While I also advocate a more realist/Bohm-like theory above standard statistical "interpretations", I would differ with Popper in that I find the principle of non-locality to be just fine indeed. My own "theory of everything" operates under the assumption that the fundamental objects of reality are universally defined (ie, over the entire mathematical domain that cosmologists call "the universe"). The big question then becomes how such spread out objects can appear to us a tiny things like hydrogen atoms and electrons. I think the geometric paradigm of Conformal Field Theory is the way to think about that question. Things start entering into the domain of String Theory at that point.
With the risk of being unpopular I have to admit I have found what I've read of Popper to be seriously overrated. So far I have gone through The Open Society... and the better part of The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
Open Society to me read mostly like a critique of the political philosophy of Plato, Hegel and Marx, with brief mentions of what the open society is actually supposed to be (I recall some mentions of social engineering and other such things). At best it felt like a grounding for the currently dominant neo-liberal social order.
The Logic... on the other hand does seem to bring novel content, but I feel the core of his endeavor is hopeless. Science definitely doesn't and can't work in a perfectly coherent algorithmic way. Science is a human social process that can't be subjected to a strict methodology. On this front I think Lakatos or even Kuhn are much closer to how things can/do work.
Ya... those are not great places to start with him... as far as philosophy of science essays in conjectures and criticisms and objective knowledge are really great and much more mature than the logic for the reasons you mentioned. Plus he develops some of the logical tools like content theory and verisimilitude in really cool ways.
> At best it felt like a grounding for the currently dominant neo-liberal social order.
He wrote it at a time when fascism and communism were tearing Europe apart and butchering millions. "Neo-liberal" social order was not at all dominant at that time.
Continental philosophy eschews formal logic and focuses more on literature and the arts as the source of philosophical truth. Some insights from Emmanuel Kant are used to justify this ([1]). Can someone explain this stance better than [1] does?
While there has been a great deal of
sympathetic interest among analytic philosophers in the idea that philosophy should be
continuous in method and subject-matter with the natural sciences -- what is commonly
referred to as "positivism" -- Continental philosophy has generally dismissed such ideas as no
more than a reversion to a pre-Kantian conception of the philosophical enterprise.
In the mid 1990s I wrote my Master's thesis about the difference between Analytical and Continental philosophy. To summarise it: The difference is more sociological (who quotes whom), historical (which are the classics you refer to, such as Kant vs. Hume, etc.) and a matter of style (a tendency (not more) to use formal logical to make something explicit or do without it) than actual philosophical differences.
For every content criterion that people have brought up to mark the difference between Analytical and Continental philosophy, one could usually find a prominent philosopher in either camp who match or does not match it:
Analytical philosophy: Formal logic? -- The early Wittgenstein is fond of it, but the late Wittgenstein moves away from it.
Analytical philosophy: Problems of philosophy as language problems? -- But Nietzsche and his fans (such as Mauthner).
Analytical philosophy: Importance of natural sciences for philosophy? -- But Cassirer.
Continental philosophy: Focus on hermeneutics? -- But Rorty.
Continental philosophy: Organic thinking (Hegel, etc.)? -- But Quine's holism.
Continental philosophy: Existentialism -- But many on the continent were not convinced. But many in the USA were interested. But Wittgensteins's mysticism.
I can give it a shot. I don't want to butcher it, but I feel like attention spans on here are pretty short for philosophy so here's the short version. Many continental philosophers appear to be skeptical of the separation of form and content necessary for logic to "work" in the context of another subject of study (Deleuze), interested in presenting tensions between ideas that do not clearly adapt themselves to exclusive truth or falsity (Derrida), or interested in presenting things that do not pretend to be particularly abstract or logical (Levinas).
On a personal note, I want to say that I drifted to continental philosophy in my undergrad after studying and appreciating formal logic. I realized that mainstream analytical philosophy had a lot less to do with logic than I had imagined (no symbolization, no commonly agreed upon rules of deduction), and at a certain point the question of "why logic" presented itself. I haven't found many opportunities in my writing to use the more technical concepts of modality or nth-orders, let alone anything from category theory.
I think the irony is that all those weird logics turned out to not just be useful for logic... but literally actually really useful! Like people make lots of money based off of them
Thats surprising, from my experience his clarity is what sets him apart from most other german philosophers of the time. The open society and its enemies takes a really long breath to read but his shorter essay-style booklets are very good.
While I also advocate a more realist/Bohm-like theory above standard statistical "interpretations", I would differ with Popper in that I find the principle of non-locality to be just fine indeed. My own "theory of everything" operates under the assumption that the fundamental objects of reality are universally defined (ie, over the entire mathematical domain that cosmologists call "the universe"). The big question then becomes how such spread out objects can appear to us a tiny things like hydrogen atoms and electrons. I think the geometric paradigm of Conformal Field Theory is the way to think about that question. Things start entering into the domain of String Theory at that point.