Are you suggesting that there's a kind of network equipment that you have to trespass to access for which people have a reasonable expectation that they are authorized to use it?
There's no giant sign hanging over the breaker box in my building's elevator room saying "AUTHORIZED USE ONLY", but I'm pretty sure I'd get in trouble if I went in there and started flipping switches.
If I'm a student, and there's a switch in the teachers' lounge that connects to the same network that I am allowed to access in the rest of the school, then I can illicitly enter the teachers' lounge and plug in to that network with the same authorization that I would have outside.
Look, if your issue here is that there's no apparent bright line that needs to be crossed to violate the CFAA --- that you don't have to break a 128 bit AES key for instance, or inject a ROP payload --- I guess that's a valid complaint, but it speaks to a pretty profound (and very common, especially with nerds) misunderstanding about the way the law works.
The prosecution does not need to produce a cryptographically signed unimpeachable notarized audit log spelling out exactly which parts of the US Code Swartz broke at each timestamped moment of the day.
Instead, they have to convince a jury that a reasonable person should believe that Swartz knew he was violating JSTOR's terms, took constructive steps to violate those terms, and did so purposefully to commit a fraud.
All we have to go on is the story laid out in the indictment; Swartz has a side to tell here too. But if you just go on the indictment, I think there's a pretty decent case to be made against him.
There's no giant sign hanging over the breaker box in my building's elevator room saying "AUTHORIZED USE ONLY", but I'm pretty sure I'd get in trouble if I went in there and started flipping switches.