This gives the DA an incentive to try to go for more false convictions since it will be a bigger stick to hold over future defendants. If false convictions had low incidence then innocent people would go to trial more often.
It gives the DA an incentive to apply any charges that might possibly stick because it increases the likelihood of a plea deal by shifting the perceived risk to the accused. This is absolutely a bad situation, but presumably the DAs aren't amoral monsters who are deliberately trying to falsely convict people. :)
This is exactly the problem though - everything about the concept of "applying whatever charges that may stick" sounds predatory.
Being thrown charges until something sticks is akin to being interrogated until something / anything damning is found against you - an inquisition.
It's not shifting perceived risk, it's shifting real risk. If you're not charged for something, you're probably (right? correct me if I'm wrong?) not going to get convicted for it. If you /are/ charged for something, there's a chance you're going to get convicted for it.
Terrible things don't mostly happen because people are monsters, they happen because people are apathetic to others' problems and value their own convenience and gain above all else.
You could also argue, the DA would avoid uncertain cases. That is the common wisdom in the legal community about federal prosecution. They only make a move when they are totally certain they can get a win.
Can't speak to local DAs in bumfuck eygpt. Maybe they are trying to avoid losing by any means necessary.
To the contrary. This isn't an uncertain case, and it proves the rule that prosecutors go after easy, sure cases. Here, you've got eight employees of a small bank admitting to originating false loans.
The employees in question were highly placed: "The accused employees include Yiu Wah Wong, the bank’s chief credit officer, who reported directly to Jill Sung; and Wai Hung 'Raymond' Tam, the loan origination supervisor, who trained the bank’s loan officers and processors."
This isn't a case where you have to connect a chain of events between a third-world branch of a megabank all the way to someone who matters. It's neat and self-contained, and easy for a jury to understand.
I'm not sure we're reading the same article. The 'neat and self contained case that was easy for a jury to understand' fell apart completely.
And the bank is (fortunately) wealthy enough to defend itself. That of course did not stop the prosecutor from going after the employees.
Really. Bank discovers internal fraud, goes after the main perpetrator who then turns star witness for the prosecution. It's a giant mess with the prosecutors having considerable egg on their face.
Whether the case ultimately panned out does not change the a priori evaluation of the case. It's better to have a do-gooder whistleblower than malfeasant employee looking for a plea deal as your star witness, but even that is better than trying to build a case just out of circumstantial evidence, which is what they had against e.g. HSBC.
If anything, the prosecutor's loss highlights why prosecutors haven't gone after the big banks. If they can't even get a conviction with multiple loan department employees pleading guilty and testifying on behalf of the prosecution, imagine going after a big bank, where the link between the wrongdoing and the central command will be far more tenuous.
I find it very hard to find fault with the bank here. It appears that a single loan officer made illegal moves and upon first discovery the bank did what they could to both contain the issue and notify the authorities.
The malfeasant employee seems to have joined the prosecution against the bank only to relieve the pressure on himself and to distract attention (when in my opinion he should have been the one charged and the bank should have been commended on their handling of the case).
The other employees may have been negligent but do not appear to be malicious, if it wasn't for the alert eye of the director this could have gone on for a lot longer.
All in all this case seems to be a net loss for everybody.
What HSBC did went - as far as we can see from the outside - right to the top and required a lot more than a rogue employee.
It does not look like a single "rogue employee" but multiple employees in the department. Of course that doesn't mean anyone at the top is to blame, but one can see why the prosecutor would draw that inference.
> What HSBC did went - as far as we can see from the outside - right to the top and required a lot more than a rogue employee.
What about HSBC went to the top? The only thing from the indictment that was a policy from the top was not classifying Mexico as a "high risk" country for money laundering controls purposes. There wasn't even a "single loan officer . . . [who] joined the prosecution against the bank only to relieve the pressure on himself" willing to testify that a higher up made that classification decision with specific intent to profit from money laundering.
If there had been a witness like Mr. Yu in the HSBC case, the government would've settled for a lot more than it did.
I suspect the real reason is the quote at the bottom of the page:
"Vance — and by extension, New York’s entire state and federal regulatory regime — gain credibility for their tough stance against an allegedly sketchy institution. The mere indictment builds political capital, regardless of whether there’s any factual basis for their claims."
In other words: this case was brought to Enhance Vance's stature, not because of the gravity of the case.
Yu's supervisor was as far as I understand the case the only other person that should have faced charges, the rest is either operating on instruction from Yu or simply did not know about it and did the right thing once the situation came to light.
Yu's supervisor should have probably caught this in an earlier stage, it went on for too long.
What are the chances that if the individuals could muster the same legal firepower that the bank has that the case against them would also fall apart?
The relevant sentence in the article is:
"Facing indictment and the threat of long prison sentences, eight Abacus loan department employees entered guilty pleas and agreed to cooperate with the district attorney’s investigation."
So according to the article it was the threat of long prison sentences that caused them to enter guilty pleas, not that they were in any way found guilty after a trial.
In short: there was no trial, so whether or not the case against them would fall apart if there had been remains to be seen.
But the article strongly suggests that the main culprit set up underlings to defer to his higher authority. That makes them a lot less culpable than the indictment would make you believe.
Very bad situation, this.