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That's true, you can't hardcode certificate fingerprints for every site. Hence, TACK.


Yes, but TACK, even if it's a big step forward, does not address the main problem: we need to get rid of a central authority we have to trust. And TACK does nothing to address that. And neither does Certificate Transparency as proposed by Google.

I really feel the correct step forward is Convergence or Perspectives. If just browser vendors would jump in, we could use it right away. Mozilla/Google could set up a few notaries and set them as trusted by default in the browser. They choose the CAs they put in our browsers anyway, so we trust them already. That trust could be implemented with notaries instead of the CA model, so if someone wants to setup their own notaries they can.

What's your take on this? I value your opinion on security matters.


By moving towards decoupling the CAs from the Internet trust model, TACK is a step towards getting something like Convergence bootstrapped. Once we accept that the CAs are a utility player and not the ultimate arbiter of security, it's not hard to get to a place where we can start verifying "pins" with sites run by EFF or ACLU.

The biggest security problem on the Internet isn't protocols and it isn't cryptography. It's that the UX the browsers have for managing/configuring Internet trust hasn't changed since the late 1990s, and it's buried 3-4 levels deep in the "no user serviceable parts" section of the config UI. There are a lot of very productive things you could do for Internet security simply by revamping that UX, without making a single wire-level change to the TLS or HTTP protocols.




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