* ... because the coiled, closely packed lines at TSA screening sites are the most dangerous places in airports, completely unprotected from a terrorist attack -- a terrorist attack that would serve the same purpose (shutting down air travel) as an attack on board an aircraft.*
This is a good point, but I don't completely agree with it. If terrorists can smuggle a bomb on board an airplane, they can probably smuggle tools on board that will allow them to break into the cockpit. Then (as we've seen), the plane itself can be used as a very large bomb. (Note that I am not venturing an opinion on whether backscatter imagers are a solution to this problem or whether the invasion of privacy is worth it even if they are.)
In the history of air travel has anybody ever breached a secured airplane cockpit (of any sort?).
To the extent that we're concerned about the security of cockpits, maybe our efforts are best directed towards better cockpit doors instead of strip-search machines.
In the history of air travel has anybody ever breached a secured airplane cockpit (of any sort?).
Excluding the events of 9/11, how many times have terrorists hijacked an airplane and flown it into a building? All I'm trying to say here is that the sample size is very small. How do we deal with the risk of unlikely but catastrophic occurrences?
To the extent that we're concerned about the security of cockpits, maybe our efforts are best directed towards better cockpit doors instead of strip-search machines.
I agree with this. I think El Al uses a double-door system, for example.
This is a good point, but I don't completely agree with it. If terrorists can smuggle a bomb on board an airplane, they can probably smuggle tools on board that will allow them to break into the cockpit. Then (as we've seen), the plane itself can be used as a very large bomb. (Note that I am not venturing an opinion on whether backscatter imagers are a solution to this problem or whether the invasion of privacy is worth it even if they are.)