When you're writing a program for generic use, you can't trust the underlying system to be set up above and beyond a stock install. If you want to use seeding as a workaround, it should be done from every program that requires secure randomness. That doesn't seem to be what you're advocating. And if you're just generating a key, why not read it directly from random instead?
You can pretend that urandom gives good randomness and be surprised when you get key collisions. Just like you can pretend that strncpy null-terminates strings and be surprised when you get a buffer overflow vulnerability. That makes you a menace.
For what's it's worth, I agree that an adequately seeded CSPRNG should never 'run out' of entropy, and I wouldn't mind if Linux got a BSD-style shared random/urandom.
But as it stands, urandom is not guaranteed to be adequately seeded, and I have no idea why you would advocate taking that risk.
Oh, we're talking past each other. Sorry. When I said "post", I meant the story this thread links to, not the comment thread. I believe you read the comments in their entirety. I think if you reread the post, you'd see that it rebuts your argument.
For encryption, the only way to be really secure is to have the same amount of randomness as there is data to encrypt, as a shared key. (A one time pad.)
This isn't that hard to do so long as you can give it to the people that need it ahead of time, and should solve all kinds of theoretical problems.
Mailing memory cards sealed in photoed glitter paint could work well too. It would be fun to 3D print a replica though.
