Rest assured I'm in no way proposing an "unconditional global skepticism of any and all knowledge" - just a sound skepticism which questions our assumptions.
There is no doubt room for a nuanced discussion about Kuhn and paradigms here. I admittedly painted with a broad brush. But your objections doesn't seem to directly address the problem at hand: would you say that there is indeed a use for a "canon" in history and philosophy of science? and how would you in that case avoid the problem of paradigms that necessarily would tend to inform such a canon?
Well for starters, I would like to think that responding to you counts as addressing "the problem at hand", unless you mean to say you were also not addressing it, and I joined you in being unresponsive by choosing to reply to you. But I would like to give you more credit than that.
Regarding the notion of a canon, it's good to have a notion of history of conceptual change that identifies a series of major advances that we hold up as exhibiting our highest standards. I would say though that I completely agree with the premise advanced by this article that it would benefit from establishing some consistent norms. I can't see the full paper, but it seems to be building out a great theory on how this happens in philosophy of science, and I think the history of Kuhn and post-Kuhn philosophers of science have exhibited how messy and all-over-the-map it can be and how, perhaps culminating in its most extreme expression in Against Method. Which I think testifies to the need for building out the kind of norms that the paper is advocating.
Thanks for several interesting reading suggestions, some of which I have now added to my to-read list. I failed to find any "relativity of wrong fallacy" however; probably you meant the essay "the relativity of wrong" by Isaac Asimov or "the relativist fallacy", part of the family of "logical fallacies" so popular in the rationalist movement foremost.
Those are interesting topics in their own right, although neither are applicable to my position, if I may say so myself (even if I lean towards Asimov, if anything). We may or may not find occasion to discuss this and related stuff, some other time.
There is no doubt room for a nuanced discussion about Kuhn and paradigms here. I admittedly painted with a broad brush. But your objections doesn't seem to directly address the problem at hand: would you say that there is indeed a use for a "canon" in history and philosophy of science? and how would you in that case avoid the problem of paradigms that necessarily would tend to inform such a canon?