You wouldn't want to be encrypting twice or three times over - at that point there really does start to be an overhead associated with it.
> Mail
Encrypting at the host level would be actively unhelpful (e.g. it would make failover or forwarding harder) and wouldn't gain you much in the way of security. You just want to encrypt the message to the actual recipient.
> chat
Again hostname-based auth is actively unhelpful in a federated system like IRC or XMPP (you want to failover to a different host if a particular host is down), and offers minimal security in a centralized-server system.
> VPN
I think a VPN is inherently the wrong approach to security; it's trying to create a network you can trust, but networks are too big to secure.
> VNC
How often do you VNC to a box with a stable hostname? I only ever use it to connect between my (coffee shop or wherever) laptop, my (dynamic IP) home machine and my (dynamic IP) dev machine at work.
> Mail
Encrypting at the host level would be actively unhelpful (e.g. it would make failover or forwarding harder) and wouldn't gain you much in the way of security. You just want to encrypt the message to the actual recipient.
> chat
Again hostname-based auth is actively unhelpful in a federated system like IRC or XMPP (you want to failover to a different host if a particular host is down), and offers minimal security in a centralized-server system.
> VPN
I think a VPN is inherently the wrong approach to security; it's trying to create a network you can trust, but networks are too big to secure.
> VNC
How often do you VNC to a box with a stable hostname? I only ever use it to connect between my (coffee shop or wherever) laptop, my (dynamic IP) home machine and my (dynamic IP) dev machine at work.