>NIST has standardized a set of PQC constructions; I think the jury is in there.
Published 4 days ago, thanks for the heads up. I was curious if they would delay announcing the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm as their choice after a paper claimed that they were able to decrypt it without quantum. I just looked the paper up and they had a bug in their code, so their claim was dropped. https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/555
>DNSSEC isn't reasonable
Memo doesn't mention it, but please enlighten me as to why you feel this way. I think it's a low-effort way to prevent a (admittedly esoteric) attack.
The NIST PQC standards were published very recently, but selected 2 years ago.
If you use the search bar below and do "DNSSEC by:tptacek", I can spare this threat a recitation of an argument I've made many times before. I would say, with some pretty solid empirical backing, that DNSSEC is more or less a dead letter at this point, most especially in North America.
Of course, "DNS encryption" (which is in the OMBZT memo) can mean a lot of things, and DoH is certainly not dead!
Published 4 days ago, thanks for the heads up. I was curious if they would delay announcing the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm as their choice after a paper claimed that they were able to decrypt it without quantum. I just looked the paper up and they had a bug in their code, so their claim was dropped. https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/555
>DNSSEC isn't reasonable
Memo doesn't mention it, but please enlighten me as to why you feel this way. I think it's a low-effort way to prevent a (admittedly esoteric) attack.