For me, going to Oslo and walking around inside "Fram" was much more amazing.
Sweden has Wasa, a ship that sank after 3km on her maiden voyage.
Norway has the most successful polar explorers in the world, and Fram was the most successful ship, used in overwinterings by both Nansen and Amundsen.
War is a negative sum game. Peace is a positive sum game.
The reality is China is now the top trading partner for most of the world. China is producing 50% of the world's steel. China has 200x the shipbuilding capacity of the United States, etc etc. Cooperation with China is positive sum for nearly the whole world, but China as the preeminent geopolitical power is incompatible with the unipolar moment where America led the world and decided the rules of the road, and could force dissenters to comply at gunpoint. China is far more relatively powerful than the USSR ever was, much less China+Russia+Iran+North Korea combined.
This is what we're seeing play out in microcosm in Ukraine, where Russia is to a large degree being backstopped by Chinese industrial and economic and diplomatic power. Hard choices are required, and there can be a lot of productive debate on the specifics of those choices. But much of "the west" seems stuck in the 1990s, where America can simply will the world it wants into existence by believing in it enough.
If America and the EU had started dumping 10% of GDP into the military 5 or 15 years ago things would likely look very different now, but we didn't and no one wants to do that now either because it would be incredibly painful for millions of people who in a democracy could vote out the leaders who enacted that policy. Hard choices are required, but we're getting mainly empty rhetoric and wishcasting, by those who wish things were otherwise. I also wish things were otherwise - but that and $5 will get me a cup of Starbucks coffee.
"The era of procrastination, of half-measures, of soothing and baffling expedients, of delays is coming to its close. In its place we are entering a period of consequences." - Winston Churchill
And what is striking is that, so far, China is effectively defeating the USA as the world leader, piece by piece, without firing a shot.
Or at least, has a golden opportunity window to do so within the next 2/3 years, while Trump/Musk & co are dismantling the country capacity to function.
China has done that by ruling internally with an iron fist and ruling externally with financial influence.
The U.S. is actually trying a play from the same playbook by abstaining from deploying troops.
When was the last time you saw China getting torn apart in the media for failing to prop up a failed state? They're doing "greenfield" diplomacy without historical baggage.
Free trade as implemented in the past seems to have been the opposite of democratic cooperation. Non-elected appointees making free trade agreements behind locked doors, which effect ignore the citizens interest and makes industry regulation irrelevant. It was free trade that enshrined current copyright laws world wide with 90 years after the authors death, which few people in the world voted for.
Free trade only reflect cooperation if done transparently, chosen by the people, and which does not bypass industry regulation that people voted on. If that is not possible then the trade agreement need to reflect the different national views on things like minimum wage, environmental issues, safety standard, animal well fare, justice system, trade marks, and so on.
Further to this point, what people call "free trade" is in many cases actually not free at all. A good example of this is the bilateral relationship with Thailand, they put tons of tariffs on US imports, and the US puts very few tariffs on Thailand. Why? The rationale for this is ostensibly that the US would like to have more political influence in Southeast Asia, or hasn't totally internalized that the Cold War is over, or something.
(It also so happens that Thailand places very low tariffs on Chinese goods - and their government has been currying political favor with Beijing for a long time - they are happy to enjoy unrestricted access to US markets and seem quite confident that the status quo will endure so if we are trying to buy political influence with them, we seemingly have been so toothless that it isn't even working!)
The US has deals like this all over the planet where it gives other countries unrestricted access to its markets, in return for what is not clear. A lot of these deals contributed to the movement of US manufacturing to places like Thailand, which hit the US working class in the wallet very directly. Sure there are also good deals that we should preserve as-is but it doesn't seem unreasonable at all to me that some of these be subjected to scrutiny and revision.
That’s why Trump saying he’ll normalize tariffs is popular:
Many Americans feel cheated, whereby they give better terms to other parties and don’t even get respect in return. So they now support a movement to mirror that behavior.
This is an example of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma: one side defected on a partnership for their benefit, trust collapsed, and now the originally cooperative partner is acting selfishly as well. Reciprocation is a fundamental part of relationships.
The US isn’t the entity that needs to hear “cooperating is better than a zero sum mindset”.
Edit to respond:
Most of those people are upset about that as well:
- foreign owned farmland and corporations;
- foreign owned condos, etc;
- inflated stock prices enriching Wall St relative to Main St;
…and so on. What you’re describing is the concerns of the petite bourgeoisie who have benefitted from inflated stock prices, housing prices, and land prices.
For Trump supporters, ending that distortion in the market while boosting domestic labor is a win-win.
Americans will “feel cheated” again when reality arrives and learn that a huge part of their economic power is based on the world dumping trillions of dollars of their savings into us stocks, bonds and real estate, thus making the US dollar artificially strong, making it possible for Americans to buy stuff and being rich. Wait until foreign money and trust starts leaving the US to see how “betrayed” you really get, now it has been la la land, let’s wait for the next act..
I assume the intended audience for the tariff talk is rust belt workers (who swung the election) who feel cheated for more dramatic reasons like their company folding while foreign suppliers thrive.
> Many Americans feel cheated, whereby they give better terms to other parties and don’t even get respect in return
> - foreign owned farmland and corporations;
That's hilarious. Many languages have a specific term for US private equity investors that rush in, buy up entire countries' corporations, then try to squeeze out every cent of profit.
> Many languages have a specific term for US private equity investors that rush in, buy up entire countries' corporations, then try to squeeze out every cent of profit.
Sure — the US bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie benefitted. But they’re not the ones supporting Trump or feeling cheated.
> But they’re not the ones supporting Trump or feeling cheated.
One of the groups most benefiting from the US dominance in the past decades were the farmers. Which is one of the larger lobby blocks and voting groups supporting trump.
And the logic doesn't compute either. Average people around the world got exploited by western, but primarily US, billionaires.
So the average people, the proletariat, should unite and revolt against those billionaires.
Instead the US proletariat voted to give billionaires even more power, in the hope that "their" billionaires would exploit foreigners more than themselves?
Free trade is built on top of economic systems which themselves are built on top of zero sum games. The only thing we can put economic value on are goods and services that use finite resources (oil, lumber, human labor, etc).
A forest, for example, has no economic value but lumber does.
Free trade may optimize how goods and services are dispersed but it can't escape the zero sum game that is foundational to economics.
I don't think it is merely a matter of redistribution. It can escape the zero-sum game through productivity gains, technological progress, recycling, and better legislation (for example, policies that regenerate forests). It may even create new industries as replacements. Because of this, I don’t believe it is inherently a zero-sum game.
> The only thing we can put economic value on are goods and services that use finite resources
A software patent does not consume physical resources (aside from the initial human labor) yet holds tremendous economic value. An app can be easily duplicated, making it a virtually infinite resource, while the patent remains attached to its novel functionalities.
There is always the possibility to dig deeper mines, explore further into space or just give people the possibility to live more a comfortable life.
But it is not only about that. Trade is also for comparative advantage. If you ever played settlers boardgame with more than two players you'll soon realize that whoever trades the most wins. And it does not really matter who you trade with, it is just reaping the benefits of trade instead of being stuck with 10 wood that is of low value to you but of high value to someone else.
What you're describing is a zero sum game. The world is limited to the board game, and whoever is best at trading and strategy collects the most finite resources and the others lose.
(Sorry if I lost the thread here. Most here were trying to argue that trade and globalization are a way to escape a zero-sum game).
I get your point, but I don't think a board game is a good abstraction to collapse the real world into. The world is not a fixed, closed system with finite resources. In a board game, expansion and innovation are not possible, only trading and strategy, as you mentioned, can optimise the system to some extent. Moreover, winning in a board game happens solely because of its rules, whereas in the real world, one person's success does not necessarily mean another's loss. Trade can be mutually beneficial, driven by each party's ambitions.
Innovation is an interesting wrinkle in the comparison for sure (I used the comparison only to continue with the previous commentor's point). Innovation only increase the potential usefulness of resources though. Assuming that will always avoid hitting the boundary of the zero sum game assumes perpetual innovation at a good enough pace to keep up.
Trade is an interesting one because it can be mutually beneficial, though it rarely includes everyone. Two countries can trade and both be better off, but other countries excluded may now be worse off. Trade also can't be mutually beneficial with regards to relative gain. Both sides can gain in trade or cooperation but one will always have gained more than the other. That doesn't make my point by the way, but an interesting related dimension to the whole topic.
The first tried to explain that it does not necessarily have to be a zero-sum game.
The second paragraph tried to explain that, even if you do see it as a zero sum game, trade between two parties, or trade in general, can give you benefits over ones who are not part of the trade.
Obviously I am trying to describe this in simple terms without writing a book. But i do think the board game analogy holds even though it is very simple.
That's a very limited (XIXth century?) perspective.
A forest (like, anything) has economic value, as soon as you get people to adopt/believe in it.
A forest may even have a greater economic value than the lumber it could produce, if it would, for instance, help/ensure the prosperity of something else that has economic value (leisure, wildlife, heat protection, soil water retention, etc.).
I completely agree outside of economics. I put much higher value on a forest than lumber. Economically, though, where is the forest ever accounted for?
In your strategic business plan, by IFRS accounting standards (existing and developing).
You have several options, account for it as lumber (but... well), or as a carbon sequestration well (so you could get carbon credits, IAS 38), or as an ecosystem providing services (several frameworks under work here), or as a contingent liability or asset (IAS 37, can be in the balance sheet if the probability of event/impact is high/certain).
Even if you forget to account for it, your insurance likely will remind you about it.
Once someone can "own" the forest, that be a bit of a cheat around the whole idea. I'm thinking out loud here, but I think all of you're examples are actually valuing the financial mechanisms rather than the forest itself.
The carbon credits are given economic value, its just not a physical resource like lumber so its harder to distinguish that the credit holds the value rather than the forest.
If Europe's military were so strong, why does the US need any involvement?
There's a reason even Zelensky described the EU militaries as weak, and believes a European army to be necessary.
Don't confuse spending with strength either: The UK, on paper, spends 2.3% of GDP on the military. That sounds good - until you realize they have only 136,000 personnel total. That's not going to defend the UK from anything - it can't even defend Ukraine for a year.
You are asking the wrong question (or at least, a wrong question). It's not "why does the US need any involvement", it's "Why has the US insisted on involvement for so long?" (e.g. during the 1980s when widespread sentiment in Europe was for the US to close its military bases, the US insisted on remaining).
The UK does not rely 136k people to defend itself from military risk. It relies on its nuclear arsenal, which while not as large as those of the USA or Russia, it quite the deterrent all by itself.
> The UK does not rely 136k people to defend itself from military risk. It relies on its nuclear arsenal, which while not as large as those of the USA or Russia, it quite the deterrent all by itself.
It's a deterrent from invading the British Isles, which would require a navy that only the US has, anyways.
It's not a deterrent from challenging the world order. The US nuclear arsenal is the only one in the West that, if it were deployed, would end human society on a global scale.
Russia has designed its nuclear forces and defense infrastructure around a war with the United States, a country with a much, much larger nuclear arsenal than the UK or France. There's a possibility that if Russia decided to use its tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine (which it has threatened before), and the UK or France responded in kind with strategic nuclear weapons, that enough of Russian nuclear forces could survive to completely wipe out those two nations while also having weapons in reserve.
Its "nuclear arsenal" consists of a single missile boat on patrol with about a dozen or so ICBMs (which could certainly mess with major Russian cities. But if a Russian fast-attack sub (of which they have quite a few) gets it, bye-bye "nuclear arsenal".
> Since 1998, when the UK decommissioned its tactical WE.177 bombs, the Trident has been the only operational nuclear weapons system in British service. The delivery system consists of four Vanguard-class submarines based at HMNB Clyde in Scotland. Each submarine is armed with up to sixteen Trident II missiles, each carrying warheads in up to eight multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). With at least one submarine always on patrol, the Vanguards perform a strategic deterrence role and also have a sub-strategic capability.
Yeah, it's the reverse of what's often pushed in the media. There have even been initiatives for autonomous EU security projects, with the US (I think even Trump at some point, despite what he says now about NATO) being against anything that would undermine NATO.
Basically, don't piss off Poland, you'll need to defeat about 500,000 soldiers, though do you really need to march on to France if you win against Germany? Even if you did, that's about 1/3 the US military, and nowhere near as well armed, or well trained, or well psychologically prepared. If you're Russia, about 1 million soldiers should do the trick; and that's not hard when you don't have moral qualms and 21 million military age men to throw at the problem; and (edit) possibly an additional few million from North Korea for purchase.
As for nuclear weapons; Russia can probably bet that using a nuclear weapon from inside France, or inside the UK, as a first strike, would be too controversial to even do. The government would probably be sued by human rights lawyers from inside itself for even trying; convinced that it's better to take the loss while remaining on the moral high ground. What's even the point, when NATO predicts they have less than 5% of the defenses required for the inevitable retaliation? https://www.ft.com/content/5953405f-d91a-4598-8b6b-6345452ca...
> (edit to reply): Russia isn't winning against Ukraine.
"Don't piss off Poland?!" There won't be a large scale war against the Eastern EU started by Russia that does not involve Poland. The EU has stronger mutual defense clause than NATO article 5+6 (of course, it doesn't have anything close to the military might of the combined NATO countries). Once there is an all out war, Finland would mobilize its army, threatening Russia's northern flank. The Baltic would be closed. The black sea would be closed. All out war would be terrible, but the deterrence is still too strong in my opinion, as the price would be too high.
The problem / question is what would the EU (or NATO) do, if Russia starts a small scale hybrid war against Estonia or Latvia. Creating a small "local" insurgency, that takes over a majority Russian speaking town on the border. If the military alliances do not react united in such a case they are done.
I think the critical question is what would the allies do (especially the ones with nuclear weapons) if Russia actually used one. There's a lot of treaties, words spoken and on paper but nobody really knows how people would react to the idea of partaking in a nuclear war.
If they dropped a nuke on e.g. Lithuania would the French do the same knowing that retaliation would come that could wipe out most of their people and country off the map? Would any country do that for someone else?
> Even if you did, that's about 1/3 the US military, and nowhere near as well armed, or well trained, or well psychologically prepared.
Nowhere near as well armed as the US. But I would argue perfectly well trained. But I laugh at your assertion that the French military is not as psychologically prepared for war.
The population of Russia was widely disputed even before the war(With most estimates placing it at below 100M), and now it's basically a guessing game.
"that's not hard when you don't have moral qualms and 21 million military age men to throw at the problem"
But do you really have them?
Putin seems really hesitant to start a new round of mobilization and refills his army with volunteers. Some of which are voluntolds, but the regime seems to be afraid of the Moscow/St.Petersburg street, so to say.
His grip on the Russian nation, especially after 3 years of endless bloody slog with almost nothing gained, does not seem to reach into the "give millions of recruits weapons and they will use them exactly as told and there is no risk that they could rebel" territory.
> If Europe's military were so strong, why does the US need any involvement?
Because Putin is all-in, willing to sacrife the lives of big parts of his population for this purpose. And this makes him a formidable enemy. Does it have to be more complicated than that?
If that is the first question you ask when someone needs help, I guess you will not have that many friends.
And it all amounts to a bag of beans. If it's so impressive they can support Ukraine and render irrelevant any contribution that the US might make? One wonders why Zelensky is in the US pleading for US help?
In the US he needs to convince one administration (and realistically, one guy). The EU is 27 governments, each one with way smaller budgets than the US.
Anyway, you might have missed it, but Zelensky is also regularly asking for help in Paris, Brussels, London, and Berlin.
But Europe is not at war. It is Ukraine that is. But they need help with equipment, and balancing their budget. This is what they are asking for, nothing else.
Much fewer than 500k soldiers are needed for training Ukrainians.
Europe certainly has the means to support Ukraine financially, if the political will is there.
But it’s incapable of providing alternatives to Starlink, Patriot or ATACMs. Especially not at the scale required to make a difference in Ukraine. The withdrawal of these systems would be disastrous for Ukraine.
Especially if the US opens Starlink for Russia but closes it for Ukraine.
ATAMCs could be somewhat mitigated with heavily increased medium range drone production.
The game of shooting down everything Russia sends was always a losing game. At some point you have to start addressing the source of the attacks - i.e. strike hard at the Russian infrastructure.
Europe produces alternatives to Patriot (Aster). And ATACMS are not crucial in any way, these days it is Ukrainian produced long range drones that do the most damage behind the lines.
Ukraine cannot win without manpower from either the EU or the US. That's the reality on the ground. No amount of equipment/weapons (conventional) is going to change that.
According to the Austrian military, there’s currently about 800k Ukrainian soldiers up against 700k Russian soldiers.
Because a substantial number of Ukrainian soldiers need to be present across the Belorussian border and elsewhere in the country, the Russians have a meaningful manpower advantage on the frontlines.
Remember Ukraine doesn't need to take Moscow to win. Russia is burning resources hard to keep the initiative and achieve Putin's war goals. All Ukraine needs to do is continue to bleed the Russian army and wait until Russia has a hard economic crunch.
I saw ESR once in a NY venue around 2000 in the middle of the bubble.
He was waving with a CD with newly open sourced banking software of some sort and raving about how all developers overarching goal will be to open source their work because don't care about money anymore, they already make so much.
Not very impressive then and not very impressive today.
The EU doesn't have control of defense policy - that is the mandate of individual European states.
The only EU member with nuclear weapons is France, which has it's own domestic nuclear ecosystem.
More critically, public sector hiring is not the same as private sector. Working for a foreign government's NatSec apparatus would be a red flag for any sort of hiring - especially in the domestic nuclear industry in France.
> These are not normal times and I believe USA also hired foreign nationals to top secret programs during and after WWII
The 1950s is ancient history now.
All countries have drastically ramped up background checks in NatSec and NatSec adjacent industries, and hiring foreigners (even from aligned states) can be a potential threat, as they will continue to retain family ties with their country of origin.
This same incident literally happened last week in the French nuclear industry, where a senior exec was canned because they weren't able to pass background checks due to their familial ties in Russia and past work in the Russian defense space before naturalizing as a French national.
If the US is to be viewed as a threat by EU member states (like a lot of Redditors-turned-HNers argue or imply), then it suffices to say that these states need to view Americans working in NatSec industries as potentially compromised.
So the US is a threat because it refuses to pay disproportionate funds for the defense of Europe? I think everyone whining about it is losing their minds over nothing. We have been massively subsidizing these "friends" so that many of them can afford free healthcare. Fuck that noise.
The ROI to USA that it has been the dominant military power for the last decades, combined with the cooling effect of NATO across the globe – i think you can imagine the instability and increase risk of nuclear war without NATO (Japan, South Korea, Europe, etc would acquire nukes without USA guarantees)
It has enabled a very stable and predictable world. This has benefited USA immensely. It it not clear to me, that rewinding and dismantling this system will have net positive effects in the next 50 years for USA.
But in the 1990s, militaries like West Germany, Canada, etc remained competitive and helped balance the load.
There's no reason Germany (and in reality it's only Germany that's the laggard) can't rebuild their conventional fighting capacities to help load balance again.
It's just German instraginence because of their fanatical opposition to deficits that is hampering their ability to do so.
> increase risk of nuclear war without NATO (Japan, South Korea, Europe, etc would acquire nukes without USA guarantees)
As I wrote below, that is highly unlikely in much of Europe, as most European states (except the UK and France) lack the capabilities to develop credible nuclear delivery systems like ballistic missiles or nuclear submarines.
>There's no reason Germany (and in reality it's only Germany that's the laggard) can't rebuild their conventional fighting capacities to help load balance again.
They could, yes. But would they need to if Russia is weak? The current strategy from USA seems to be to appease Russia, give them what they want and weaken security guarantees. The point im trying to make is that there is another way here which i beleive nets the West (both USA and Europe – USA's natural ally) more benefits than gearing up for war (aka the Peace Dividend).
>lack the capabilities to develop credible nuclear delivery systems
Is this the case? I think Sweden were months away from testing their nuclear bombs when they were conviced to dismantle the system in return for protection from USA's nuclear umbrella and were in process of producing supersonic nuclear bomber in the 1950s.
They still produce today world class submarines, develops and build their own fighter jets.
I would think that Europe has knowledge and skillset. I mean, North Korea managed.
> The point im trying to make is that there is another way here which i beleive nets the West (both USA and Europe – USA's natural ally)
And this is the crux of the issue. It's hubris to assume Europe is our natural ally and should always be our top priority.
In the US, our Pacific allies (Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand) are a higher priority than our European ones.
As can be seen in US Military Deployments (the majority of US Armed Forces personnel is deployed in the Pacific) along with economic relations (APAC trade is larger than EU trade)
For the US, China is the primary adversary to worry about, not Russia. Why should European states assume the US has an obligation to always support Europe? At least France and UK have historically tried to maintain some strategic autonomy, and Eastern NATO states like Poland, Romania, and Turkiye have continued to build domestic defense capacity.
And unlike most European countries, our Asian allies (SK, JP, TW) have continued to build fairly competitive domestic defense industries. Japan and South Korea can manufacture their own ballistic missiles, tanks, submarines, airframes, heavy artillery, etc. Only France has a similar diversity of domestic defense R&D and manufacturing capacity in Europe.
> more benefits than gearing up for war (aka the Peace Dividend).
It's Europe that gets the peace dividend. Not the US. We still need to the capacity to fight a two continent war. That's a bum deal.
> I would think that Europe has knowledge and skillset.
Europe as a continent, sure. But in reality, it's a number of individuals states working on their own domestic production, procurement, and supporting their domestic champions.
France will continue to protect Thales Group, Arianne Group, Dassault Group, etc, just like how Germany continues to back Rheinmetall, ThysennKrupp, Eurofighter, etc.
There is no ability to unify production and procurement without also undermining domestic industries and jobs.
France's Ariane Group will never transfer their Medium Range Ballistic Missiles technology to a German company - they don't want to help a potential competitor.
This same thing happened with the Eurofighter project, with France deciding to back Dassault instead.
>Why should European states assume the US has an obligation to always support Europe?
Well, it agreed to:
>In 1994, Ukraine agreed to transfer these weapons to Russia and became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in exchange for assurances from Russia, the United States and United Kingdom to respect the Ukrainian independence and sovereignty in the existing borders.
I don't necessarily disgree with the central thesis of your comment and your perspectices, but i think there is a more fruitful balance to be had than what i see as completee capitulation to Russia and the abandonment of Europe (after almost a century of collaboration and investment).
At some point one need to ask oneself: what am i defending?
I agree that we in the US need to continue defending the Budapest Memorandum and helping Ukraine where possible.
That said, individual European nations have had over a decade to re-arm and further help Ukraine (even before the 2022 invasion), but it ended up primarily being US, UK, Canada, and Turkiye providing support and training for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
European states are starting to step up, but using Trump as a punching bag to distract from the very real issue of Central Europe's pigheaded lack of preparedness is foolish.
We are starting to see these changes now with Starmer and Macron's announcements, but plenty of individual European states are not viewing this crisis seriously enough, as Poland's Donald Tusk pointed out today [0]
Donald Tusk also said today there is no option of sending Polands army to Ukraine because "Polish army is for defending Poland borders", its like he forgot what happened in 1939 :|
Appears to be because of Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus:
"Poland simply doesn’t have the additional capacity to send troops to Ukraine,” said a senior Polish official who spoke on condition of anonymity, noting the country has long borders with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Russia-allied Belarus, which need to be reinforced with Polish forces. “The French are far away so they can send soldiers to Ukraine; we’re close so we cannot.” [0]
The biggest hurdle that caused the current emergency talks to fail appears to be Germany and Scandinavia (as usual).
We can't afford to police the whole world. NATO expansionism is one of the causes of the latest conflict in Ukraine.
It's not clear to me that unwinding our interventionism around the world is going to make the world more stable. But it is clear to me that we can't afford to keep doing it. China is eating our lunch and they have about 3x as many people as we do. Neither Europe nor the US are producing much, and the entire West is in massive debt. Do you seriously think we can win the inevitable war with China? We can't even defeat Russia in Ukraine, and China would fight much dirtier than Russia. It's time to get real, restructure our debts, and rebuild our own country.
> NATO expansionism is one of the causes of the latest conflict in Ukraine.
There's no such thing as NATO expansionism. Eastern Europe became dead set on joining NATO after seeing the destruction of Russian democracy by the remnants of the Soviet security-military complex. They correctly predicted that Russia would degenerate into an authoritarian dictatorship that would turn outwardly expansionist after KGB hardliners consolidated power and crushed all internal dissent.
Eastern Europe's entry into NATO is like townsfolk signing up for neighborhood watch after seeing the social order break down in the next town and fearing that criminality will spill over into their own community. The criminals, of course, are disturbed that people are setting up security cameras and looking out for each other. Breaking into houses would be much easier in a town where everyone keeps to themselves.
Eastern Europe managed to break free of Russian military occupation only in 1994. Criminal gangs had taken over our town by force at the end of WWII and prevented us from living normal lives for half a century. Now, the same criminals demand that we dismantle cameras, fire security guards, and stop cooperation amoung ourselves because "neighborhood watch expansionism" violates their "interests." Damn right it does.
>Do you seriously think we can win the inevitable war with China?
I believe showing Russia, China, and the world, that USA stands behinds it commitments and allies, defends the rule based world order and is true leader of the democratic society would deter leaders such as Putin and Xi from trying anything.
NATO is (imo) close to collapsing. All it would take is a minor just-under-war incursion, e.g. in northern Finland by Russia. Would USA (Trump) defend Finland in this scenario? If not, NATO is dead and the next 100 years belong to China and Russia.
If we are defeated by China or Russia, it will have been because of decades of political malfeasance and hollowing out of our industrial base.
>I believe showing Russia, China, and the world, that USA stands behinds it commitments and allies, defends the rule based world order and is true leader of the democratic society would deter leaders such as Putin and Xi from trying anything
Half of the European countries now are anti-democratic, and actively work against the will of their own people. As for "rules-based order" I think we are just the cleanest shirt in the dirty laundry. Don't kid yourself. Our governments have been up to a lot of nefarious things around the world. We don't have a clear moral high ground as the propagandists would have you think. But we're stuck in our own countries for better or worse. We have to do what we can to straighten things out.
If our allies can't defend themselves despite being wealthier than their enemies and having more people than we do, we are literally worse off than being on our own without such allies. There's nothing wrong with asking them to pull their own weight at minimum.
> I think everyone whining about it is losing their minds over nothing
I agree. It is doable for individual European states to rebuild their conventional fighting capabilities.
France has been a proponent of this kind of "strategic autonomy" for decades, and so has the UK to a certain extent.
Most of the angst is coming from Germany, who let the Bundeswehr degrade from being one of the most capable Armed Forces in Europe in 1990 to what it is today.
Note that "US as a threat" was a strawman argument.
(Although USA has threatened to occupy EU territory in the last weeks.)
It does not have to be a threat, but if Europe should take more responsibility for their own defense, it would make sense build up their nuclear capacity.
(And I am well aware of the differences between EU, Europe and individual countries. But it seems to me tha France is the country to build upon.)
Ukraine had nuclear weapons that they gave away. Maybe they shouldn't have?
Also - universal healthcare is not about 1-2 percent lower military spendings (much of which goes back to the country itself). USA is a rich country, you could also afford it.
Ukraine had weapons systems that it could not operate due to them being locked down by USSR leadership. So their choices were really to give them up, or begin reverse engineering and risk getting invaded by parties that didn't want them to have those weapons.
>Also - universal healthcare is not about 1-2 percent lower military spendings (much of which goes back to the country itself). USA is a rich country, you could also afford it.
We can't afford it. Most of the Western countries that have it can't actually afford it either. The US and the rest of the West are only rich in a very narrow sense, in that they get to borrow more than anyone else. Manufacturing has left, and everyone is running a trade deficit. It's time to turn all that around before our countries become 100% dependent on imports and unable to defend themselves.
Yes, but France and UK has working nuclear weapons, my point is that it may give protection to build on them especially when their previous ally leaves the space.
AFAIK USA pays more for healthcare per capita per person. It is not about economy, but political will. (And I did not bring up this argument).
One thing that can be criticised though is low retirement age in southern Europe. But whenever that question is brought up (Macron has bet much of his political future on it), the JD Vance friends from the far right wakes up and start wild protest and collecting votes against (yellow vests, AFD).
I don't think we disagree that Europe has been naive in trusting both USA and the current world order with free global trade.
> Maybe that will change. Germany certianly has capability to manufacture nuclear armements. The UK may rejoin if the situation gets dire enough.
Given the politics here, I don't see that happening. No nuclear reactors, even.
I won't be too surprised if Finland gets some, but I don't really know the full politics of the area, only that they have reactors and are concerned about Russia.
Poland might, but no earlier than 2030.
In Europe but not in the EU, Ukraine… entirely depends on if they think they have nothing left to lose. If it looks like Trump will sell them out and they don't think anyone else will pick up enough slack to keep them independent of Moscow, they may rush a development program.
I can easily believe that Ukraine would try to hire any of these workers. No reason to think any of these workers would be interested, but I can see Ukraine trying.
A nuclear shield is useless without second or third strike capabilities - which requires a nuclear triad - as both Russia and China have developed those capabilities due to their rivalry with the US.
Poland hypothetically building 10 nuclear devices does nothing if Russia can launch multiple strike after getting striked.
Furthermore, developing nuclear weapons is causus belli enough to justify a hot war for China or Russia, nor does it actually prevent war as can be seen with the Kargil War.
More critically, nuclear programs are expensive and that money is better used in further building out conventional military capabilities, as can be seen with the Russia-Ukraine War, where a country with an ossified MIC (Ukraine) is able to cause significant pain to a nuclear power.
Tl;dr - Nuclear weapons alone are useless in a world where most Nuclear Powers (US, Russia, China, India, Israel) have a nuclear triad and multi-strike capabilities.
> Also South Korea and Japan may
The Indo-Pac theatre is different from the European theatre, as there is bipartisan support to prioritize Asian defense over European defense.
Furthermore, in a situation where American support is reduced, Asian countries can continue to retain conventional warfighting capabilities. This is because defense spending across Asia had always been high since the early-mid 2010 standoffs, so there hasn't been the same level of angst that much of Central Europe has.
Furthermore, Korean and Japanese military exports are extremely competitive, with Indonesia, Vietnam, and Philippines all closely aligning with SK and JP on defense posture.
Nuclear weapons are not meant to be used. They are meant to prevent invasion attempts.
For instance, between China and its own nuke North Korea is guaranteed not to be invaded by the US.
Likewise, Israel is guaranteed that Arab countries or Iran won't try to invade it.
In fact, that's why France developed its own nukes, in addition to making sure they'll keep a seat at the "adults table".
Poland might be/have been another good example. They would only need to guarantee that St Petersburg, Moscow, and Minsk would be vaporised in case of invasion to be safe on their Eastern border.
> Poland might be/have been another good example. They would only need to guarantee that St Petersburg, Moscow, and Minsk would be vaporised in case of invasion to be safe on their Eastern border
As I mentioned above, the fear of vaporization goes away if you can continue to keep striking after being striked. If you've reached the point where you are launching nuclear strikes, you accept the massive toll that you will have to pay with a launch, and wish to enact as severe a toll as possible. To do that you need second strike and nuclear triad capabilities.
Every single one of the countries you mentioned has second strike capabilities and either has Nuclear Triad capabilities (China, US, Israel) or is working to implement them (France, North Korea).
A country like Poland or Germany is too late in the game to build second strike or nuclear triad capabilities, and even starting a nuclear weapons program would be causus belli enough in the short-to-medium term for a war while being unable to prevent a strike.
No,the fear does not go away. The point is that Russia isn't even going to try if they know their main cities are going to be wiped. Whether they can possibly ultimately "win" because irrelevant if it is a pyrrhic victory and/or cost is to high.
> The point is that Russia isn't even going to try if they know their main cities are going to be wiped
And my argument is if you as a state are seriously consider a nuclear strike, you have accepted that millions will die, but it's better to completely wipe out the other opponent. No amount of rationalization can resolve that level of existential threat. Poland saying "we can threaten to nuke Moscow" is enough of a justification for Russia to view Poland as an existential threat to wipe off the map.
Large countries, and especially large nuclear powers, have multiple cities where industries are distributed. This remains true in Russia, as most of their military manufacturing capabilities remain spread out across Omsk, Kazan, Novosibirsk, etc.
If you wish to scare a country from fighting a war with you, even conventional capabilities are enough to highlight the pain while also not reaching the threshold where a conflict becomes existential.
So no, it does not make sense for Poland or Germany to develop nuclear capabilities so late in modern world.
France can nuke Moscow and is still there, North Korea caan nuke Seoul and Tokyo and is still there.. once you have credible nukes you can't be wiped out, that's the point of having them.
There is no being 'late', either. It's about the threats.
I have never implied that Poland should develop nuclear weapons. I wrote that they are/were in the very situation in which nuclear weapons may be desirable (similar to France, Israel, North Korea). Relatively small countries have nukes simply to make any attempt at invasion not worth it even if everyone knows they can't "win" against the USSR/Russia/the US, anyway.
They have second strike capabilties and a nuclear triad
> North Korea caan nuke Seoul and Tokyo and is still there
They have second strike capabilities and are working on nuclear triad capabilities
> I wrote that they are/were in the very situation in which nuclear weapons may be desirable
But unlike the nations listed above, they do NOT have a domestic ballistic missiles program, and that would take decades to build.
SK and Japan both have had domestic ballistic missile development and submarine development capabilities for decades, and that's why if they wished to become a nuclear power, they could do so very quickly.
Poland and Germany does not.
> Relatively small countries have nukes simply to make any attempt at invasion not worth it even if everyone knows they can't "win" against the USSR/Russia/the US, anyway
You can't make nukes (and the associated delivery systems) overnight. It takes decades to build the entire ecosystem.
Just having a nuclear bomb isn't enough if you lack the ability to develop and manufacture ballistic missles or submarines domestically.
Furthermore, as was seen in the Kargil War in 1999, nuclear weapons can fail as a deterrence for war.
Russia is not the USSR. In practice, Russia is Moscow and St Petersburg. Pose a credible threat to those cities and be set. Because Poland and Russia are so close geographically, plausible second strike capability can be achieved many ways without having ICBMs and nuclear strike subs.
I'd focus on your previous point about second-strike capabilities.
> Even if Moscow or St Petersburg are completely wiped off the map, Novosibirsk, Kazan, Omsk, etc will remain while much of Poland is irradiated.
Yes, but the goal isn't to win a first strike, it's MAD to prevent the other side doing that.
Russia has enough warheads to not just level Poland's cities, but every settlement and forest in the country.
Poland with 10 credible nuclear weapons is enough to break the economic back of any country who attacks, so they won't attack.
This needs what you said before, second-strike capability. Either that or a fast enough response time that they can launch while hostile missiles are still inbound. (Or does that still count as second-strike?)
> Poland with 10 credible nuclear weapons is enough to break the economic back of any country who attacks, so they won't attack.
If you are in a situation where you are even seriously considering a nuclear strike, that means you are viewing a threat as existential, which completely undermines the economic argument.
> This needs what you said before, second-strike capability. Either that or a fast enough response time that they can launch while hostile missiles are still inbound. (Or does that still count as second-strike?)
Absolutely, but the issue is that this takes A LOT of time to build and implement, and a country like Poland or Germany cannot build that kind of capability overnight. Yet a nuclear program can be viewed as an existential threat that can be used as a causus belli for war (conventional or nuclear).
This is a pretty bad RoI.
Nuclear programs are expensive, and instead of spending the amount you would need to build a nuclear program, it's much better for Poland and Germany to double down and concentrate on conventional war capabilities such as rocket systems, drones, artillery, and heavy weapons. The fact that a country with an ossified MIC like Ukraine is able to bog down a military like Russia's with conventional capabilities is proof enough that doubling down on building conventional war-fighting capabilities is enough to cause severe pain on an aggressor while not turning a conflict into an existential one which justifies nuclear warfare.
And this is why you never hear Polish or German military leadership talk about developing a nuclear program.
> If you are in a situation where you are even seriously considering a nuclear strike, that means you are viewing a threat as existential, which completely undermines the economic argument.
No, because it's not symmetric.
Party A may be an existential threat to party B, party B can prevent that existential threat just by being sufficiently painful. B doesn't even have to be close to an existential threat to A for it to be painful enough to reconsider.
That's how bees keep humans away from hives. Also how the Irish kicked my great-grandparents generation out of controlling Ireland, even at the height of the British empire.
> Nuclear programs are expensive, and instead of spending the amount you would need to build a nuclear program, it's much better for Poland and Germany to double down and concentrate on conventional war capabilities such as rocket systems, drones, artillery, and heavy weapons. The fact that a country with an ossified MIC like Ukraine is able to bog down a military like Russia's with conventional capabilities is proof enough that doubling down on building conventional war-fighting capabilities is enough to cause severe pain on an aggressor while not turning a conflict into an existential one which justifies nuclear warfare.
Yes, they are expensive. Also, I expect a multi-polar nuclear arms race to go hot much more easily, to normalise their use, to generally be bad for everyone.
So I hope you are correct (or, more importantly, that your opinion is shared by decision makers). On the other, there's clearly a constant undercurrent of "let's not give too much more aid to Ukraine just in case the Russian nukes actually work", so I don't think it's seen that way.
> German military leadership
Given the local attitudes towards even nuclear reactors, I think it's just a political non-starter around here. (I'll have to wait and see if @TeMPOraL sees this and responds regarding Poland's politics?)
> So I hope you are correct (or, more importantly, that your opinion is shared by decision makers)
Yep. I'm basing my stance on Poland's current defense strategy [0][1].
Furthermore, Poland's on track to outcompete Russia in rocket artillery and tanks, so it has day 1 capabilities that are comparable to a tactical nuclear strike minus the cost.
> No, because it's not symmetric
Yep. It isn't symmetric, but it doesn't matter, because crossing the nuclear launch threshold is enough to justify retaliatory strikes and counter-strikes - which is something a state which lacks a second strike or nuclear triad cannot deter against.
And the Kargil War in 1999 was proof enough that two states having nuclear weapons capabilities alone cannot deter a war.
It's not existenial if you don't have anyone on the other side of the "deal" to offer nuclear strikes in return. So far, it's been the US, but that doesn't seem assured for the future anymore.
It takes decades to build credible second strike or nuclear triad capabilities. A conventional war would be finished well before that.
For example, to launch into Russia, Poland and Germany would need Tactical, SR, MR, and LR Ballistic Missiles, but neither state has a ballistic missiles program so they would need to start from scratch or be entirely dependent on France (which the defense industry in both states have lobbied against).
If a Poland or Germany attempts to begin a nuclear weapons program, that is reason enough for a belligerent nation like Russia to start a war.
If you are as close neighbours as Poland and Russia, you get first and second strike "for free".
Launch 3000 drones at once and let one in a thousand carry a nuke.
Not having nukes didn't protect Georgia or Ukraine from war and invasion. This is just more "let's not provoke them". Well, that doesn't work very well, does it? It's time someone pushed back and called their bluff. Because if it's not a bluff we are screwed anyway. In this case, the only way to not lose is to play.
Sweden has Wasa, a ship that sank after 3km on her maiden voyage.
Norway has the most successful polar explorers in the world, and Fram was the most successful ship, used in overwinterings by both Nansen and Amundsen.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fram_(ship)
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fram_Museum
(And finally Gjöa has made it indoors as well, what a save!)
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