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Yes, one wonders why peterwwillis hasn't, as he suggests as an easy approach, "audited" OpenSSL himself and found the heartbleed in process. And that "over one weekend."

Speaking of OpenSSL there's even this:

http://openmirage.org/blog/introducing-ocaml-tls

Transport layer security (TLS) in pure OCaml, useful for MirageOS.



You don't have to audit code to find security holes in an operating system. You audit the operating system. This is not rocket science, nor laborious.


Please do audit the Mirage OS as modified in the article and show what you find. I'm interested to see how you can claim that the OS which doesn't even have a file system, has only drivers for virtual hardware and not even code for starting a process isn't more secure than any other big solution. Above all, the code based on the functional language. It's closest to what we have to have a provably secure system.


This is the same security fallacy as I mentioned twice before, just reworded. Removing code does not leave you with secure code. There's still a memory allocator, I/O layer, a tcp/ip stack, DHCP protocol+service, HTTP protocol+service, HTTPS protocol+service (edit: sorry, there's no HTTPS support in Mirage), and all of the miscellaneous parts required to run those bits, which all have security concerns.

These are the exact same things you expose to vulnerability in a regular Unix OS, and have the exact same potential flaws. Code doesn't become more secure just because you have to use an ABI. Computers (and security) are not magic.

And provable security, really? First of all, proofs have bugs. Second, no real-world attackers have ever been stopped by a provably secure design (partly because implementation is never provably secure). And finally, Mirage was only written to be a statically-typed low-overhead binary that encourages more code reuse. It was not designed with security in mind. That shows that it's nowhere near provable security to begin with, and real-world attackers won't care either way.


Until you present some proof of any vulnerability, your word has not more weight than mine, and I claim that you don't understand what you talk about and that you can't find a way to compromise her setup.




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