To be sure - God and creation being indistinguishable isn't something that Spinoza would agree with either. Two relevant items here.
One is that God has an infinite number of attributes, only two of which are extension and thought (the only ones we can know). All physical things are modes of the attribute of extension, and all "mental" things are modes of the attribute of thought. So if creation just means the set of all physical things (or even "mental" things), these are just the set of all modes of extension, an attribute of God, (along with the set of all modes of thought, another attribute of God, if you include mental things). But these are but extension and thought are but two of the infinitely many attributes of God.
Two is that Spinoza draws a distinction between the set of all of the modes of the attributes of God (Natura naturata) and God himself (Natura naturans). (See the Note of Proposition 29 of Part 1 of Ethics.)
So if by pantheism we mean that God is nothing but the set of all things, Spinoza does not seem to be a pantheist.
That isn't to say that Spinoza is just a perfectly orthodox theologian, of course, but just that reducing the radical nature of his theology to the word "pantheism" (construed as creation and God being the same) appears to be an oversimplification.
(Also, minor note, in the last comment I said Leibniz thinks God actualizes the best possible worlds, that's a typo, I meant the best possible world, singular.)
Rough going so far, as Spinoza is both precise and uses words in the senses they had in Scholastic times.
I think I understand how Spinoza is not a pantheist, though: God determines Creation, in that the Creation is the maximal object that could be created from God, and the Creation determines God, in that God is the minimal object that could create the Creation, so they're two very distinct things, but in a 1:1 relationship.
(examples: intension/extension in logic, cones/gamut in vision, grammar/language in informatics)
I'm not sure how easy the distinction between his viewpoint and pantheism would have been to explain to someone with a XVII background, but Aquinas defo would've been unhappy with the "the deity can create any universe he wants, as long as it's black" part.
(hmm. if our universe only uses up two attributes, 'thought' for all the abstracts and 'extent' for all the concretes, are there any other universes lurking in the remaining infinity of attributes? this also opens the question of whether we're dealing with a countable infinity of attributes, or a higher cardinal...)
>Creation is the maximal object that could be created from God
Well, just the only one, but I suppose the maximal element of a set with one element is just that element, so yeah.
>Creation determines God, in that God is the minimal object that could create the Creation
Well, the only thing that could create Creation, but I suppose the minimal element of a set with one element is just that element, so yeah.
>Aquinas defo would've been unhappy with the "the deity can create any universe he wants, as long as it's black" part.
Hmm, I don't know what you mean by this. Spinoza isn't saying this, Spinoza is saying that God must have created only this universe, and everything that God does is necessary---there's nothing else he can do.
>if our universe only uses up two attributes
OK, so it's not that our universe is only uses two attributes, it's that we can only perceive things with respect to two attributes. There's only one possible universe, which is this one, and it's necessarily this one.
Yes, I was purposely playing with the trivial definitions of maximal and minimal (max{x} = min{x} = x) to draw out an analogy with the modern concept of Galois Connections.
> there's nothing else he can do.
Right, and I thought Aquinas' take was that he must be capable of doing otherwise, but doesn't.
> we can only perceive things with respect to two attributes
Aha, so this universe uses all (are they countable?) attributes, but we imperfect finite creatures only perceive thought and extension; angels might perceive three, or a dozen, or all the attributes? (which would make sense: Samuel Johnson can both think of a rock and perceive its extension of mass in space, but the rock, while it might "perceive" the extension of Johnson's foot in space does not think of Johnson. So a creature beyond us as we are beyond the rock might have metathought? "be not afraid" indeed!)
That's another reason to introduce the maximal and minimal: those def'ns would still go through even with an Aquinas-style god.
(and they yield an irreligious 1=3 trinitarian argument: if C takes a god to its maximal creation, and G takes a creation to its minimal god, then CG and GC are not necessarily the identity, but we do necessarily have C = CGC and G = GCG)
Definitely, Neoplatonism was a big influence on Abrahamic philosophical thought. Though the real locus classicus for God is Aristotle's Metaphysics, specifically his description of the unmoved mover. There are some not-so-minor differences between Aristotle's theology and Abrahamic theology, but God insofar as he is the ground of all being is a concept that most clearly originated in Aristotle's work.
oops, I was reading the "contingent things must be dependent upon necessary things" as implying modality, but you're right that if it's there it's only implicit.
right, there is something modal going on here, but in terms of the formal mathematical tool of modal logic, Spinoza isn't using them, though I think you understood that from the start.
One is that God has an infinite number of attributes, only two of which are extension and thought (the only ones we can know). All physical things are modes of the attribute of extension, and all "mental" things are modes of the attribute of thought. So if creation just means the set of all physical things (or even "mental" things), these are just the set of all modes of extension, an attribute of God, (along with the set of all modes of thought, another attribute of God, if you include mental things). But these are but extension and thought are but two of the infinitely many attributes of God.
Two is that Spinoza draws a distinction between the set of all of the modes of the attributes of God (Natura naturata) and God himself (Natura naturans). (See the Note of Proposition 29 of Part 1 of Ethics.)
So if by pantheism we mean that God is nothing but the set of all things, Spinoza does not seem to be a pantheist.
That isn't to say that Spinoza is just a perfectly orthodox theologian, of course, but just that reducing the radical nature of his theology to the word "pantheism" (construed as creation and God being the same) appears to be an oversimplification.
(Also, minor note, in the last comment I said Leibniz thinks God actualizes the best possible worlds, that's a typo, I meant the best possible world, singular.)