The alternatives offered are: 1) the orca felt hope, 2) the orca was confused.
This article does not give any insight why and when animals would or would not grieve.
Functional homology is a method. If we assume that the caudate nucleus responds in canines similarly to the one in humans, we can say things about emotions in animals. In the end you will need more hypotheses to still keep the human up a pedestal. For example, if the owner enters the fMRI room, the caudate can supposed to activate because the human is recognized while in humans itself it fulfills an emotional role. In this way you can explain differences only be denying functional homology.
It would somehow "degrade the human experience" is philosophical argument that I don't get. My feelings are not somehow less if another sentient being can feel the same. Is my pain less if someone else can feel it too? Do I need to feel it "better" to be able to deserve the term?
This article does not give any insight why and when animals would or would not grieve.
Functional homology is a method. If we assume that the caudate nucleus responds in canines similarly to the one in humans, we can say things about emotions in animals. In the end you will need more hypotheses to still keep the human up a pedestal. For example, if the owner enters the fMRI room, the caudate can supposed to activate because the human is recognized while in humans itself it fulfills an emotional role. In this way you can explain differences only be denying functional homology.
It would somehow "degrade the human experience" is philosophical argument that I don't get. My feelings are not somehow less if another sentient being can feel the same. Is my pain less if someone else can feel it too? Do I need to feel it "better" to be able to deserve the term?