On: The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable developers

[leccine]

NSA likes this. Only one random and entropy code to compromise.

[agwa → leccine]

As opposed to putting a CSPRNG in userspace, in which case they only need to compromise either of two CSPRNG codebases?

[leccine → agwa]

As opposed to have everybody implement his/her own random()/entropy().

[awj → leccine]

...the NSA would love that most of all. The vast majority of programmers lack the knowledge, skill, or both required to correctly implement anything related to cryptography.

[leccine → awj]

"The vast majority of programmers lack the knowledge, skill, or both required to correctly implement anything."

Agreed.

[agwa → leccine]

Who's "everybody?" If you mean userspace application/library developers, they don't have a good source of entropy, so they have to get it from the kernel. That means userspace CSPRNGs end up depending on the kernel CSPRNG. Presto, two single points of failure!

[leccine → agwa]

I see, so prior to this random() and entropy() addition to Linux nobody could ever write any security related application. Yes, this is true. We should change the pull request to "Enable security for Linux, 2014". God, never too late...