These are excellent questions, all of which need to be clarified sooner or later. While I'm still digesting this white paper and need to do a much more reading of the sources it quotes as well as study of the underlying issues, here's my gut feeling about what those answers will turn out to be (any or all of which might be completely wrong):-
1. I'd guess it included political appointees, such as the director of the CIA or head of the NSA.
2. This is the crucial question. The memo appears to think it requires means and motive but that the US is not obligated to wait for an opportunity before acting. Suppose, for example, that AQ had a plan to repeat 9-11 (to save my defining some new scenario). If you knew that such an operation was planned and that an individual agent of AQ had the authority to order it to commence, it would be legitimate to attack that individual even if you didn't know the precise timing and vectors of the attack. To me this is analogous to attacking an opposing general who's responsible for directing military operations against you even if he has never personally shot at you and his fighting consists of directing others' activity.
3. I'd say an 'associated force' was one that had explicitly declared itself to be affiliated with Al Qaeda or to have a common enemy (eg the US) with that organization. So while Hamas, say, is considered a terrorist organization by the US, I don't think it would be associated with AQ since its activities are confined to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict rather than being part of a global struggle. I think the word 'force' is important too, so that we're responding to the threat of actual injury rather than targeting people who just make nasty remarks about us.
4. I think this is a bit of a red herring, since there's no evidence that we were targeting that individual [the 16-yo son of Anwar Al-aulaqi/Awlaki). Unofficially, the target of that strike was one Ibrahim al-Banna (who I personally know nothing about but who I'm going to assume was a legitimate target) and Abdulrahman had the ill fortune to be in his company at the time he was attacked. While I think it's important to minimize 'collateral damage' and civilian casualties (and think drone warfare actually represents an advance in this regard), I don't feel that the incidental possibility (however improbable or unpredictable) of injuring a US citizen should serve as an effective shield for Al Qaeda's executive, such that senior AQ people effectively get issued with personal hostages to prevent them from being targeted. As Justice Jackson observed, 'the Constitution is not a suicide pact.'
I wholly agree that we can't abdicate all responsibility to the executive (ethically comforting though this might be), but nor should we abandon our legitimate interest in self-preservation to procedural paralysis. Thus, for example, the constitution contemplates not only declarations of war, but the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal without limitation in scope.
1. I'd guess it included political appointees, such as the director of the CIA or head of the NSA.
2. This is the crucial question. The memo appears to think it requires means and motive but that the US is not obligated to wait for an opportunity before acting. Suppose, for example, that AQ had a plan to repeat 9-11 (to save my defining some new scenario). If you knew that such an operation was planned and that an individual agent of AQ had the authority to order it to commence, it would be legitimate to attack that individual even if you didn't know the precise timing and vectors of the attack. To me this is analogous to attacking an opposing general who's responsible for directing military operations against you even if he has never personally shot at you and his fighting consists of directing others' activity.
3. I'd say an 'associated force' was one that had explicitly declared itself to be affiliated with Al Qaeda or to have a common enemy (eg the US) with that organization. So while Hamas, say, is considered a terrorist organization by the US, I don't think it would be associated with AQ since its activities are confined to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict rather than being part of a global struggle. I think the word 'force' is important too, so that we're responding to the threat of actual injury rather than targeting people who just make nasty remarks about us.
4. I think this is a bit of a red herring, since there's no evidence that we were targeting that individual [the 16-yo son of Anwar Al-aulaqi/Awlaki). Unofficially, the target of that strike was one Ibrahim al-Banna (who I personally know nothing about but who I'm going to assume was a legitimate target) and Abdulrahman had the ill fortune to be in his company at the time he was attacked. While I think it's important to minimize 'collateral damage' and civilian casualties (and think drone warfare actually represents an advance in this regard), I don't feel that the incidental possibility (however improbable or unpredictable) of injuring a US citizen should serve as an effective shield for Al Qaeda's executive, such that senior AQ people effectively get issued with personal hostages to prevent them from being targeted. As Justice Jackson observed, 'the Constitution is not a suicide pact.'
I wholly agree that we can't abdicate all responsibility to the executive (ethically comforting though this might be), but nor should we abandon our legitimate interest in self-preservation to procedural paralysis. Thus, for example, the constitution contemplates not only declarations of war, but the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal without limitation in scope.