Honest question. Submitting these types of bugs only to get a: "we have determined it is known low risk issue..." seems like they really don't want to pay for someone else's time and dedication in making their product safer. If they knew about this, was this disclosed somewhere? If not I don't see them playing a fair game. What's the motivation to do this if in the end they can have the final decision to award you or not? To me it looks like similar to what happens with Google Play/Apple store to decide whether or not an app can be uploaded/distributed through them.
Edit: I popped this up because to me is absolutely miserable from a big company to just say: "Thanks, but we were aware of this".
I don't think they're being underhanded exactly... they're just making a terrible decision. Quoting from the article:
> The average user views the separation of private and public repositories as a security boundary, and understandably believes that any data located in a private repository cannot be accessed by public users. Unfortunately, as we documented above, that is not always true. Whatsmore, the act of deletion implies the destruction of data. As we saw above, deleting a repository or fork does not mean your commit data is actually deleted.
"We surveyed a few (literally 3) commonly-forked public repositories from a large AI company and easily found 40 valid API keys from deleted forks."
This is how your customers get their entire cloud taken over, because you made a stupid, stupid decision and instead of fixing it when warned (repeatedly!) you instead decide to just blame the customer for not reading page 537 paragraph 3 subsection B about the counter-intuitive security footgun you've left in your product.
If you published a key, you must assume someone copied it and that deleting references to it is not sufficient. You must rotate that key now, and should check whether it was used improperly. This is pretty basic incident response.
The thing about exposing commits that were only ever in a private repo is pretty indefensible, but not garbage collecting public commits on delete shouldn't matter.
Why would anyone think that a private fork is "published"!?
This is the footgun here: The UI is telling you that nobody can see the secrets you committed to your private copy, but actually it is widely accessible.
A similar example of UI-vs-reality mismatch that I've noticed recently is the Azure Store Account "public" visibility. By default, it uses your authenticated account for RBAC access checks, so if you click around it'll say something like "you don't have browse access". This looks secure, but attempting access anonymously would have succeeded!
I had a customer recently where this happened -- they clicked through every Storage Account to "check" them, convinced themselves they were secure, meanwhile they had database backups with PII accessible to world+dog!
Putting keys in repos should not be done, full stop. Even if GitHub forks weren’t public, their _private_ repos could one day be compromised. Instead, store keys in a shared vault, .gitignore the .env and have a .env.example with empty keys.
Don't blame the end user for doing something you don't want them to do if it is more convenient to do and works without immediate consequences. Redesign it or rethink your assumptions.
The bit you quoted is referring to public forks that were deleted. That sounds like a non-issue to me, and I'm not at all surprised that
1. Public "forks" are just namespaced branches that share an underlying repo
2. They don't run the garbage collector all the time
I'd be surprised if those weren't true.
Like I said, the behavior with private forks sounds indefensible.
The OP is mixing together multiple things. Being able to access deleted public data isn't that surprising and definitely isn't a security issue as far as leaking keys is concerned (it was already public. Assume it has been cloned). Being able to access private forks is a footgun/issue. They should be garbage collecting as part of public repo creation so that unreferenced commits from private forks aren't included.
As far as I can tell, they never run the garbage collector. Code I pushed to a fork that was deleted several years ago can still be accessed through the original parent repo.
> Why would anyone think that a private fork is "published"!?
Anyone who put sensitive content in a git repo should consider published anyway. Git is a decentralized tool, as a company you cannot control the amount of git remotes that may host your code. Considering your code is only hosted as a private repo in a specific remote git server is at best naive. This is without even considering the amount of copies that are stored in dev computers.
Besides, anyone who put stuff on a third party publicly accessible infrastructure should consider it published anyway as breaches happen all the time.
If you happen to have api keys stored in a git repo, the only viable response is rotating those keys.
If the criteria for bug is "not intended", and that's solely judged by the company, then broken auth et al. suddenly become part of their product design.
I can see this argument making a bit of sense, but if they documented this 3 years after the issue was reported, they don't have a way to demonstrate that they truly already knew.
At the end it boils down to: is Github being honest and fair in answering the bug bounty reports?
If you think it is, cool.
If you don't, maybe it's not worth playing ball with Github's bug bounty process
It doesn't matter if they knew. If they don't deem it a security vulnerability --- and they have put their money where their mouth is, by documenting it as part of the platform behavior --- it's not eligible for a payout. It can be a bug, but if it's not the kind of bug the bounty program is designed to address, it's not getting paid out. The incentives you create by paying for every random non-vulnerability are really bad.
The subtext of this thread is that companies should reward any research that turns up surprising or user-hostile behavior in products. It's good to want things. But that is not the point of a security bug bounty.
> The incentives you create by paying for every random non-vulnerability are really bad.
So much this. It's pretty clear that most people commenting on this thread have never been involved in a bug bounty program on the company's side.
Bug bounty programs get a lot of reports, most of which are frankly useless and many of which are cases of intended behavior subjectively perceived as problematic. Sifting through that mess is a lot of work, and if you regularly pay out on unhelpful reports you end up with many more unhelpful reports.
This particular case definitely feels like one where the intended behavior is horribly broken, but there are absolutely many cases where "this is intended" is the only valid answer to a report.
That's true, but what's stopping a company from documenting a security issue as a known (mis)behaviour/bug? [*]
Companies can join/setup a bug bounty program, and just use it as a fig leaf for pretending to care about their own product/service's security.
Of course bug bounties can and are abused daily by people who report trivial non-issues in the hope of compensation
But in the same way, companies can also be bad actors in the way that they engage with bounties. I would usually expect big names (like Google, Apple, Github, etc.) to be trustworthy...
[*] Of course what stops companies is precisely them not being seen as trustworthy actors in the bug bounty system anymore... And for now, that's a decision that individuals have to make themselves
No large company cares even a tiny bit about the money they're spending on bug bounties. They would literally lose money trying to cheat, because it would cost them more in labor to argue with people than to pay out. In reality, the bounty teams at Google and Apple are incentivized to maximize payouts, not minimize them.
If you don't trust the company running a bounty, don't participate. There are more lucrative ways to put vulnerability research skill to use.
Github chooses to store all "Github forks" in the same repository, and allow accessing things in that repository even when they are not reachable by the refs in the namespace of one "fork". That is purely a Github decision.
They could have split forks off into new repos, but then they wouldn’t be forks, in the repository sense. It was never hard to just copy a repo instead of forking it. The UX just leads people into holding it wrong.
Shouldn't that be on the config page for the repo below the "private" button with a note saying private is not actually private if it's a fork? And ditto for delete?
No large company running a bug bounty cares one iota about stiffing you on a bounty payment. The teams running this programs are internally incentivized to maximize payouts; the payouts are evidence that the system is working. If you're denied a payment --- for a large company, at least --- there's something else going on.
The thing to keep in mind is that large-scale bug bounty programs make their own incentive weather. People game the hell out of them. If you ack and fix sev:info bugs, people submit lots more sev:info bugs, and now your security program has been reoriented around the dumbest bugs --- the opposite of what you want a bounty program to do.
In my (admittedly limited) experience, whilst payouts for bugs might be seen as a positive internally, payments for bad architecture/configuration choices are less so (perhaps as they're difficult to fix, so it's politically not expedient to raise them internally).
To provide one example I reported to a large cloud provider that their managed Kubernetes system exposed the Insecure port to the container network, meaning that anyone with access to one container automatically got cluster-admin rights. That pretty clearly seems like not a good security choice, but probably hard to fix if they were relying on that behaviour (which I'm guessing they were).
Their response was to say it was a "best practice" behaviour (no bounty applicable) and that they'd look to fix and asked me not to publicly mention it. Then they deprecated the entire product 6 months later :D
That's one example but I've seen similar behaviour multiple times for things that are more architecture choices than direct bugs, which makes me think reporting such things isn't always welcome by the program owners.
Repeating myself: this almost certainly has nothing at all to do with the money they'd have to give you (I assure you, if there's even a whiff of legitimacy to your report, the people managing the bounty would probably strongly prefer to pay you just to get you off their backs) and everything to do with the warped incentives of paying out stuff like this. People forget that the whole point of a bug bounty is that the rewarded bugs get fixed; the bounty is directing engineering effort. If it directs them to expensive work they already made a strategic decision not to do, the bounty is working against them.
You would prefer this company to have made a different strategic choice about what to spend engineering time on, and that's fine. But engineering cycles are finite, so whatever time they'd spend configuring K8s differently is time they wouldn't be spending on some other security goal, which, for all we know, was more important. Software is fathomlessly awful, after all.
Yep that's the point I was making, they don't want to pay out on architecture/configuration changes if making those would be expensive/difficult.
That doesn't mean the report isn't legitimate (being cluster-admin with no authentication is generally considered not to be a good security idea, in fact it's about as bad as it could get without putting the insecure port on the Internet), but that bug bounties aren't architected to accept that kind of issue. The challenge with this is it means that bug bounty researchers won't look for that kind of (legitimate) security issue as they get to know the programs often won't pay out.
Personally, I don't ever report bug bounties for the money reward, but so I don't get shouted at by companies when I write a blog or do a talk that covers the issues :) In this case I was a bit annoyed that they combined telling me it wasn't a bug, with asking me not to mention it publicly for 6+ months (IIRC they credited me like years after the fact).
Yes. Bug bounties are not a panacea, and were never intended to be. They have specific goals, and those goals surprise technologists working outside of the security teams that run the programs. They make a lot more sense when you remind yourself that they (a) direct engineering efforts and (b) create profound incentives; those facts together sharply constrain the problems they can be applied to.
As the article pointed out, GitHub already publicly documented this vulnerability.
My employer doesn't pay out for known security issues, especially if we have mitigating controls.
A lot of people spam us with vulnerability reports from security tools we already use. At least half of them turn out to be false positives we are already aware of. In my opinion, running a bug bounty program at all is a net negative for us. We aren't large enough to get the attention of anyone competent.
> As the article pointed out, GitHub already publicly documented this vulnerability.
I'm honestly not yet convinced that is enough here - I've fallen victim to this without realizing it - the behaviour here is so far removed from how I suspect most user's mental model of github.com works. For me none of the exposed data is sensitive, but the point remains I was totally unawares it would be retrievable like this.
If the behaviour flies so against the grain, just publishing it in a help doc is not enough I'd argue. The linked article makes the exact same argument:
> "The average user views the separation of private and public repositories as a security boundary, and understandably believes that any data located in a private repository cannot be accessed by public users. Unfortunately, as we documented above, that is not always true. Whatsmore, the act of deletion implies the destruction of data. As we saw above, deleting a repository or fork does not mean your commit data is actually deleted."
The problem with this line of argument is that the fundamental workings of git are also surprising to people, such that they routinely attempt to address mistaken hazmat commits by simple reverts. If at bottom this whole story is just that git is treacherous, well, yeah, but not news.
There's a deeper problem here, which is that making the UX on hosting sites less surprising doesn't fix the underlying problem. There is a best-practices response to commiting hazmat to a repository: revoke the hazmat, so that its disclosure no long matters. You have to do this anyways. If you can't, you should be in contact with Github directly to remove it.
Sure, but the whole point of the article is that people don't know their "private" forks aren't private. You can't get in touch with GitHub if you've never had any indication that anything's wrong.
aside: I think it's questionable to say that forking isn't a git concept. it's just a branch on a different upstream. Those two upstreams could simply be two different folders on your machine, or shared server.
I supposed the branding and UI for it could be a counter argument, but then again Github allows regular branch creation / committing / merging in their UI. Their main value add (not downplaying it—it's huge) on top of git (besides ancillary things like CI / linters) is the ability to comment on a branch's diff, i.e. a PR Review.
There's an entire custom UX flow for forking on GH that is not part of git at all. I think its very fair here to discuss "fork" in the specific sense Github uses it, as its what has lead to some of the issues discussed. There are absolutely means of providing fork functionality that don't have some of the problems we are discussing, but that's not how GH chose to build it.
1. GitHub has a nasty privacy/security hole, where commonsense expectations about the meanings of common words are violated by the system.
2. Github has publicly announced that they don't care about this part of user data security (private code), so won't pay people to know tell them what they alreay know and announced.
Github won't pay you to tell them they are wrong when everyone alreay knows.
The expectations for AWS and public repository hosting are not the same. If you leaked something to a public GitHub repo you should assume that it has been cloned the second you pushed it.
For both sides it turns into a net negative. Better to keep your bugs and use them when needed or sell them to others to use if possible.
Lets get back to what we had before when multiple people can find the same bug and exploit if needed. Now we have the one person who finds the bug it gets patched and they don't get paid.
Security disclosures are like telling someone they have a spot on their face. It's not always welcome, and there's no obligation on anyone to do so, nor anyone to return the favor.
In this case, the spot turned out to be a freckle, which everyone involved already knew was a freckle (since it was documented), and if anyone owes anyone anything, it's the researcher that owes github for wasting their time.
Disagree. This is obviously a deliberate design choice with obvious implications. Expecting a bounty for reporting this is unreasonable. These kind of beg bounties are exactly what gives security "researchers" a bad name.
The security implications are also minor. The only problem really is with making a fork of a private repo public - that should only make what exists in that fork public and not any other objects. Something that was already public staying public even when you delete it from your repo is not a security issue at all. Keys you have ever been pushed to a public repo should be revoked no matter what, with or without this GitGub feature.
I wasn't really expecting a bounty, more so hoping they'd fix the issue. For example, to this day I keep having to tell people to never fork the Unreal Engine repository, instead making a manual copy, just in case.
This causes lots of problems for repositories that are private with the expectation that companies will make private forks with their own private changes.
Someone once pushed a bunch of console SDKs (under strict NDA) to a private fork without knowing this. Now that code is just there, if you can guess the commit hash, forever. Literally nothing can be done to remove it. Great.
I reported a variant of this issue that (to me) was unexpected:
* You add someone to your private repo.
* After some time, you revoke their access.
As long as they keep a fork (which you can't control) they can use this same method to access new commits on the repo and commits from other private forks.
Back in 2018, this was a resolved as won't fix, but it also wasn't documented.
For moral reasons, historically I never wrote POCs or threatened disclosure.
For companies like Microsoft, which a CSRB audit showed that their security culture 'inadequate', the risk of disclosure with a POC is about the only tool we have to enforce their side of the Shared Responsibility Model.
Even the largest IT spender in the world, the US government has moved more from the carrot to the stick model. If they have to do it so do we.
Unfortunately as publishing a 'bad practices' list by us doesn't invoke the risk of EULA busting gross negligence claims, responsible disclosure is one of the few tools we have.
It's not just GitHub and it's not just because they don't want to pay bug hunters. In my career, I have escalated multiple bugs to my employer(s) in which the response was 'working as intended'. And they wouldn't have to pay me another cent if they acknowledged the issue.
In my experience, there was two reasons for this behavior:
1. They don't want to spin dev cycles on something that isn't directly related to revenue (e.g. security)
2. Developers don't have the same mindset as someone who's whole job is security. So they think something is fine when it's really not.
I didn't find anything mentioning it online at the time. But there wasn't much time and dedication involved either, to be fair. I discovered it completely on accident when I combined a commit hash from my local client with the wrong repository url and it ended up working.
The issue had been reported at least twice and was clearly documented. GitHub knew about this and had known for years. Their replies to the two notifications were even very similar.
GitHub clearly knew. Would you prefer that a vendor lie?
companies vary wildly in their honesty and cooperation with bug bounties and develop reputations as a result. if they have a shit reputation, people stop doing free work for them and instead focus on more honest companies
there are endless examples of reports that, by the judgement of the community, are entirely valid and unknown security concerns and fit within the guidelines of a company's bug bounty program, and do not ever result in payment
Edit: I popped this up because to me is absolutely miserable from a big company to just say: "Thanks, but we were aware of this".