To convince Churchill of Pykrete's qualities, Mountbatten put a block of Pykrete into Churchill's bath (while he was in it, according to the Wikipedia article):
What happened next was explained several years after the war by Lord Mountbatten in a widely-quoted after-dinner speech. "I was sent to Chequers to see the Prime Minister and was told he was in his bath. I said, 'Good, that's exactly where I want him to be.' I nipped up the stairs and called out to him, 'I have a block of a new material which I would like to put in your bath.' After that, he suggested that I should take it to the Quebec Conference." The demonstration in Churchill's steaming bath had been most dramatic. After the outer film of ice on the small pykrete cube had melted, the freshly exposed wood pulp kept the remainder of the block from thawing.
Interesting, I hadn't known remnants survived in the lake.
It draws 2 of 3 wrong reasons why it didn't go ahead though.
Not at all Iceland, that was long before, but leasing the Azores airbases in 43 made the biggest difference to the Atlantic Gap (U boat alley as this article calls it). The Atlantic Gap was massive[1]. Iceland offered its use to the US in 41 after the British invasion in 1940 following the German occupation of Denmark (Iceland was then Danish). Operation Fork if you want that rabbit hole[2]. :)
Centimetric radar made a big difference - thanks to the well known cavity magnetron story, but Bomber Command was pushing for priority, and there were modifications needed for it to work on the flying boats (ASV IIIC). So for Coastal Command initially on Wellington and Liberator only, with Coastal not coming on stream as soon as Bomber Command. Don't think it took too long to get to the boats though.
For the British side of the Atlantic, VLR (Very long range) Liberators were already available, and had been some time, but in limited numbers. They were distributed between the three Commands that wanted them (Bomber, Coastal and Transport). VLR Liberators were compromised from a fighting point of view (removed some or all turrets, armour and bomb bay space for the extra fuel tanks). Catalinas, Wellingtons and especially Sunderlands did more action against subs, despite more limited range. Sunderlands managed to increase range by about 40% with additional and temporary tanks - albeit pushing the III to its absolute limit. I think they managed to get about 2,600m from a III in the end, including the unofficial drop tanks, but that was brutal on engines. The V solved that with heavily uprated engines. Catalinas had very little space for extra fuel without compromising already limited armament.
Don't know much about anti sub operations the US side. Obviously they'd be far more Liberator, and probably Catalina heavy. :)
Back to Habbakuk. The scale made it faintly absurd, even though technically viable. The amount of steel and engineering needed was equivalent to a couple, perhaps more, conventional carriers.
So much so I'm seriously considering reading the full version.
The biggest revelation was just how close the shipping battle was circa-1942. Without timely technical and tactical advances, it's likely Britain would have been choked off and had to reach some kind of peace agreement. The civilian supply situation was literally within months of being that dire.
It's funny how much popular perception of the war, mine included, is still distorted by wartime secrecy. Even after the war ended.
Some things (e.g. Dresden) are now more fully detailed.
But others (e.g. just how effective the Atlantic submarine campaign was, how weak the US Pacific fleet was pre-Midway) never seemed to have been revised post-war.
The Battle of the Atlantic was, for Britain, quite simply the most important theatre of the entire war, and yet is one of the least known beyond "convoys" today. 12 hour Sunderland and days long naval patrols weren't suitable for sexy movies, though there were a couple of b&w. It gave repeated opportunities to lose. From initial US reluctance to form convoys at all, despite British preference until loss rates convinced, through the Air Ministry neglect of Coastal Command both pre-war and early war. Always second place to Bomber and Fighter Commands yet the Ministry were determined to retain control during Admiralty efforts to coordinate activity with the Navy. Thankfully the Admiralty won out, or we would have lost.
The U Boat "happy times" could so easily have lost the war, and remarkably fast. Bridging the gap with "stupid" ideas like the improvised merchant carriers that carried a few obsolete, but remarkably effective Swordfish stringbags kept things going until mid-late war when convoys had a decent chance of escorts. The tech and boffins going into the Atlantic war are mainly invisible, just as important, but make a bomb bounce for a PR only dam raid and everyone and their dog knows those forever.
Bomber Harris (Bomber Command crews preferred to call him Butcher when avoiding profanity), had more the ear of the politicians. Churchill was supposedly not convinced by Harris' controversial, and often ludicrous, promises to win the war by air alone yet they got the men and aircraft that implied they did. Obviously with Dresden and other actions, Harris and Bomber Command is far better known and re-examined today. I've never been entirely convinced by Churchill and war cabinet's supposed reluctance to accept bombing given how well supported they were.
Approximately no one at all knows, writes books about or builds monuments to RAF Coastal Command or Western Approaches Command[1] (the Naval fleet and associated Admiralty group HQ in Liverpool) that actually did repeatedly stop us losing the war. There should be a Sunderland in the BBMF next to the Spitfires and Hurricane, not a bloody Lanc. Some revision and re-evaluation is probably long overdue.
One relative in Bomber Command, two in Coastal. I think my bias is showing. :)
