboard also.
I haven't looked closely enough at this token thingy Kagi is doing but it seems on the surface like it might scratch the itch by letting them decouple the accepting-payment part of their service from the providing-results part such that they know that you've paid, but not which payer you are.
Government's power over companies does not negate cryptographic privacy protections. For example, one criminal who used ProtonMail got caught because ProtonMail handed over their recovery GMail address to the law enforcement after they were compelled[1]. However, that means end-to-end encryption worked: that was the only thing they could hand over. I think the same principle applies here.
The government forces companies to backdoor their systems and use compromised implementations of what would otherwise be private and secure systems (see for example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit). It's also worth noting that the only thing preventing your searches being linked to your account via IP address and browser fingerprinting is to use Tor which conveniently will also not protect your from the US government either. Account settings can also link a person's searches to their account.
The good news is that while the NSA will absolutely be tracking everything you search for while using Kagi they also do the exact same thing with every other search engine you use so what difference does it make.
The difference is cost. Pervasive and unhindered surveillance is way cheaper than coordinating an individual to be targeted through court orders and all the bureaucracy and potential legal battles that come with it. That’s why EU/UK is trying to coerce Apple to disable end to end encryption[1]. If it hadn’t made any difference, we wouldn’t be seeing any complaints from governments.
I think the idea here is that it literally can't be traced to the user – at no point is there anything passed that would allow Kagi to make the association between the user and the query.
Thanks, yes completely agree! I guess the part I’m concerned with is the politically side whereby they could be potentially compelled to change the method slightly after the fact and be forced to slip something in somewhere in a quite technical process now making it possible.
I’d love to assume this will never happen, I’m just concerned that even if it did I’d never find out - Because unfortunately the more popular this service gets for bad actors, the more of a target it becomes for the government with identification of users.
I guess as a search engine, we could assume the government may leave them well alone and still just focus on content creators.
The best that we can do is to continue working on FOSS solutions that make it technically impossible to backdoor. I haven't grok'd the protocol yet, but it seems to claim you only have to trust the client. The client is open source, so it would be hard for it to be backdoor'd without the community noticing.
Cryptography is a literal godsend for people living under oppressive regimes.
Definitely suggesting the method is secure, assuming the company does all the things they’ll say they do, which I also agree they’ll do. I’m just concerned the government can destroy this all, just by compelling them not to, and change a well intentioned method at any moment.
But what would the government compel them to do? If the method is secure, you don’t need to trust the server. And if they backdoor the open source client, people could notice it in an audit.
I think you’re right, perhaps I’ll do some more reading about it - It seems like it all relies on what the extension does, and if this extension is open source someone will notice as you said. Thanks for the clarity!
The method is secure until they change it. Their docs mention that generating a token is not anonymous, but using a token is. Considering they already know who generated it, it could be trivial for them (to change something server side where the validation occurs, if compelled) to link a particular search to a user.
You don’t get the token itself from the server though, you get something so you can make your own token for which the server doesn’t know who created it. So they can do whatever they like on the server, they can’t identify you.
This seems cool, but I still think the pricing of kagi is rather steep. It is $5/mo for 300 searches a month, which is really going to get you under 10 a day... That's insufficient. Then $10/mo (or $108/yr) for unlimited.
I'm curious if anyone knows, are companies like Google and Microsoft making more than $10/mo/user? We often talk about paying with our data, but it is always unclear how much that data is worth. Kagi does include some numbers, over here[0], but they seem a tad suspicious. The claim is Google makes $23/mo/user, and this would make their service a good value, but the calculation of $76bn US ad revenue (2023) and $277 per user annually gives 274m users. It's close to 80% of the US population, but I though google search was about 90% of global. And I doubt that all ad revenue is coming from search. Does anyone know the real numbers? Googling I get inconsistent answers and also answers based on different conditions and aggregations. But what we'd be interested here is purely in Google /search/ and not anything else.
I don't know nor do I really care what other search companies are making. I pay $10/month for Kagi because it works for me and it's good. I don't even care about Kagi as a company (I don't care about any company); their search works. It's a good product, and I'm happy to keep paying for it as long as it keeps being useful while all the free competitors are still terrible. I use about 2k searches per month.
edit: Even just the ability to rank, pin, and block domains alone is crazy useful. I never need to see Pinterest in any image search results again. If I see a crappy blog spam site, I just block it and it never shows up again. It feels like these are basic, fundamental features that every search engine should have had a long time ago. It's pretty sad that Kagi is getting so much praise for doing things that really should have been standard for at least a decade (not sad in any negative way toward Kagi, but because our standards and expectations for search have dropped this low).
So funny that blocking Pinterest comes up in all discussions on Kagi (I've mentioned it myself in the past). I almost think people might pay $1 a month just to block Pinterest.
$10 felt a bit steep until I realized there is probably the economies of scale at play here.
1) There is a marginal payment overhead. I'd assume $0.50-0.75, leaving their amount down to $9-ish.
2) It's a fairly niche product with a still-small userbase. ~40k users at ~$9/mo = $360k/mo (I know there's $5/mo users and $25/mo users but I'd assume there are far more $5/mo and $10/mo users than $25/mo users)
3) They have to keep the service running 24/7/365, so you have to hire devs either across multiple time-zones or compensate them enough to be OK fighting fires at 2am.
As the user of a service things like payment overhead, a small userbase, and dev salaries aren't my problem. My only concern is what I'm getting for what I'm paying.
$5 a month for fewer than 10 searches a day is clearly not a good deal. $10 a month might be worth it for some, but an extra $15 a month on top of that for AI results is kind of crazy.
I don't know Kagi's financials, but this is usually the case for a lot of products with a smaller customer base. For example, a block of Kraft cheddar will be a lot cheaper than an equivalent-sized block from an organic local dairy. There's always a customer base that is willing to pay for a differentiating feature or value.
I'm satisfied paying for it because the product works well and saves me time. I can't say the same for a lot of the random $10 impulse buys I make in a month.
For me, it's also about voting with my wallet. I'm not enthusiastic about invasive ad tech. As it stands, nobody else offers what Kagi offers at any price. If there were an equivalent service for $5/month, I'd give it a look, but there isn't.
The way I think about it is how much time do I save by having better search results. I'm on a family plan currently, but was on an unlimimited 10/month plan. At the rate I value my time, Kagi needs to save me well under an hour per month through better search results. I'm quite confident it reaches and exceeds that bar relative to google. And that's even before you get into any philosophical/moral preferences for being the direct customer rather than being the product (as in ad-supported services).
That extra $15 a month is for access to LLMs. They currently support the Claudes, the GPTs (not o1), Mistral, Gemini, Llamma, Qwen QWQ, Nova, and DeepSeek. It's currently unlimited access in the standard chat format.
You can also choose if you want the chat to RAG search results into the context for additional info, and then cite those sources. To me, replacing a Claude/ChatGPT subscription with $15 on top of a company I already like, while also getting a bunch of other models was a no-brainer.
This. I used to host my private searxng service which is a bit like what Kagi is selling. Yes, Kagi offers site blocking, rewrites and pinning which is great. But the best part is the access to R1 combined with Kagi search which adds context.
You can just quickly write !ai to the toolbar and you have a deepseek chat open. Or !sum to summarize the current page or video.
If you can pay $10/month for a better search experience, then Google's making way more than that much off your data.
Kagi saves me much more than $10 of time every month. I definitely don't regret the subscription cost. Their LLM thing (append "?" to your internet search query) is worth more than that on its own.
I’ve been paying for Kagi for a long time through all their pricing model changes and updates. I have never once hit the search limit. I know they base their tiers on market research of search volume balanced against cost of serving a query. If you’re looking for reasons not to pay for search, you’ll find them. But the pricing model is hardly one. If you want an amazing and respectful search experience, and want to back a company that’s truly doing right by users and innovating at the same time, give Kagi a try!
The reason why it's worth it is because its search works really well. I've tried DuckDuckGo, Bing and always subconsciously ended up back at Google. This is the only search service I've used that works better than Google search and I think it's a combination of them not putting ads on the search and the way they let you tweak the search to block poor quality sites. How much it costs them or how much google profits vs your payment is not really relevant to me. It's the best working search engine in my opinion.
Kagi Ultimate plan ($25/mo) includes Kagi Assistant with more than 15 different models (including Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0, ChatGPT 4o + o3 mini, DeepSeek R1 etc). That plan suddenly becomes the cheapest, IMHO. I know that paid versions of LLM services offer more advanced models, but you at least get ahead of the rate limits this way.
I subscribe to an unlimited family plan. When considering how much cleaner my web experience is, it's a no-brainer. Default search engine on all our phones and devices.
They're my portal to the web. It's less like an optional web service (like a streaming service), and it feels more like I'm paying for them to be my ISP.
I pay $10/month just to have search results that aren't littered with SEO spam. The time savings alone make it totally worth it for me. Everything else is a giant bonus.
FWIW I signed up about 4 months ago on the starter plan and I'm definitely going to run over. I could be smarter about my searches though. I've switched to kagi on ALL of my devices, including work devices. And I could have searched to using google for most gifts/maps stuff instead.
some anecdotal data:
11/2024: 183 searches
12/2024: 360
1/2025: 376
2/2025: already at 222
Will definitely (happily) have to upgrade to the $10 plan. It's been great.
I subscribed to kagi's $5/m plan since last March, and my usage until now is around 3.3k searches, with the monthly distribution similar to yours. Some months it's more, some months it's fewer.
Currently I'm debating with myself if I should go for the $10 plan. I'm all down for supporting kagi, but surprisingly I didn't use as many searches as I thought.
One thing we noticed anecdotally (may not apply to your case) is that Kagi users search less when they switch to Kagi from other search engines, and the likely reason is that they just find things faster. Which is basically the main metric we are optimizing the product for - happy users, lower cost for us.
You can't expect world percentages to match US percentages. The US is only 5% of the world's population and has a very different relationship to search. Also, only 63% of the world is online, so what does "90% of global" even mean?
Back-of-the-envelope:
- 2tn searches per year.
- US is 20% of all searches.
- Us revenue is 76bn
$76bn / (2tn * 0.2) = $0.19 / search
So, getting 300 searches for less than $0.02 per search sounds like a pretty good deal.
I thought this too but at this point I've been subscribed well over a year. On a typical workday I might use 20+ searches, but I frequently use little to no searches on weekends and holidays, etc. Ultimately I end up using right around 300 per month (averaged out across the year), so I think their pricing isn't as wild as it initially looks.
It's just about the best Internet-related money I spend. I get fast, quality results on a service that doesn't obviously bend over backwards to monetize me. Ironic, in a way. I thought it was spendy at first, and now I can't imagine cancelling my subscription.
I assume Kagi's customers (of which I've been one since 5/22) are apt to value retaining their privacy more than Google values selling their data. That is to say, it's worth more than $10 (and more than $23 a month) for me to believe my data isn't being sold to advertisers. If you don't take that position, or set different values on it, I can certainly see why $5 or $10 a month wouldn't be worth it to you.
There's also the matter of Google search quality being increasingly bad, while Kagi's is consistently... okay. They also have a a lot of nice features, liking being able to change the weight of different sites in your list of results.
I don't have exact numbers, but I wouldn't be surprised if 80-90% of google ad revenue comes from the ad prices they can charge for US users. I would be shocked if the percentage was less than 50-60% of revenue from US alone, which would put the value extraction per user for google at ~10$/month/user
Sorry, I mean that the revenue seems to not just be search ad revenue but ad revenue. Google's ad revenue comes from a lot of places, such as in your Android app. I assume it also includes adsense and other things.
> This seems cool, but I still think the pricing of kagi is rather steep. It is $5/mo for 300 searches a month, which is really going to get you under 10 a day... That's insufficient.
You can split your searches with search engine shortcuts on the desktop, and the search engine quickbar on mobile.
When I still was on the starter plan, I used Kagi whenever I had a search that if I use google, I know I will:
- get a bunch of listicles and AI slop (Kagi downranks and bundles these)
- get a buch of AI images (again, Kagi clearly labels and downranks these)
- have to do multiple google searches for, but can instead use Quick Answer for
- will get a bunch of Reddit pre-translated results for
- technical / scientific questions, because of the sites I can uprank/downrank/block
I used google for things like:
- highest building in the world
- $bandname Wikipedia / Discogs
- name of thing I can't remember but have the approximate word for
Depends on how you use it. For non-developers, under 10 searches per day on average sounds right. Not everyone has a job where they sit on a computer all day.
For me, I use Kagi only at home for personal use. And most months, I don't exceed 300. Of course, if I included work related searches, then yes - 10 searches won't get me far.
I've been paying $5 a month for over a year and have hit the 300 search limit only once. I feel like I'm pretty active on the web, but perhaps I just have days where I don't search as often as others.
This should placate any potential subscribers who worry that their searches could be logged. Another great feature from a product which keeps getting better all the time.
Ironically, I couldn't access this page while using Tor. Reading it from another device though, it seems like a great announcement, I love the idea.
I also would be interested in a service like this for attestation on other sites. Device attestation has chilling privacy implications, but if you could have a paid service with a presumably trusted entity like Kagi attest that you are a legitimate user (but hide your identity), maybe more of the Internet could be browsed anonymously, while still minimizing spam.
I get why many sites currently block Tor and VPN users, or even users in incognito or without a phone number, as the Internet is essentially unusable without anti-spam measures. That said, I do think anonymity has its place (especially for browsing, even if commenting weren't allowed), and maybe ideas like this could allow for anonymity without the Internet being riddled with spam.
The browser creates embeddings of user query, then send the embeddings to the server.
To complete a search, the server is a machine and it does not really need text to understand what a user want. A series of numbers, like LLM embeddings, are totally fine (actually it might even be better, because embeddings map similar words closely, like Duck and Bird have similar embeddings).
On the privacy side, LLM embeddings are a bunch of numbers. Even the embeddings are associated with a user, other people cannot make meaning out of the embeddings. Therefore the user's privacy is preserved.
This is an interesting idea, and indeed such an approach to providing privacy has been formalized to different degrees and varying levels of success (eg. [1][2]).
Unfortunately, as described, such a solution would only satisfy a somewhat meaningless notion of privacy. Specifically, the embeddings by definition contain potentially private information about the user, revealing things like "I'm asking about birds" to use your example. Even though it might "compress" the query in a slightly lossy way, it would still reveal a great deal of information about the query.
A true solution to this problem would require something like differential privacy and adding noise to the embeddings. However, the noise required would (likely) end up destroying too much information from the embedding to preserve accuracy of the LLM.
While this is a neat sounding idea, there's a few issues here:
1. Embeddings are very close to a reversible function. It's not hard to take an embedding and query back the closest query semantically from the source LLM.
2. We already don't log any queries from the users. I'm aware this has to be taken on faith from Kagi users. But you can believe that not having any user query data at all anywhere is a significant speed bump for us in feature development, bug tracking and roadmapping.
It's a shame that their $5 tier is only 300 searches/month, or 10 searches per day. It's kind of ridiculously low. I could burn through half of that in a single day of debugging
Also I just tried it and you can't really search for porn
that's because you're a computer professional and the professional plan is more appropriate for you.
I gave a hundred searches to some normies I know and they told me that they save them to use when Google can't find what they want because Kagi works better (!) so they hoard the searches as backups to Google.
All I know is that I haven't used Google on purpose for a year and it's really turned into an eyesore
I will try it for more technical queries, but the results seem to be worse than Google/DDG. The reverse image search sucks and has never returned a single result for me. I suppose the advantage is that it whitelists/blacklists against spam, but it frequently comes up empty handed. So maybe it needs to crawl/scrape the web deeper or it needs a better search algorithm or trust model.
I could probably get better results by crawling the web myself at home.
Heh, that's one of the more aggressive "how hard can it be?!" that I've seen in a while
I invite you to look at the number of threads of people complaining about Cloudflare locking their perfectly normal browser out of a stupid amount of the Internet and then carefully consider how you would circumvent those anti-bot controls
>We are working on enabling this feature for Trial and Starter plans, which have access to a limited number of monthly searches. [...] and theoretically, users on this plan could redeem more tokens than the limit of searches allowed on their plan (again, we do not know who the user redeeming the tokens is, or what plan they are on).
This doesn't make sense. Is this saying they're worried about a user on a trial or starter plan using someone else's tokens? That can still happen when tokens are disabled for trial and start plan users: the trial or starter plan user can use tokens generated by someone on an unlimited plan.
They're saying that when someone uses a privacy token to search, they cannot track which account it's tied to. Therefor, they cannot track limits & billing.
The whole point of privacy tokens is you don't need to track usage. You track generation instead. They can track limits and billing at generation time. They know this. The sentence I previously quoted says so in the [...] section:
> We are working on enabling this feature for Trial and Starter plans, which have access to a limited number of monthly searches. Therefore, they risk a worse user experience if their generated tokens are lost (for example, due to uninstalling the extension)
If they don't track limits and billing at generation time, then there's no "risk [of] a worse user experience if their generated tokens are lost".
This ""risk [of] a worse user experience if their generated tokens are lost" is a logical reason to not enable privacy tokens for Trial and Starter plans. The risk of "users on this plan could redeem more tokens than the limit of searches allowed on their plan" is not a logical reason to not enable privacy tokens for Trial and Starter plans.
What's to stop a single unlimited user from generating and sharing infinite tokens with the rest of the world, then?
Edit: Each account is limited to 2000 tokens per month, unless they email support to request more. (from the FAQ near the bottom).
Still seems like there could be a secondary market for resold tokens, though. Not just as a money making system, but possibly as a privacy initiative? If enough accounts pooled tokens into a shared pool and withdrew a random one from it each time, it would be a further safeguard.
Cool feature, curious, does the bangs solution (! Language ! Region ! Safe search) to the inability to use your config not introduce the same privacy concerns?
> allowing users to send a small configuration with every request (language, region, safe-search) to automatically customize your search experience to some extent. However, we currently believe this would quickly result in a significant loss of anonymity for you and for other users.
> For manual search settings customization, you can always use bangs in your search query to enable basic settings for a specific query.
Wouldn't this allow people to abuse and share token amount many users? People used to buy one subscription and share among friends e.g. Netflix but only shared amount family or friends - you wouldn't want random people know what movies you like to watch. Similarly people would less likely share their chatgpt plus account because everyone can see history and change settings. But with such privacy pass those issues don't exists I guess so more likely this can be abused.
In general I am a very happy Kagi subscriber, but I have noticed in the past month or so that sometimes my searches (via the Safari extension) just hang. Navigating it kagi.com also hangs.
When I'm in a rush this forces me to fall back to Google which often doesn't provide good results for my queries, which is unfortunate
It generally resolves itself in under a minute, but it is still a mildly irritating availability issue that wasn't present earlier. Maybe something to do with load balancing? No clue.
Pretty cool feature. The unstated downside is that any personalization settings like dark mode, translation, and lens settings are still seemingly tied to account login.
We even considered variations of having some settings preserved in local storage and impact of that on anonymity. Ultimately decided that was not worth it.
Check the FAQ section (towards the end) for full details and analysis:
You could have a few built in options (like for domain filtering and customisation) for the privacy people. Could even be community sourced so there's no onus on Kagi itself.
So for example there could be a built in "developers" preset that might make domains useful to coding higher ranked (and down rank or block things like stack overflow clones). Etc etc.
Basically this could allow a smaller amount of customisation with less ability to identify a specific user.
I also use Orion and I do like the idea someone else had of integrating an option for Kagi Privacy mode into the "incognito" tabs specifically as an option!
Though those still get passed to the server, and your combination of personalization settings is likely to be globally unique, and it's almost certainly unique among the subset of users that are paranoid enough about their privacy not to store preferences in their session... But still.
Not only that but your searches themselves likely give Kagi more than enough information to identify you as an individual. We saw that nearly 20 years ago when AOL searches were published and people were able to track down specific individuals from their search terms. (https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html)
Privacy Pass is great for reducing friction, but it still relies on trust in the issuer. A ZK-based approach (e.g., using zk-SNARKs or anonymous credentials) could let users prove they’re paid subscribers without revealing their identity or even interacting with Kagi’s servers beyond the initial proof. This would remove the need for trust while keeping the experience just as seamless. Would love to see more services explore this direction.
This is meaningless with a paid for service.
Kagi can and will be required by court order to collect and track a subscribers use.
It doesn't matter if your tech is supposed to be “anonymous”, they have to make it happen.
You must operate in a country that cant compel this and be willing to jump ship when your nsa equivalent gets upset.
problem is that they have small margins because they have to pay a lot for their upstream providers (and those don't care about what region kagi users are from so charge the same)
I can't explain this rationally, but my brain just rejects any other search engine. For example, in the case of Kagi, black links instead of blue feel off-putting. I guess years of using Google has hardwired into my brain how a search engine should look.
The way I feel about Kagi reminds me of how I felt about Google circa 1999.
The cynic in me wants to stop myself from becoming a fanboy because we all know how the story of tech startups goes and it's bound to repeat itself again; the optimist in me still wants to believe that there can be forces of good on the web.
I've read the post and saw the references, but can anyone easily explain how it works? Can the server not just store whatever is generated to link it back to the user using it?
Do people have news articles of Microsoft, Google et al using search history to the searcher's detriment? How frequently does this happen? I'm imagining it must be like one in a million.
Per-user search history can directly be sold to advertisers, no? I was under the impression Google and Microsoft do that, or at least use it internally to build a profile of each user, again used for advertising.
A problem with "zero knowledge" proofs is that Kagi needs to verify that the user has paid for the service, which requires the server to have some knowledge about the client at some point.
But they still couldn't do accounting / query limiting for users on a limited queries per month plan. So you could do "yes you have assistant" or "no you don't" but their $5/month taster plan has a query limit.
>As standardized in [2 - 4], the Privacy Pass protocol is able to accommodate many “architectures.” Our deployment model follows the original architecture presented by Davidson et al. [1], called “Shared Origin, Attester, Issuer” in § 4 of [2].
From [2] RFC 9576 § 3.3 "Privacy Goals and Threat Model" :
>Clients explicitly trust Attesters to perform attestation correctly and in a way that does not violate their privacy. In particular, this means that Attesters that may be privy to private information about Clients are trusted to not disclose this information to non-colluding parties. Colluding parties are assumed to have access to the same information; see Section 4 for more about different deployment models and non-collusion assumptions. However, Clients assume that Issuers and Origins are malicious.
And From [2] RFC 9576 § 4.1 "Shared Origin, Attester, Issuer" :
>As a result, attestation mechanisms that can uniquely identify a Client, e.g., requiring that Clients authenticate with some type of application-layer account, are not appropriate, as they could lead to unlinkability violations.
Womp womp :(
This is not genuinely private in any meaningful sense of the term. Kagi plays the role of all three parties, and even relies on the very thing section 4.1 says is not appropriate: to use mechanisms that can uniquely identify a client. They utilize a client's session token: "In the case of Kagi’s users, this can be done by presenting their Kagi session cookie to the server."
Frankly, that blog post is disingenuous at best, and malicious at worst.
=================================
I want to be wrong here. Where am I wrong? What am I missing?
From [2] RFC 9576 § 4.1 "Shared Origin, Attester, Issuer", right before the sentence you quoted:
> In this model, the Attester, Issuer, and Origin share the attestation, issuance, and redemption contexts.
I haven't read the RFC in detail, but I believe this is where the nuance is: When you enable the privacy pass setting in the extension/browser the redemption context is changed relative to the attestation context by removing the session cookie, to just the information sent by the browser for someone who is not logged in. What remains is your IP address and browser fingerprinting, which can be countered by using Tor.
This would definitely seem like a big concern if you were just looking at the RFC, but the key here is that Kagi's system has a different set of security/privacy/functional requirements and therefore the issues mentioned in the RFC do not necessarily apply.
In the RFC's architecture, the request flow is like so:
1. CLIENT sends anonymous request to ORIGIN
2. ORIGIN sends token challenge to CLIENT
3. CLIENT uses its identity to request token from ISSUER/ATTESTER
4. ISSUER/ATTESTER issues token to CLIENT
5. CLIENT sends token to ORIGIN
You can see how the ISSUER/ATTESTER can identify the client as the source of the "anonymous request" to the ORIGIN because the ISSUER, ATTESTER and ORIGIN are the same entity, so it can use a timing attack to correlate the request to the ORIGIN (1.) with the request to the ISSUER/ATTESTER (3.).
However you can also see that if a lot of time passes between steps (1.) and (3.), then such an attack would be infeasible. Reading past your quote from RFC 9576 § 4.1., it states:
> Origin-Client, Issuer-Client, and Attester-Origin unlinkability requires that issuance and redemption events be separated over time, such as through the use of tokens that correspond to token challenges with an empty redemption context (see Section 3.4), or that they be separated over space, such as through the use of an anonymizing service when connecting to the Origin.
In Kagi's architecture, the "time separation" requirement is met by making the client generate a large batch of tokens up front, which are then slowly redeemed over a period of 2 months. The "space separation" requirement is also satisfied with the introduction of the Tor service.
There is some more discussion in RFC 9576 § 7.1. "Token Caching" and RFC 9577 § 5.5. "Timing Correlation Attacks".
One question you may have is: Why wasn't this solution used in the RFC?
This can be understood if you look at the mentions of "cross-ORIGIN" in the RFC. This RFC was written by Cloudflare, who envisioned it's use across the whole Internet. Different ORIGINs would trust different ISSUERs, tokens from one ORIGIN<->ISSUER network might not work in another ORIGIN<->ISSUER network. This made it infeasible for clients to mass-generate tokens in advance, as a client would need to generate tokens across many different ISSUERS.
Of course, adoption was weak and there ended up being only one ISSUER - Cloudflare, so they adopted the same architecture as Kagi where clients would batch generate tokens in advance (batch size was only 30 tokens though).
RFC 9576 § 7.1. also mentions a "token hoarding" attack, which Cloudflare felt particularly threatened by. Cloudflare's Privacy Pass system worked in concert with CAPTCHAs. Users could trade a completed CAPTCHA for a small batch of tokens, allowing a single CAPTCHA completion to be split into multiple redemptions across a longer time period.
However, rudimentary "hoarding"-like attacks were already in use against CAPTCHAs through "traffic exchanges". Opening up another avenue for hoarding through Privacy Pass would have only exacerbated the problem.
>3. CLIENT uses it's identity to request token from ISSUER/ATTESTER
The ISSUER and ATTESTER are different roles. As previously quoted, "Clients explicitly trust Attesters to perform attestation correctly and in a way that does not violate their privacy." The RFC is explicit that, when all of the roles are held by the same entity, the attestation should not rely on unique identifiers. But that's exactly what a session cookie is.
>You can see how the ISSUER/ATTESTER can identify the client as the source of the "anonymous request" to the ORIGIN because the ISSUER, ATTESTER and ORIGIN are the same entity, and therefore it can use a timing attack to correlate the request to the ORIGIN (1.) with the request to the ISSUER/ATTESTER (3.).
No timing or spacing attack is needed here. If I have to provide Kagi with a valid session cookie in order to get the tokens, then they already have a unique identifier for me. There is no guarantee that Kagi is not keeping a 1-to-1 mapping of session cookies to ISSUER keypairs, or that Kagi could not, if compelled, establish distinct ISSUER keypairs for specific session cookies.
> The RFC is explicit that, when all of the roles are held by the same entity, the attestation should not rely on unique identifiers. But that's exactly what a session cookie is.
Very true, but again, the RFC describes a completely different threat model with much stronger guarantees. The Kagi threat model:
- Does not provide Issuer-Client unlinkability
- Does not provide Attester-Origin unlinkability
In particular, the model does not assume a malicious Issuer and requires the Client have some level of trust in the Issuer. The Client trusts the Issuer with their private billing information but does not trust the Issuer with their search activity.
The RFC explicitly guarantees the Issuer cannot obtain any of the Client's private information.
That said, I will point out that this Issuer-Client unlinkability issue can be solved by introducing a 3rd-party service or when Kagi starts accepting Monero payments.
> There is no guarantee that Kagi is not keeping a 1-to-1 mapping of session cookies to ISSUER keypairs, or that Kagi could not, if compelled, establish distinct ISSUER keypairs for specific session cookies.
Also completely valid, but also not something Kagi claims to guarantee. They believe the extension should be responsible for guarding attainer issuance partitioning. I don't think it's implemented currently but it shouldn't be too hard, especially since they currently use only 1 keypair.
>Very true, but again, the RFC describes a completely different threat model with much stronger guarantees. The Kagi threat model:
>
>- Does not provide Issuer-Client unlinkability
>
>- Does not provide Attester-Origin unlinkability
If the Client, Attester, and Origin are all a single party (Kagi), then it follows from that threat model that Kagi does not provide Kagi-Client unlinkability, no?
Further, this is not what Kagi has advertised in the blog post:
>What guarantees does Privacy Pass offer?
>
>As used by Kagi, Privacy Pass tokens offer various security properties (§ 3.3, of [2]).
Kagi are explicitly stating that they provide the guarantees of § 3.3. They even use more plain language:
>Generation-redemption unlinkability: Kagi cannot link the tokens presented during token redemption (i.e. during search) with any specific token generation phase. *This means that Kagi will not be able to tell who it is serving search results to*, only that it is someone who presented a valid Privacy Pass token.
>
>Redemption-redemption unlinkability: Kagi cannot link the tokens presented during two different token redemptions. This means that *Kagi will not be able to tell from tokens alone whether two searches are being performed by the same user*.
As it stands, Kagi cannot meaningfully guarantee those things, because the starting point is the client providing a unique identifier to Kagi.
>That said, I will point out that this Issuer-Client unlinkability issue can be solved by introducing a 3rd-party service or when Kagi starts accepting Monero payments.
Sure, but at that point, there is no need for any of the Privacy Pass infrastructure in the first place.
>Also completely valid, but also not something Kagi claims to guarantee.
I disagree. Their marketing here is "we can't link your searches to your identity, because cryptography."
>They believe the extension should be responsible for guarding attainer issuance partitioning. I don't think it's implemented currently but it shouldn't be too hard, especially since they currently use only 1 keypair.
If Kagi is going to insist on being the attester and on requiring uniquely identifiable information as the basis for issuing tokens, then yes, the only way to even try to confirm that they're not acting maliciously is to keep track not only of distinct keypairs, but also of public and private metadata blocks within the tokens, and to share all of that data (in a trustworthy manner, of course) with other confirmed Kagi users. And if a user doesn't understand all of the nuances that would entail, or all of the nuances just discussed here, and instead just trusts the Kagi-written client implicitly? Then it's all just privacy theater.
> If the Client, Attester, and Origin are all a single party (Kagi), then it follows from that threat model that Kagi does not provide Kagi-Client unlinkability, no?
Kagi does not provide Kagi-Client unlinkability as the Client's payment information allows Kagi to trivially determine the identity of the Client. Kagi does provide Search-Client unlinkability (what the RFC calls Origin-Client unlinkability). More formally: If we assume Kagi cannot derive any identifying information from the privacy token (which I understand you dispute), then given any two incoming search requests, Kagi would not be able to determine whether those two requests came from the same Client or two different Clients.
> Kagi are explicitly stating that they provide the guarantees of § 3.3. They even use more plain language:
Not 100% sure I am understanding you correctly but if you are claiming that Kagi promises all the unlinkability properties in § 3.3, I would say that would be unfair, since they explicitly deny this in the FAQ at the bottom of the post.
I think they are citing that section as they reference several definitions from it in the text that follows.
> >Generation-redemption unlinkability: Kagi cannot link the tokens presented during token redemption (i.e. during search) with any specific token generation phase. *This means that Kagi will not be able to tell who it is serving search results to*, only that it is someone who presented a valid Privacy Pass token. > >Redemption-redemption unlinkability: Kagi cannot link the tokens presented during two different token redemptions. This means that *Kagi will not be able to tell from tokens alone whether two searches are being performed by the same user*.
>
> As it stands, Kagi cannot meaningfully guarantee those things, because the starting point is the client providing a unique identifier to Kagi.
These specific unlinkability properties are satisfied given that the earlier assumption about the token not providing identifiable information is true.
> Sure, but at that point, there is no need for any of the Privacy Pass infrastructure in the first place.
Kagi Privacy Pass in combination with a 3rd party can acheive a level of privacy that cannot be matched by architectures that don't involve the Privacy Pass or some other exotic cryptography.
I claim that a 3rd-party service + Kagi Privacy Pass meets all unlinkability properties in the RFC (except Attester-Origin for obvious reasons). Additionally, it guarantees confidentiality of the search request and response from malicious middleboxes, given the assumption about the token is true and that the user has access to a trusted proxy.
> I disagree. Their marketing here is "we can't link your searches to your identity, because cryptography."
Disagreement acknowledged. And yes, that quote is a fairly accurate summary of the marketing!
> If Kagi is going to insist on being the attester and on requiring uniquely identifiable information as the basis for issuing tokens, then yes, the only way to even try to confirm that they're not acting maliciously is to keep track not only of distinct keypairs, but also of public and private metadata blocks within the tokens, and to share all of that data (in a trustworthy manner, of course) with other confirmed Kagi users. And if a user doesn't understand all of the nuances that would entail, or all of the nuances just discussed here, and instead just trusts the Kagi-written client implicitly? Then it's all just privacy theater.
Yeah, I'm glad you are willing to say it at least, a lot of stuff these days is security theatre, people just kinda stick their heads in the sand I guess? I'm still hoping that people will realize that SSL has been long in need of a successor, and frankly BGP needs a complete rework too. It's also surprising to me that people are still willing to use Linux distros, although realistically modern computing as a whole is rotten at it's core. At least PGP is still alive, but it has its problems too...
I believe you should currently be able to
- create an account under a pseudonymous email address
- pay for a plan using a pseudonymous Bitcoin wallet
- use your login session to generate Privacy Pass tokens
- search with such tokens via the Tor browser on Kagi's .onion domain
You have to generate the tokens while signed in, but once you have the tokens, you can use them without your searches being associated with your account (cryptographically provable).
That being said, they essentially took the IETF draft I worked on for a while [1] and also my Rust implementation [2]. They built a thin wrapper [3] around my implementation and now call it "Kagi’s implementation of Privacy Pass". I think giving me some credit would have been in order. IETF work and work on open-source software is mostly voluntary, unpaid, and often happens outside of working hours. It's not motivating to be treated like that. Kagi, you can do better.
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-privacypass-batc... [2] https://github.com/raphaelrobert/privacypass [3] https://github.com/kagisearch/privacypass-lib/blob/e4d6b354d...
reply