It's funny how much popular perception of the war, mine included, is still distorted by wartime secrecy. Even after the war ended.
Some things (e.g. Dresden) are now more fully detailed.
But others (e.g. just how effective the Atlantic submarine campaign was, how weak the US Pacific fleet was pre-Midway) never seemed to have been revised post-war.
The Battle of the Atlantic was, for Britain, quite simply the most important theatre of the entire war, and yet is one of the least known beyond "convoys" today. 12 hour Sunderland and days long naval patrols weren't suitable for sexy movies, though there were a couple of b&w. It gave repeated opportunities to lose. From initial US reluctance to form convoys at all, despite British preference until loss rates convinced, through the Air Ministry neglect of Coastal Command both pre-war and early war. Always second place to Bomber and Fighter Commands yet the Ministry were determined to retain control during Admiralty efforts to coordinate activity with the Navy. Thankfully the Admiralty won out, or we would have lost.
The U Boat "happy times" could so easily have lost the war, and remarkably fast. Bridging the gap with "stupid" ideas like the improvised merchant carriers that carried a few obsolete, but remarkably effective Swordfish stringbags kept things going until mid-late war when convoys had a decent chance of escorts. The tech and boffins going into the Atlantic war are mainly invisible, just as important, but make a bomb bounce for a PR only dam raid and everyone and their dog knows those forever.
Bomber Harris (Bomber Command crews preferred to call him Butcher when avoiding profanity), had more the ear of the politicians. Churchill was supposedly not convinced by Harris' controversial, and often ludicrous, promises to win the war by air alone yet they got the men and aircraft that implied they did. Obviously with Dresden and other actions, Harris and Bomber Command is far better known and re-examined today. I've never been entirely convinced by Churchill and war cabinet's supposed reluctance to accept bombing given how well supported they were.
Approximately no one at all knows, writes books about or builds monuments to RAF Coastal Command or Western Approaches Command[1] (the Naval fleet and associated Admiralty group HQ in Liverpool) that actually did repeatedly stop us losing the war. There should be a Sunderland in the BBMF next to the Spitfires and Hurricane, not a bloody Lanc. Some revision and re-evaluation is probably long overdue.
One relative in Bomber Command, two in Coastal. I think my bias is showing. :)
Some things (e.g. Dresden) are now more fully detailed.
But others (e.g. just how effective the Atlantic submarine campaign was, how weak the US Pacific fleet was pre-Midway) never seemed to have been revised post-war.