Reading through the report, it becomes clear that there needs to be an idiot assessment officer, similar to the gimp in Pulp Fiction. Their role, filled by a layperson with a rudimentary knowledge of engineering, will be to be kept completely away from any decisions that are not critical to a mission, they will be knowledgeable only to those that are critical. If the IAO does not understand something even for a moment, then it is the responsibility of the engineers and managers to either refine it or go back to the drawing board. Verbiage should be clear and concise:
If it is colder than 50 degrees fahrenheit outside, do not launch. IAO would say: "what temperature is it outside? 50 degrees?" Runs over to the abort launch button.
The engineering for parts is amazing, but it is so easy to make things "within specification." The section where a part was reduced from 1-R critical but with redundancy to 1 without redundancy juxtaposed against the blow-by that occurred on multiple occasions strikes at the heart ethics.
If it is colder than 50 degrees fahrenheit outside, do not launch. IAO would say: "what temperature is it outside? 50 degrees?" Runs over to the abort launch button.
Reading the Challenger O-ring process and its reduction in perceived danger as it progresses up the management ladder reminds me of reading Tufte's discussions on the Columbia failure (http://www.edwardtufte.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg?msg_id=0...).
The engineering for parts is amazing, but it is so easy to make things "within specification." The section where a part was reduced from 1-R critical but with redundancy to 1 without redundancy juxtaposed against the blow-by that occurred on multiple occasions strikes at the heart ethics.