It's sad that this headline (presumably) is not tautological.
First, the TSA itself has admitted that there is no evidence of terrorist plots against aviation in the US[0].
Second, the circumstances under which 9/11 happened would be impossible to repeat. Plane cockpits are all but impenetrable[1] - the only reason that some of the 9/11 hijackers were successful was that the standard protocol for dealing with hijackers assumed that hijackers wanted to take the plane hostage for ransom, not use the plane as a weapon. This protocol was fixed almost immediately. (Note that United Airlines Flight 93 did not face the same fate as the other three planes, because the passengers knew what the hijackers were planning.)
Since it's impossible to take control of the cockpit as a hijacker these days, even if someone managed to bring a gun on board a flight, the most damage they could do is kill all the passengers (leaving the pilots unharmed). That is truly a horrible scenario, but that makes flying no more risky than going to the movies or going to school (eg. Newtown, Arapahoe, Boulder).
Of course, one "logical" conclusion is therefore to establish TSA-style security at every school, cinema, mall, etc... in which case we have turned the country into a police state, and we should expect the same crime rates as within federal prisons: http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=194
[1] I believe I read another comment on Hacker News a while back in which the pilot had a heart attack after the cockpit had been locked from the inside, but before leaving the gate, and it still took the fire department almost an hour to cut through the door.
> "[1] I believe I read another comment on here a while back in which the pilot had a heart attack after the cockpit had been locked from the inside, but before leaving the gate, and it still took the fire department almost an hour to cut through the door."
I can't find a report of this ever happening, though I did find an article from December 2001 which pointed out potential danger to pilots behind locked doors. It also notes that the danger of an incident mid-flight can be reduced by having a flight attendant step into the cockpit whenever one of the pilots steps out.
(Edit: Lest my nitpicky comment be misunderstood, it also talks a little about how strong the reinforcements are; I think your point about cockpit doors being extremely solid can be reasonably taken as fact.)
Recently in Africa a suicidal pilot crashed a regional jet[1], killing all aboard, after sending the co-pilot back to check something in the cabin. Due to the locks nobody could re-enter the flight deck (might not have mattered, but who knows). "[The] cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder revealed, that the captain was alone on the flight deck, banging on the flight deck door could be heard on the cockpit voice recorder"
Passenger aircraft are supposed to NEVER operate with only one person on the flight deck, but rules are not always followed.
We don't know how many hijackings have been prevented by the locking doors. Are there any documented cases? We do know of a few cases where they have caused deaths, or at least prevented any chance to try to avert a disaster.
Could that happen? It's not that hard to know that the doors can be locked, and if so, you pretty much give up on trying to get in to the cockpit to take over the plane.
I don't know much about flying airplanes, but does a pilot really need to lock the copilot out of the cockpit for an extended period of time to crash the plane? It seems to me that it's probably not worth spending resources on securing airlines against terrorist pilots (other than doing research on the pilots, obviously).
But according to Cialidini's "Influence", there is a ten times higher chance of dying in a plane crash if you fly in the months immediately after a highly publicized suicide, so securing the plane against a suicidal pilot (as opposed to anyone wanting to carry out a terrorist attack) might very well be more worthwhile than securing it against terrorists.
(Cialdini cites research, which I'm too lazy to look up right now, that claims something as high as 40-50 excess deaths from car and plane crashes in the US per highly publicized suicide)
My claim wasn't due to the danger of a suicidal pilot, but rather the futility of securing a plane against a suicidal pilot. It seems like the problem is roughly equivalent to creating a plane that can operate entirely without a pilot.
I know. But it need not be that hard - being suicidal does not automatically mean someone is prepared to e.g. fight their co-pilot to kill themselves. In fact, most people who are suicidal are not strongly intent on going through with it - it often takes just a little nudge one way or the other to change the outcome.
A co-pilot at the helm, or an unlocked door through which someone may come in and question the pilots actions could very well make all the difference.
The interesting bit (from the book IIRC) is that the copiers will often wait some time so it seems like they are not copying. This is why the risk to subsequent air travel increases after some delay from the original incident. People are partially unpredictable, so it's possible to have an immediate copy as well.
With seatbelts and their introduction there were anecdotes about people crashing their cars into ponds, lakes etc. where their lives were saved because they were not wearing their seatbelts. I think it is human nature to want to repeat the one incident where the safety measures could have led to disaster.
Since you are so adept at research, can you find this one for me?
Recently a senior New Labour politician who was responsible for bringing in TSA style checks in the UK wise-cracked about how those that complained should be offered two lines at the airport, one with the body scanners, sniffer dogs, robocops etc. and another - to a different flight - where you could just walk straight on. He wondered which flight would be chosen to go on by those complaining types.
It bugs me now that I can't find the quote or remember whether it was Gordon Brown or some other politician.
Those little commuter planes are decidedly less safe in bad weather, and the pilots operating them tend to be younger/less experienced. It's not a perfect trade-off.
I was only responding to the following, which says nothing about smaller planes:
"Recently a senior New Labour politician who was responsible for bringing in TSA style checks in the UK wise-cracked about how those that complained should be offered two lines at the airport, one with the body scanners, sniffer dogs, robocops etc. and another - to a different flight - where you could just walk straight on. He wondered which flight would be chosen to go on by those complaining types."
Ah, sorry. I didn't read the GP post carefully. I saw "non TSA" and was thinking about the subject of the original article (where TSA security rules don't apply to very small commuter/charter aircraft).
Indeed they are but every plane needs to avoid bad weather as much as possible. Of course the bigger the plane the higher its limits.
Now on pilots, this really depends which pilots you are talking about. North American pilots, and here I am pointing at Canadian pilots more because I am in Canada and I am in the process of getting my PPL (for pleasure),however, I am sure this also applies to US pilots, very well trained. To get a job at a big airline you need experience, and where do you get the best experience, far up north where harsh weather, huge winds and tiny landing strips are located. I don't think that 3 years college will do, unless you are lucky.
I also talk to a lot of commercial pilots as my girlfriend is a flight attendant, so during the travels we go out and chat about everything.
As far as safety, over exaggerated, really. No one cares, well, people do but they shouldn't, because if someone wants to hijack I am sure they will find a way to do it. This is the big boys game on a government level. Tax payers are paying for scanners etc, whoever wins the bid makes them and they are sponsoring the next election. (I will not get into this here but you get the point). Scanners are useless.
This is an older video from 2010, scanners give better pictures nowdays but are still as useless as before. I got scanned at Schiphol 3 months ago, the scanner was not much different from the one shown this video.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=idICUSiGcqo
It is great to fly small planes, no security, quick, and more fun to fly than a big airliner.
I would pay extra for the walk-straight-on flight. Not a lot extra, mind you, but it'd be worth at least $25 to me to reduce that source of stress and uncertainty. If there were a no-checks airline I would fly that one almost exclusively.
You forget about the subset of crazed American freedom-lovers that may be on any given plane. Hijackers would have to somehow get past people willing to die to stop them. It's just not a viable method anymore.
Anyone who has the guts to take down an armed intruder to save anonymous people from becoming victims of a terrorist plot has my undying appreciation. But, you have to be crazed to do that. There is such a thing as good-crazy. We call it courage. I guess I wasn't clear on that. My bad.
It would not just be about saving anonymous people. It would be about the potential of saving your own life (not fighting back is a sure death, fighting back is only a possible, perhaps likely, death). It is also about saving the lives of family members or friends who might also be on the plane.
Not all fighting back scenarios involve crashing the plane into a field. In fact, now that cockpit doors are reinforced, most fighting back scenarios will end in the plane safely landing. There have already been several cases of passengers successfully fighting back before much damage was done.
tl;dr: I think fighting back is a rational response.
Fighting back if nobody else are willing to take the first step is a rational response. Doing what everyone else is doing is a safer first response - in the hope that someone is crazy enough or desperate enough to be the first person to throw themselves at the guy with a weapon.
1) I know everybody else is thinking that theory. Nobody will move.
2) Bystander effect. Nobody will move.
In short, the one to act first will be me, 'cos y'all a bunch of cowards. (Hopefully not too coward to jump in once someone's made the first move though)
But what you really need to think about is- what if I'm not on that plane? What if every person on that plane is a coward? Will you wait in terror and lose your chance? Are you willing to take that risk?
The reality is that most people are willing to take that risk, intentionally, or more likely not (bystander effect, as you say).
Unless there's literally seconds until the hijacker will be untouchable, that's likely the most rational choice: play chicken with the other passengers, to see who gets desperate enough to act first.
Now, the moment someone acts, all bets are off - some non-negligible subset may quite likely follow the first person, depending on that persons social standing (people are more likely to jaywalk behind a jaywalker in a suit than one in less formal clothes, for example, if neither of them does anything else to get people to follow - our propensity to deviate from the group behaviour depends on how authoritative the person "leading the charge" appears)
Similarly, if at any point it appears that the hijacker will suddenly become impossible to take out, it becomes more rational to go first, out of the risk that nobody will act.
But the bystander effect is there for a reason: It is generally quite safe to do what everyone else is doing. Except when it isn't.
In terms of hijackings, as it turns out, it is quite safe: Most hijackings, even after 9/11, ends with no dead victims. 9/11 represented a small set of extreme aberrations from hijackings both before and after.
With that in mind, throwing yourself on an armed hijacker only becomes rational once it appears they'll otherwise gain control of the cockpit, at the earliest.
Bystander effect is less about safety and much more about leader/follower. The bystander effect is basically what happens when you get a lot of followers together near an "event". It can be prevented by the presence of a leader.
Anyway, I don't intend to wait and find out what the hijacker intends, and as the best window for action is going to be right after he/she walks by your seat, your window for action is small. When they are far away, you have to close the distance, which costs you surprise. So waiting to see if they are going to try to breach the cockpit is probably not the best plan.
Well, I guess if they take a hostage at the back of the plane and yell "take me to Prague!", it's probably not worth it, I guess there would need to be some attempt to read their intentions.
Nitpicking, but I wouldn't consider the people they are saving to be anonymous, but strangers. Maybe in the defender's eyes they are just fellow Americans.
I would like to believe I would be the one trying to stop them. But, frankly, I've never had a loaded weapon pointed at my face. No one knows how they're going to respond with death knowing at their door. It's something you have to experience.
I think both of those are a great example of the fact that X-Ray + metal detectors provide sufficient protection in conjunction with alert passengers. Is the guy next to you trying to light his shoe or trying to set his pants on fire? Take him down.
More importantly, security is provided by catching would be terrorists before they even get anywhere near the airport. Because otherwise they can do a lot more damage at a crowded security checkpoint than they could with whatever explosives they managed to mix in their underwear. This is a job for intelligence agencies, not for the TSA.
Bomb sniffing dogs are more effective at a fraction of the cost.
But really, if someone wants to destroy a plane, they're going to be able to destroy a plane. The question is not "should we try to stop people from blowing things up?" The question is "what are reasonable and effective means to stop people from blowing things up?"
> But really, if someone wants to destroy a plane, they're going to be able to destroy a plane.
Unless we have measures to prevent them from getting on the plane in the first place, and since no bombs have been going off on a plane for quite a while, isn't that a sign that the security measures are working?
You can't point to this as a success of the security measures. First, it implies that there are a significant number of bombers who are either captured or deterred. If the first was true, both the Bush admin and the Obama admin would be touting it as a success. If these "numerous" bombers are being deterred, you can't point to the security measures as the deterrent. It might be the NSA, CIA, or other organizations (US and other) that would be disrupting their plans. Otherwise it's back to the magic rock that keeps tigers away.
> You can't point to this as a success of the security measures. First, it implies that there are a significant number of bombers who are either captured or deterred. If the first was true, both the Bush admin and the Obama admin would be touting it as a success. If these "numerous" bombers are being deterred, you can't point to the security measures as the deterrent.
Why not? I'm not saying you're wrong, just that you are making a claim without backing it up.
To me this is the prime reason that the TSA is useless. There are a half dozen ways to get explosives and other stuff THROUGH TSA checkpoints, not to mention the other dozen exit points into the airport. Anyone determined enough, will get through. About the only person they have a chance in stopping is a random lay person who just decided this morning. And they don't even seem to be able to stop that person. But looking at all the other risks in life, I'll take my chances.
Sorry to break it to you, but bomb sniffing dogs are not really all that great at sniffing all means and methods for creating and delivering "bombs". And dogs don't make corporate and political parasites billions of dollars. How do you expect the exploiting class to live without tapping into citizen tax supported corporate welfare profits?
The Israelis liked to claim that both probably would have been spotted at the multiple checkpoints they put into Ben Gurion Airport. Being as both were so anxious they more or less sweated through the bombs they were carrying.
That comparison is valid only if you have data demonstrating that the TSA has successfully deterred/foiled aviation terror plots.
If you have that data (which I'd love to see), there are still powerful arguments that TSA funding would have been better spent in many other ways (better training budgets for security/investigative personnel, more "soft" layers at airports, fewer kneejerk infrastructure upgrades).
Let's all remember why the TSA was created; solely so the Bush administration could buffer the economic impact of their shit economic policy and the effects of the terrorist attacks that group of feeble minded simpletons played right into. It's a make-work program, plain and simple.
Let's also remember what genius methods and techniques the "terrorists" used to hijack some planes....they "smuggled" some box cutters on the plane. .... The END ... FIN
I bet you if any one of you put a plastic craft blade, you know, the marker sized ones with the break away blades, in your carry on bag you would not be stopped or discovered; especially if you placed it with the blade on edge to the image.
Here's a tip though, never, NEVER ever will another plane be hijacked by anyone else using those means. Not only did the "authorities" finally secure the cockpits like it had been pleaded for years prior to 9/11, but I can guarantee you that anyone even attempting would be ripped apart by the limbs. I, for one, don't care if you were able to smuggle a middle-earth battle axe on the plane; you will be dead within seconds of pulling some shit.
That being said, I'm not quite certain if it has gotten any better, but just relatively recently it was still rather easy to access the runways and bays. Just saying, the phantoms we are fighting might get "genius" and pull of a "highly sophisticated plot" that my seven year old could plane and execute with just a tablet computer at their disposal.
Let's all remember why the TSA was created; solely so the Bush administration could buffer the economic impact of their shit economic policy and the effects of the terrorist attacks that group of feeble minded simpletons played right into. It's a make-work program, plain and simple.
Initially, the Bush administration and the GOP resisted the creation of a Federal airport security service. They were not at all excited about a big new (particularly unionized) government workforce. But the Democrats fought for it and won that political argument. Here's a contemporaneous news account that covers the basics: http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=87570
The GOP had majorities in both the House and Senate, and the linked article mentions begins by mentioning the unanimous passage of the bill in the Senate. The law in question was the Aviation Security Act. When it passed in the house, 136 Democrats voted against it (partly due to concerns about unionization eligibility), but only 2 Republicans and 1 independent did. So I don't think it's fair to say 'the GOP resisted the creation' of the TSA. As for the administration, transportation secretary Mineta wanted to federalize airport security from the outset.
The GOP had majorities in both the House and Senate...
No, they didn't. By then, Senator Jim Jeffords had become an independent, caucusing with the Democrats and giving them a one-vote majority control of the chamber. Also, FWIW, Norm Mineta was the token Democrat in the Bush cabinet.
And of course everyone voted for the bill once it was clear it would pass. Who wanted to be against enhanced airline security?
I'm not saying the GOP put up the fight of the century on the TSA, far from it. But it's a mischaracterization of history to say that Bush demanded a dramatic expansion of the Federal workforce as some kind of economic smokescreen. If that were so, you'd expect to find accounts of Democrats at least raising token opposition to this brilliant political stratagem.
> Let's all remember why the TSA was created; solely so the Bush administration could buffer the economic impact of their shit economic policy and the effects of the terrorist attacks that group of feeble minded simpletons played right into. It's a make-work program, plain and simple.
The transfer of existing security responsibilities from airlines to the federal government wasn't a make-work program, it was a measure to eliminate potential airline liability for future security failures.
It was about the economy, because reducing the airlines liability risk going forward was one of many steps taken to help the airline industry, but it wasn't primarily a "make-work" program.
It was also at least partly intended to streamline coordination of all the parties involved. You had various federal organizations under Treasury, DOJ, DOD, FBI, DOT, and others that were all silos. Sounds good on paper, merge them into one overall "DHS" and poof everything runs like a Swiss watch. Of course that never happens in reality. It was just an even bigger bureaucracy that still has a bunch of internal silo organizations.
Forming DHS was, at least notionally, about coordination. Moving airline security from private carriers to the federal government was about liability. Since it was a new internal security operation, it made sense to included it in the new internal security department. But since it wasn't a federal agency before, it wasn't really part of the coordination of existing federal agencies that motivated the creation of a new internal security department.
Meanwhile, one of my pet peeves is that while they stop small sharp items, I can, and do, carry my 1.2 meter umbrella with a solid wood handle and thick steel ribs. It would take about 10 minutes to reshape it into a sturdy pike. To be clear, I don't think they should stop them, but I do think that if you aim to stop sharp items with the excuse that they might be used as weapons, stopping something that can actually easily be turned into a fairly dangerous weapons ought to be top of the list.
First time I was travelling with it, I went to check it in, and they looked at me as if I was stupid. Clearly no terrorist has tried to use a huge umbrella as a pike yet, so it's not yet a risk. If I was a terrorist, testing a suitable set of objects with enough sharpened metal pieces for whether or not they'd ask me to check them in would be trivial - any terrorists being stopped by their lack of ability to bring something sharp on are so dumb they'd be stopped by someone drawing a stop sign in crayons and insisting they're not allowed to pass.
So the terrorists are either really stupid, there aren't that many of them, or they, like you, are smart enough to realise that they'd better have some pretty horrible weapons to be able to survive a hijack attempt in a post-9/11 world.
In other words, it's not even about stopping sharp items, but about giving the appearance of stopping a suitable set of objects that will keep people concerned about terror threats.
What about liquids? Pretty much every trip I end up forgetting some bottle or other of liquids, generally a half litre bottler of some drink, often because the mother of my child keeps putting bottles in his bag that I don't notice until after security. Not once have they been noticed at the security checks.
So it's a show, as those who do want to get liquids past can just put them in their carry on and send it through with good odds of being able to walk straight on. If they cared, they'd do better. But they don't care, as this is not about stopping a viable plot, but about keeping up appearances.
Meanwhile my 4 year old was picked out for secondary screening when we flew to visit my mother for christmas, without setting off the metal detectors, and had to pass his shoes through and go through the new scanners, and get patted down; I was furious, but didn't want to upset or scare him or risk messing up his christmas by making a fuss about it; and when we'd gone through, I found a full drinks bottle in his bag that they'd missed.
A wooden stick with sharpened steel ribs sufficiently strong to penetrate a body sticking out in front of it does not strike you as more likely to be useful than a pair of scissors or something along those lines in keeping other passengers in check?
My point is not that it'd be a great weapon - it's not. But compared to the stuff they are confiscating, it's miles ahead in terms of potential damage.
It demonstrates either a total lack of critical thinking when deciding what to allow, or how little this has to do with security, or both.
Personally I'm quite pleased they don't ban my umbrella, but I'd prefer it if they removed most stuff from the list of banned items.
The idea that the Bush administration created the TSA just to create jobs is ridiculous. There are much cheaper ways to create jobs (e.g. fixing highways), and much as people like to deride George Bush's intelligence, there is no way his administration would have created the TSA for such a stupid reason.
It's not hugely complex to create interlocks such that the cabin occupancy is monitored and the locks are opened when the cabin has fewer than two occupants. I can't immediately think of a completely failsafe version, but I suspect with a bit of time this could be readily achieved.
Might be because the airplane is already over US territory. Thus, if you smuggle a bomb on board and the plane explodes, it might crash into a US city. Flights going to the States need to travel for quite a few hours before they reach US territory.
Thus cockpits doors are not impenetrable if you could bring the necessary tools with you. If we did remove the security screening an attacker could come with 30 kg of professional cutting gear in his bag, and not even safes and concrete walls can withstand that for long.
Ever used professional cutting gear? There is no carry on bag I've ever seen that would fit the smallest petrol powered gear I've used. The blade alone is 300mm http://www.hirepool.co.nz/equipment-hire/s1/1/s3/61/FetchGro...
However electric gear is smaller. If you can find a power point and a decent extension lead, run it to the pilot's door, avoid someone unplugging it, don't blow a fuse, don't get it too smokey to breath (bring respirator or get a passenger to assist by pouring water on the door - avoid the water/electrics issue as that can be dangerous. 1 minute of cutting can make so much dust/smoke you can't see your hand in front of your face). You'll be through that door in under an hour!
I think that the most serious risk in this scenario is that pilots would have a great chance to die of laughter when they'd figure out what this noise is.
Doesn't matter. By the time they cut through the door, the pilot would already have performed an emergency landing at a nearby airport. You're going to have a hard time cutting through the cockpit door when a SWAT officer is pressing your head against the floor.
Do you not think someone would spot them sawing the door open? Also keep in mind that pilots are FLYING THE AIRPLANE. They can just start to do maneuvers that would make it impossible for attackers to even stay at the cockpit door, let alone take it apart.
"About twenty minutes after takeoff, as the flight crew carried on a casual conversation, Calloway entered the flight deck and commenced his attack. Every member of the crew took multiple hammer blows which fractured [the flight crew's] skulls. A lengthy struggle ensued with the flight engineer and captain as Tucker, also an ex-Navy pilot, performed extreme aerial maneuvers with the aircraft, at times flying upside down, with the intent to keep the hijacker off-balance."
First, the TSA itself has admitted that there is no evidence of terrorist plots against aviation in the US[0].
Second, the circumstances under which 9/11 happened would be impossible to repeat. Plane cockpits are all but impenetrable[1] - the only reason that some of the 9/11 hijackers were successful was that the standard protocol for dealing with hijackers assumed that hijackers wanted to take the plane hostage for ransom, not use the plane as a weapon. This protocol was fixed almost immediately. (Note that United Airlines Flight 93 did not face the same fate as the other three planes, because the passengers knew what the hijackers were planning.)
Since it's impossible to take control of the cockpit as a hijacker these days, even if someone managed to bring a gun on board a flight, the most damage they could do is kill all the passengers (leaving the pilots unharmed). That is truly a horrible scenario, but that makes flying no more risky than going to the movies or going to school (eg. Newtown, Arapahoe, Boulder).
Of course, one "logical" conclusion is therefore to establish TSA-style security at every school, cinema, mall, etc... in which case we have turned the country into a police state, and we should expect the same crime rates as within federal prisons: http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=194
[0] http://tsaoutofourpants.wordpress.com/2013/10/17/tsa-admits-...
[1] I believe I read another comment on Hacker News a while back in which the pilot had a heart attack after the cockpit had been locked from the inside, but before leaving the gate, and it still took the fire department almost an hour to cut through the door.