You're forgetting that Joe made his decision in a different circumstance.
Substance S exists because at various times in the past Joe made the decision to do substance S. He made those decisions under the assumption that he'd be compensated. You have the option to use substance S under Joe's terms because he made those decisions.
Think of it this way. What if you'd die if Joe didn't touch you? The reason that Joe's touch can save you is that Joe spent 10 years studying and practicing. (Other folks tried but failed to develop this ability.)
Your example is both inaccurate in critical details:
- you require me to coerce Joe into coming to touch me
- I only require Joe not prevent me from using my own pharma lab and my own materials to cook up my own batch of S
...which is why I won't even answer your question; it's irrelevant to the situation at hand (changing essential details to get the outcome you want is silly).
You're also treating Joe like he's stupid, which is not very likely if he's inventing substance S (you and I may be idiots; Joe is smart with a capital S); given that Joe's a smart cookie it's a safe assumption that Joe is well aware that he's deciding to spend 10 years developing a new technique that can be easily replicated as soon as he invents it.
He's aware of the possibility for (ii) the entire time we're negotiating (i); failing to arrive at a mutually-agreeable arrangement as per (i) (eg something close to cost-of-manufacture; it's not like I can beat that price myself, right?) is a calculated risk on his part, which doesn't always work out in his favor.
There're obvious consequences for (ii) -- among which is Joe no longer deciding to invent substance T -- but those are consequences one can opt for, in precisely the same way that Joe's inflexibility (unwilling to compromise far enough on (i)) has unwanted consequences for Joe (prompting me to pick option (ii)) that he has opted for.
Which in general is the flipside of the "patent-ignoring nations undercut incentive to innovate, making future drugs unlikely to be invented" argument: pharma companies have been extremely well aware in general of eg the situation in india and more generally the sentiment that if push comes to shove (poverty, epidemic, etc.) the right thing to do is ignore patent and manufacture; in the same way that the consequences of ignoring patents are obvious so too is it obvious that driving too hard a bargain for too long will undermine the ability to drive future bargains at all, b/c sooner or later circumstances change and your not-really customers say "fuck it".
EG: it would've been prudent in the long-term for pharmacompanies to push for a standardized international regime for temporary patent abatement (due to epidemic or poverty, etc.) that (presumbably) would have some sliding scale (dire emergencies and abject poverty == SELL AT COST, less so @ the less extreme) and (for example) some notion of compensatory patent extension (eg an extension for 2 years + 2x the duration of the abatement period); such an arrangement wouldn't be ideal, but by proactively crafting a better-than-today, even-if-not-really-good-enough compromise they could've nipped the larger issue (countries going "rogue") mostly in the bud.
Yes, my example is different. I'm using that difference to demonstrate that your argument fails.
You acknowledge that Joe doesn't owe you his touch on the basis that he isn't required to put out any effort to save you.
My point is that you're distinguishing between effort at different times. You think that should be able to benefit from work that he does before you have a need but not from work that he does after you find yourself in need. That's absurd.
Yes, I know that the mechanism by which Joe withholds his labor is different in the two cases. So what?
The whole "there's no marginal cost" argument is silly. We pay programmers more than ditch diggers even though it's clear that the latter work much harder than the former.
As to the "prudent" argument, pharma companies don't control IP law. The actual argument boils down to "they should have tried to molify righteous thugs". (Yup, I think that taking someone's labor is thuggery.)
Yes, my example is different. I'm using that difference to demonstrate that your argument fails.
From here on out I've been saying:
- (i) your example is sufficiently different from mine that to me it proves nothing about mine (though I'm sure it's an example you know how to "win" arguments with)
- (ii) here's why I consider your example sufficiently different from mine as to no longer be relevant
- (iii) please explain why I'm wrong -- why I ought to consider your example and my example equivalent
...at which point to my eyes the rest of our "conversation" reads as you re-iterating that you prefer your example to mine blah blah blah.
And it's worth noting you can't even summarize my scenario accurately, which gives me little faith in your reading ability:
* You think that should be able to benefit from work that he does before you have a need but not from work that he does after you find yourself in need.*
...is wrong; the work was finished well before I was in need...regardless of whether I die or not he's doing no further work, full stop.
More to the point (for the peanut gallery): I'll use anamax's verbiage throughout, despite the general silliness of his rhetorical framing.
Firstly: the notion that there's something absurd in my being able to profit from work some pharma research did in an earlier era is itself absurd; if you really believe that under no circumstance is that warranted, you wind either being against patent expiry at all (b/c why would it suddenly become ok just b/c some years have passed) -- which is a tenable but very minority position -- or you have to concede that there's no general principle against such situations, at which point we can get to arguing details.
That's why it's LOL-worthy; it's already the case that it's totally fine to "profit" from work done earlier without compensating the person who did it, provided that the work was done sufficiently long ago (so as to have fallen out of whatever ip bracket it fell into)...which means the argument-from-principles is just ignorant, and the real argument is "do you consider exigent circumstances to also justify such "profiting" from previously-performed labor in the same way that "the passage of time" justifies the same, or not.
Reasonable people can disagree on the latter topic; arguing that my argument somehow fails because it violates a principle that is also violated by all the world's systems of intellectual property is a position you can take, at the expense of revealing yourself to be holding a position contrary to pretty much all the serious thought on IP in general.
But let's move along. The notion of "withholding his labor" is manifestly silly: he created knowledge, knowledge is not excludable once distributed, so there's no intrinsic ability to "deny" future-time use of already-produced-and-distributed-knowledge...whatever ability Joe has to "deny his labor" in this specific case is a gift from those he would deny it to.
This makes the programmers-versus-ditch-diggers a red herring: programmers get paid what they do because they can deny their labor if they're not paid a satisfactory wage (they stop working, it's that easy); a knowledge-producer can't deny use of already-distributed knowledge in anything like the same way, and depends on the state's willingness to enforce certain rules for what capacity to "deny labor" that way.
Which of course means that yes it is imprudent not to mollify righteous thugs in other nations; those righteous thugs are the means by which a pharma company would be "denying its labor" in that nation, and failing to strike a mutually-agreeable bargain leaves you unlikely to be able to do any denying, at all.
That's reality and that's the scope of options within pharmas operate (and indeed they know this probably better than you and have made their choices, etc.); you are free to dislike it and find it unpleasing -- perhaps curse fate for not evolving a cerebral cortex with a functioning drm system -- but making choices based on the actual nature of reality is probably the only way to make good choices short of luck.
> The notion of "withholding his labor" is manifestly silly: he created knowledge
Said knowledge is the result of his labor, just as a ditch is the result of a ditch digger's labor. No one feels entitled to a ditch, yet you feel entitled to knowledge.
And yes, the ditch digger also built on the work of others.
I want people to disclose knowledge, that's why I want them to be able to profit from doing so.
Note that said disclosure is why Joe was able to produce the knowledge to which you feel entitled....
You are increasingly nonsensical; it's also true that if wishes were ponies than beggars would ride, but what of it?
I don't feel entitled to Joe's knowledge; in the hypothetical scenario I already have Joe's knowledge, at which point why yes I do feel "entitled" to make use of said knowledge, unless there's a good reason not to make use of it.
I tell you what: if you can explain to me the concepts of:
- rivalrous and nonrivalrous goods
- excludable and non-excludable goods
...and then either:
- explain how both ditches and knowledge share an identical classification along both of those axes, thereby properly being treated together
- or explain not only that your little theory doesn't recognize distinctions about the above but also why your little theory ignores the distinction
...then I'll walk away from this with the sense that you're someone with a rational outlook that just happens to disagree substantially with mine, and call it a day.
Otherwise I'm going to conclude you've just gotten a lot of ego attached to a self-image as a defender of some moral order or other, which feat you regularly accomplish by throwing totem-words until people quit; they get bored, you feel like a winnar.
You seem to think that other people are obliged to accept your premises and rules. You're wrong.
It's easy to distinguish knowledge from ditches. The question is whether and when distinguishing various aspects makes sense.
Your latest rant boils down to "here's a set of rules and definitions that leads to the conclusion that I like, so prove me wrong with them or I'll declare victory". Whatever floats your boat.
The fact remains you "have" Joe's knowledge because it was disclosed under certain terms. You seem to think that you're not bound by those terms. That's like agreeing to pay Sam the ditch digger over time and then stiffing him after a couple of payments.
A short reply so as not to strain your reading comprehension:
I've asked you to explain why you hold your premises and you haven't; you just continue reiterating that you hold them, and then point out that if I also held your beliefs I'd be in the wrong.
I get that. If you can't justify your own premises -- why the obvious differences between a ditch and knowledge don't matter -- there's not much more to discuss.
Actually, you didn't. I pointed out that you were demanding that I play rhetorical calvinball using your premises and rules. I then declined.
It's also interesting that your response to the fact that it's not the actual beneficiary who is using the knowledge, but a speculator, was to invoke realpolitik.
One problem with that is that the means produce the ends. The other is that the speculator doesn't have the characteristics that you use to justify your conclusion, but your conclusion is unchanged.
My underlying moral intuitions as relevant to the specific situation at hand are as follows:
- generally speaking I don't expect real-world moral dilemmas to have parties unambiguously in the right and in the wrong. It is convenient when things work out that way but not to be expected; what is to be expected is that a real-world moral dilemma will have convincing arguments on all sides. Consequently making a moral judgment is not playing "spot the villain!" but, instead, deciding which position has the most merit; that a particular position has the most merit says nothing about the merits (or lack thereof) of the other positions other than that what merit the other positions have is less than the position with the most merit. tl;dr: moral dilemmas involve hard choices.
- generally speaking mortal peril -- the threat of losing one's life -- is a significant circumstance that effects how I judge someone's actions. For example: I think murder is wrong, but killing in self-defense is not wrong; most justice systems of the world recognize this principle, and I think they do so correctly.
- there's nothing magical about contracts that exempts them from the previous point: when one party to a contract can only fulfill that contract at cost of that party's own life, the situation demands heavy scrutiny; expecting someone to place adherence to past agreements above self-preservation fails most common-sense morality tests (and is for example why killing in self-defense is considered differently from murder, and why bank employees aren't usually charged with theft when a bank robber sticks a gun in their face). Just having your life at risk isn't carte-blanche to do anything you want; it's simply a relevant fact that colors how I judge a person's decision to renege on past agreements
- in the specific case of an individual suffering from a terminal illness with a single, patented cure who has tried-and-failed in good faith to negotiate a hardship discount from the patent holder I see nothing morally wrong in the individual using their own materials and knowledge to produce the patented substance thereby saving their own life (risking what consequences may come). This analysis is equal parts general moral principles -- not expecting people to go to their own graves for the general benefit of society -- and the specifics of the situation at hand (ignoring patents: fine; stealing stuff: not so fine)
- (unsurprisingly) I also think that in the case of third-world nations facing national epidemics that a similar moral conclusion obtains: if after a good-faith effort to negotiate a price the nation can afford (where "afford" means "purchase in enough quantities to halt the epidemic / mass suffering / etc") then the nation cannot be faulted for ignoring the patents and self-manufacturing the substances in question (regardless of whether production is nationalized or farmed out to private-sector actors); I don't expect the patent holders to like this -- and I don't think they're wrong to dislike it -- but I also don't see anything wrong with the state's actions in that case. The morality-of-the-state does not immediately follow from the individual situation but I think that it does follow insofar as you view the state as obligated to advance its citizens' aggregate interests. I can understand why one might believe the state would better advance its citizens' aggregate interests by respecting the patent-holder's rights, and have already explained in great detail why I don't take that position.
These are relevant moral intuitions; can you state yours?
It's also interesting that your response to the fact that it's not the actual beneficiary who is using the knowledge, but a speculator, was to invoke realpolitik.
One problem with that is that the means produce the ends. The other is that the speculator doesn't have the characteristics that you use to justify your conclusion, but your conclusion is unchanged.
You've per usual mischaracterized what I said.
Anatoly raised a valid point: the specific scenario I drew up isn't actually an accurate match for the scenario at hand, and explained that the moral calculations would probably come out differently in a situation that more closely resembled the situation on the ground.
Unlike you, he very carefully sketched out his own situation, premises, and conclusions, and pointed out explicitly where our views of the world diverged. He then asked what the moral choice would be for Bob -- whether Bob ought to shut down Jim's off-brand pharma factory or whether Bob ought to let Jim stay in business.
Given such a well-formed approach I felt it warranted a proper reply.
I first explained why as a practical matter if Bob is an elected representative -- and thereby accountable to his constituents in some fashion -- the incentives for Bob almost certainly tip in favor of Bob's letting Jim continue.
One thing I admittedly elided somewhat was the relationship between "Bob's incentives as his constituent's elected representative" and "Bob's moral obligations as his constituent's elected representative"; there are entire fields of political philosophy that try to nail that down and getting dragged into it in this context is pretty much a derail.
Suffice to say that yes: Bob is clearly incentivized to allow Jim to continue operating due to the situation Bob is in -- whether Bob is being moral to do so -- and (unstated but implied) to the extent you think that the moral balance generally tips in favor of saving lives now (at the expense of ignoring some patents) instead of preserving the integrity of the patent system (at the expense of deaths) then Bob is, additionally, morally correct to act on those incentives.
I then pointed out that that analysis only applied if Bob was an elected representative.
The only mention of realpolitik was in one of the explanations for why Bob would be incentivized to allow Jim's explanation to continue; it was in the context of a hypothetical defense he might offer to his constituents after he shut down Jim's factory. The realpolitik-derived explanation Bob could offer was that even though he might personally approve of Jim's operation allowing the operation to continue would jeopardize other trade agreements, with worse consequences than whatever fallout derived from shutting down Jim.
I then explained this was a politically weak explanation, as it made Bob look lame for having agreed to such crappy trade terms to begin with; given that it's a weak explanation that makes Bob look bad he'd be incentivized not to wind up in a situation in which he'd have to proffer that defense.
If what you got from that response was "realpolitik! that's another word I don't like" I give up.
I like the word "realpolitik" - accurate labels are a good thing. My point is that the means produce the ends and the means of realpolitik produce crappy ends.
My point is that the means produce the ends and the means of realpolitik produce crappy ends.
I'm still not sure you understand what I was trying to say; regardless of whether your take on realpolitik is correct or not (and I don't have a dog in that hunt) it's effectively a non-sequitur to the discussion.
EG: If I were saying that I can't make it downtown by 5 o'clock because:
- it's too far to bike in the available time
- my car is in the shop
- and I missed the last train
...your statement would be something like:
- trains have uncomfortable seats
...which may be true or false but doesn't really have much to do with the previous thrust of the conversation, does it?
The relationship between your point (which you've made twice now) on "realpolitik" and the posts of mine that mention "realpolitik" is well-nigh isomorphic to the example I just sketched. If you don't believe this I will be happy to make the analogy more explicit.
As this has now happened twice I can't tell which of the following holds:
(i) you understood the analysis I made of the politician's situation but don't care to comment on it; you'd rather discuss what you think of realpolitik. Given the tangential nature of realpolitik to the point I was making this leaves me confused.
(ii) you didn't really get what I was writing but saw a few words in there you have opinions on and so to continue the conversation offered your opinions on those words independent of any consideration as to the structural role those words played in the point I was making.
Substance S exists because at various times in the past Joe made the decision to do substance S. He made those decisions under the assumption that he'd be compensated. You have the option to use substance S under Joe's terms because he made those decisions.
Think of it this way. What if you'd die if Joe didn't touch you? The reason that Joe's touch can save you is that Joe spent 10 years studying and practicing. (Other folks tried but failed to develop this ability.)
Does Joe owe you his touch?