TLS inspection can _never_ be implemented in a good way, you will always have cases where it breaks something and most commonly you will see very bad implementations that break most tools (e.g. it is very hard to trust a new CA because each of OS/browser/java/python/... will have their own CA store)
This means devs/users will skip TLS verification ("just make it work") making for a dangerous precedent. Companies want to protect their data? Well, just protect it! Least privilege, data minimization, etc is all good strategies for avoiding data leaking
You also need some decent support + auditing. There are a couple of places to configure (e.g. setting CURL_CA_BUNDLE globally covers multiple OSS libraries) but there will be cases where someone hits one of the edge clients and tries to ignore the error, which ideally would lead to a scanner-triggered DevOps intervention. I think a fair amount of the rancor on this issue is really highlighting deeper social problems in large organizations, where a CIO should be seeing that resentment/hostility toward the security group is a bigger risk than the surface problem.
This means devs/users will skip TLS verification ("just make it work") making for a dangerous precedent. Companies want to protect their data? Well, just protect it! Least privilege, data minimization, etc is all good strategies for avoiding data leaking