When I read the paragraph that began with this sentence:
> Likewise, Luttwak contends that at the higher levels of Grand Strategy the logic of ‘get big or get stomped‘ reverses paradoxically.
I thought, "so many lessons of geo-politics I have learned by wasting time playing strategy board games". My comment is largely petty, but it does make one wonder about gaming in education: it's one thing to read about political strategy, and another thing to actually feel and remember its effects because of a game you've played. Perhaps carefully designed games would teach certain abstract concepts as well or better than simply describing those concepts.
Actually, I agree quite a bit with this. If the game is setup well, it can get players to think through the challenges and learn how the pieces come into play. It's not a terribly new concept, either - teachers have been using in-class games for ages.
Since fields like this have so much speculation and so little hard data to go off of, they have to resort to historical analogies for much of their analysis. Who really knows if China's South Sea strategy is the result of a concerted turn towards militarism, inflamed nationalistic sentiments forcing the government in a particular direction, a geopolitical priority based on projected energy needs, emergent behavior from different factions struggling for power, or a combination of these things? Especially when it comes to a political system and government as opaque to outsiders as that of China? And so we reach for the tired, ill-fitting Bismarck analogies and maybe dredge up some three thousand year old historical event that we imagine might provide some sort of insight.
Also, the guns to butter argument doesn't really make sense. You can't just spend lots of money to quickly buy up a fully-trained military. It takes years, even decades of operational experience to develop a competent fighting force, experience that simply cannot be purchased.
I believe the key is to be a bit more loose with the "guns to butter" analogy. The strategy isn't really to "buy up a fully-trained military" but rather to direct a large proportion of the GDP to building one at whatever time-scale is required.
If you were to do this as an up-and-coming nation (i.e., you've got just a little butter), you'll meet strong resistance from your peers: they know they can counter you by putting your butter pile at risk.
But if you first pursue a strategy that gives you a mountain of butter reserves, your peers lose much of the leverage they can exact upon you, and you are free to devote massive resources toward military with minimal "worst-case" economic risk.
EDIT: I made another comment about how interesting it is to relate this stuff to strategy board games, and this is an example that converts pretty well: "don't start bludgeoning your neighbors into submission until you're pretty sure that you no longer depend upon them for basic resources." is the strategy. (The alternative strategy would be to constantly be frienemies: take a little, give a little, injure a little the whole game, rather than to have a phase of friendship followed by a phase of foeship).
The dilemma facing China was nicely summarized with:
"China’s drive towards military aggrandisement will push other countries towards anti-China coalitions that reduce rather than enhance China’s diplomatic clout. And because China can effectively deter direct military action, nations seeking to counter its rise will be bound to choose “eco-strategic containment” strategies that slow, rather than enhance, the growth China needs so desperately to maintain."
The funny thing is that the review makes me want to read the book much more than the linked article. The reviewer may disagree with the author but at least the review lets the author's ideas come through. The linked article is just badly written. I wish someone had linked the review instead.
This article is so full of overly board generalizations and quite pretentious. To draw conclusions about all of China is silly. To describe China as a nation surrounded by minor gangs of barbarian is absurd. One of those "gangs" was the Mongolian.
That he so easily dismisses the idea of Kissinger as "flattery" is dishonest. Let's not forget Kissinger is among the greatest statesmen in history and has had an enormous role in US and Chinese history. His strategy of using China to counter the USSR is what eventually lead to the disarmament agreements with the USSR. Kissinger also remade the face of Middle Eastern politics by moving Egypt into the US camp following the Yom Kippur War.
Edit: My problem with this article is that while long it is not nearly long enough to encompass the topic he's talking about. He gets around this by drawing conclusions for us. I wish he had taken a much smaller bite and talked in much more detail about the supporting ideas. For example, why does he dismiss Kissinger's idea on China? I would like to see what he thinks and see if I agree with those ideas. Painting Kissinger in broad strokes and in negative light seem to play a crucial role in this article.
Why is it wrong to call the Mongols a "minor gang"? Their conquests are more notable, but I don't think their numbers, or culture, were anything special compared to the other constantly-churning ethnic steppe groups. As far as I'm aware, the Mongol Empire quickly devolved into a bunch of regionally-sized kingdoms (which were more or less friendly with each other, but didn't share administration).
Kissinger was a drama queen prone to petulant and unprofessional behavior. I bet there are senior FO Staff who where burned by him back in the 70's - and I bet there's a few now senior members of the state department who feel the same.
I can't speak of his personal behavior. I've never been in a room with him nor read any accounts of that. However, dismissing his expertise as simple "flattery" without really breaking it down is dishonest. Kissinger has a track record of being quite successful. I know some countries came out worse because of him but it doesn't diminish his insights.
I haven't read Luttwak's book but he seems like a smart guy. I hope in the book he does more than just call it "flattery" and talk about Kissinger's wife, which is what the linked article does. My guess is that Luttwak breaks down Kissinger's ideas. My problem isn't with Luttwak or his book. I haven't read it to be able to judge. I just don't like this article and I think it doesn't do a good job of advancing Luttwak's idea. Why would he even deviate into personal things about Kissinger like his wife?
Luttwak's writing is often brilliant. Check out as many of his essays and summaries as you can. "Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire" drags and is difficult at times, but quite insightful.
One important point, re: this article --
> If you pursue military agrandizement so monomaniacally and consistently with realpolitick that you start to seriously threaten your neighbors and competitors then, if they are smart enough and act in time, you will provoke them into forming an alliance of resistance dedicated to doing whatever is necessary short of nuclear war, but including crushing your economy, to prevent you from getting big enough to dominate.
That was a followed by a criticism of the realism perspective to international relations, but there's variants of realism --
Which wouldn't advocate unlimited buildup of military resources. Compare offenseive realism, from Wikipedia --
"The emphasis offensive realism puts on hegemony as states’ end aim stands in sharp contrast to defensive realism’s belief that state survival can be guaranteed at some point well short of hegemony. In a defensive realist mindset, security increments by power accumulation end up experiencing diminishing marginal returns where costs eventually outweigh benefits."
So... that particular criticism of realism should perhaps be of offensive realism? As a sidenote, reading about realism on Wikipedia is certainly an interesting use of time.
"How did the late-Victorian-era British do it? Foresight, humility, compromise for the sake of alliance, and expert diplomacy and statesmanship. [Excuse me for a moment as I wipe the tears off my keyboard in my woe at contemplating what greatness has been lost and despite the fact that loss was not mine, though it was the world's.]"
The unfettered and self-unaware bias towards Western values of statesmanship by this so-called -- do they actually call themselves this? -- political _scientist_ is cringeworthy.
> "Until 2009 the credibility of the Peaceful Rise grant strategy was reaffirmed by actual Chinese conduct ... actual Chinese conduct kept faith with these promises in the years 2005-2008 ... But that is no longer true of course."
> Future Historians will certainly try and look back and discover the sequence of events and decisions that led to China’s shift in behavior. Perhaps it was the financial crisis and the feeling that the moment of leapfrogging over a peaked and declining West was finally on the horizon. Perhaps it was an internal squabble amongst political elites or wealthy families. Perhaps leftist-nationalist popular fervor took over and the temptation towards aggressiveness could not be resisted, or that having been compelled by circumstance to issue guarantees now seemed more ‘humiliating’ than crafty. It will be interesting to read what those Historians uncover.
The Chinese were very concerned until 2008 that no-one boycotted the Beijing Olympics, which was a very symbolic event for its population regarding China's status in the world. Heck, they even practically dismantled the Great Firewall for a year to make sure there were no excuses for a boycott.
"Luttwak is considered to be brutally honest, whereas Kissinger is recognized as a successful and charming but mendacious manipulator. Both are brilliant, and both are flawed in their own ways, but, in my view, Luttwak’s writing is more often reliable as giving you actually correct information (though selectively, with a slant towards his broader agenda of policy influence), whereas Kissinger is better at obtaining access and favor. They are kind of a real life Jewish immigrants versions of the ‘Once an Eagle‘ duo where Kissinger is Massengale and Luttwak is Damon."
I'm done with the article. Telling me pre-digested conclusions is not entirely honest. There is a lot of fudging going on there which he hides under a veneer of references.
The article really treats the reader like a complete novice to the area of grand strategy, foreign policy, and history.
1. Just because an individual has personal flaws doesn't make the entirety of their work worthless. (re: Steve Sailer)
2. You oppose pre-digested conclusions in articles? You don't want an author to have thought about an issue - and reached a conclusion - before writing about it? Sounds silly to me.
the ideal thing to do for an emerging great power (China, in this case) would be to artificially suppress your military aggrandizement and try to influence perceptions about your country in the direction of ‘friendly’, ‘trustworthy’, ‘peaceful’, ‘non-confrontational’, ‘cooperative’ and especially ‘non-threatening’ growing out of ‘objectively not interested in domination because not interested in military power’.
This seems to be precisely what the US succeeded in doing, with the unwitting help of Nazi Germany taking the fall as the heavy, giving the US the perfect "Good War" justification for a massive military buildup and establishment of a huge military-industrial complex. Then the Soviet Union succeeds in taking Germany's place, continuing the justification.
China's unspoken strategy may be to paint the US as current hegemon and current "heavy." If so, they do seem to be doing it wrong.
A very solid example of someone that doesn't actually understand China very well at all and so analyzes it from a somewhat extreme and self-focused perspective that is particular to conservatives from the West.
> Likewise, Luttwak contends that at the higher levels of Grand Strategy the logic of ‘get big or get stomped‘ reverses paradoxically.
I thought, "so many lessons of geo-politics I have learned by wasting time playing strategy board games". My comment is largely petty, but it does make one wonder about gaming in education: it's one thing to read about political strategy, and another thing to actually feel and remember its effects because of a game you've played. Perhaps carefully designed games would teach certain abstract concepts as well or better than simply describing those concepts.