Historically, intelligence monitoring of communications providers was done extra-legally (by employees at the communications providers who either worked directly for or were compensated or politically-motivated agents of intelligence agencies). When it doesn't need to be used in court, there are a lot more options. Stuff as simple as an employee providing copies of the day's tapes.
Later, intelligence agencies got smart (particularly the Israelis) and ran cut-rate service providers for support services (VoIP termination, billing reconciliation, etc.), selling to existing consumer-facing providers, primarily for information.
Just because FBI is talking about this for law enforcement purposes (implying they don't have it now) doesn't mean they don't necessarily have various types of existing access for their dual role as a counterintelligence agency, or that other organizations (US and foreign) don't have access.
ECHELON shows us that the US (and the 4 other countries involved) are happy to sidestep the law and spy on their citizens.
ECHELON did it by having 5 nations involved. If the US wanted information on a US citizen they'd pass that name onto the 4 other countries who would do the spying for them.
ECHELON was also used for industrial espionage, providing lots of information to US aerospace.
As far as I know, data obtained using ECHELON or Predator or whatever they are are calling it this month, would not be admissible in court. The spying approach might work for the NSA, but the FBI needs data they can use in a court case.
Data that you can't use in court can still be very valuable. For example, if they can illegally determine whom to follow or where to look, then they can focus on collecting enough legally obtained information to paint a picture that gets them a warrant.
This would probably be considered fruit of the poisonous tree so would also be inadmissible. Whether the defence could show that to be the case though is another matter.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but the "No Fly List" doesn't come from a court, does it? That's why it's important that any kind of restriction or punishment be reviewed by and sentenced by a judge after due process. The ISP six-strikes policy comes to mind.
Historically, intelligence monitoring of communications providers was done extra-legally (by employees at the communications providers who either worked directly for or were compensated or politically-motivated agents of intelligence agencies). When it doesn't need to be used in court, there are a lot more options. Stuff as simple as an employee providing copies of the day's tapes.
Later, intelligence agencies got smart (particularly the Israelis) and ran cut-rate service providers for support services (VoIP termination, billing reconciliation, etc.), selling to existing consumer-facing providers, primarily for information.
Just because FBI is talking about this for law enforcement purposes (implying they don't have it now) doesn't mean they don't necessarily have various types of existing access for their dual role as a counterintelligence agency, or that other organizations (US and foreign) don't have access.