I have to say I think the conclusion that this isn't related to the Korean Airlines mishap series is mistaken. KAL Cargo Flight 8509 [1] was the last KAL crash, when cultural reasons turned a instrument malfunction into a fatal crash, because a junior FO wouldn't speak up when a Senior Captain(Colonel RoKAF) over-banked the 747, and crashed.
One thing that surprises me is that the same personality trait that crashed 8509, would make them a lousy flight lead as well, not to mention a lousy Squadron CO or Wing CO. If the pilots in the squadron aren't comfortable raising safety issues with their CO, then sooner or later, a crash will happen.
It's not just a foreign issue, poor safety culture lead to the VFMAT-101 crash in San Diego, where 4 people on the ground died[2]. The CO of VR-1 (Fleet Logistics Squadron/VIP transport) got canned for poor command climate [3], which caused a few safety issues, then fudging her NATOPS flight proficiency paperwork. A more "balanced" CO would have realized that flying the checkride, staying fully current would have been easier, and certainly better for safety climate.
IMO(Former pilot): Based on reports, the Pilot Not Flying(PNF/Experienced FO) didn't inform the veteran Captain that he was significantly slow by 500 ft, which could be considered the "waveoff window"[3] for landing a 777 on a runway, even when on a visual approach. Others have pointed out the regulations requiring a go-around for a visual approach are vaguely worded as "when required" without specifying the conditions. Some pilots take that the regulations literally, and believe that a visual approach doesn't require a decision altitude, call-outs or a stabilized approach. It does require to pilots to be safe, and is often required by company Operations Manuals.
I believe it's up to the airline to have a go-around policy for unstabilized approaches. Westjet, for example, requires the approach to be stabilized by 1000 feet. An unstabilized approach is a major causal factor in the majority of landing accidents (according to IATA research). I know which airline I would rather fly on.
Yes, Its up to the airlines. 500ft to be stablized is relatively safe. 1000ft is a little safer margin, but not having a stabilized visual approach procedure is definitively risky at best, and sometimes fatal.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southwest_Airlines_Flight_1455 is an example of an experienced crew making unstable approach and landed high, then overran the runway and crashed. 500 ft for Southwest pilots to be "in the slot" or go around.
I agree 500ft is fine too. The important thing is to have some SOP for a stabilized approach, and for it to be monitored by the company. I suspect Asiana isn't doing this, but I guess we'll find out.
To some extent these chain of command cultural issues (or whatever you want to call them) are unavoidable and show up in most airlines. The worst aviation disaster in history could largely be chalked up to this problem. Two 747's collided in Tenerife because the co-pilot of one was too timid to tell his pilot, who was practically famous within the company, that he was wrong and should wait to take off.
Not disagreeing that KLM Capt. van Zanten was wrong.
The point is that they are not supposed to adversely effect safety and cockpit environment. It takes real leadership to encourage co-pilots/subborinates to raise operational issues in an appropriate way.
Some reports indicate KLM Capt. van Zanten wasn't as overbearing as the official report said, but he still would have been somewhat intimidating due to his status, and the fact is that he had opportunity to take 15 seconds to confirm with the tower, and/or Pan Am 747, after the co-pilot pulled the throttles back. He didn't confirm, and a crash occurred.
One very senior test pilot I know, commented that if a crew chief DID NOT ground abort them (usually before taxiing) because of a safety issue, or at least discuss the problem, and let them fly anyway, then the crew chief would be history. It would be considered dereliction of duty, and heading towards Article 15 Non-Judicial Punishment.
Needless to say, it is not that uncommon for this senior pilot to ground abort, and the crew chiefs do their job.
One thing that surprises me is that the same personality trait that crashed 8509, would make them a lousy flight lead as well, not to mention a lousy Squadron CO or Wing CO. If the pilots in the squadron aren't comfortable raising safety issues with their CO, then sooner or later, a crash will happen.
It's not just a foreign issue, poor safety culture lead to the VFMAT-101 crash in San Diego, where 4 people on the ground died[2]. The CO of VR-1 (Fleet Logistics Squadron/VIP transport) got canned for poor command climate [3], which caused a few safety issues, then fudging her NATOPS flight proficiency paperwork. A more "balanced" CO would have realized that flying the checkride, staying fully current would have been easier, and certainly better for safety climate.
IMO(Former pilot): Based on reports, the Pilot Not Flying(PNF/Experienced FO) didn't inform the veteran Captain that he was significantly slow by 500 ft, which could be considered the "waveoff window"[3] for landing a 777 on a runway, even when on a visual approach. Others have pointed out the regulations requiring a go-around for a visual approach are vaguely worded as "when required" without specifying the conditions. Some pilots take that the regulations literally, and believe that a visual approach doesn't require a decision altitude, call-outs or a stabilized approach. It does require to pilots to be safe, and is often required by company Operations Manuals.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Air_Cargo_Flight_8509
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_San_Diego_F/A-18_crash
[3] http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120916/NEWS/209160317/UAV...