[edit: Rereading your comment, I think we are talking cross-purposes. I'm talking about heads up games only. You said "Heads up, where there is an optimal strategy, is essentially solved," I replied that "this is wrong, although there is a solution, it's far from solved..." and the conversation went from there. It seems at some point you switched to talking about ring games? On that I obviously agree, Nash does not apply.
So I maintain everything i said before; HU games are far from solved. Much the same that chess is far from solved.]
The game of poker is symmetrical and zero-sum (ignoring rake).
As you say, "Nash is a strategy where no individual has a motivation to change from the equilibrium." If I were playing a GT optimal strategy, the best you can do yourself is play the same strategy - you are not motivated to deviate. This will be EV neutral to both of us in a symmetric, zero-sum game.
Any deviation you make will either be EV neutral and therefore indifferent, or EV negative. If it is EV negative to you, I gain.
Of course none of this applies to multiway games, we're talking heads up.
Ah, I see what happened. You responded to my initial comment with:
> Firstly, although it is proven that there is an optimal (game theoretic) strategy to play (Nash) [...]
The reference to Nash here made me think you were claiming there to be an optimal strategy in the multiway case. I've been talking mostly about multiway ever since. I associate Nash equilibrium with multiway games and wouldn't use the term "Nash" to describe GTO play in a heads up game, even though a Nash equilibrium would be GTO. But maybe this is standard lingo?
Question: So is it the case that there are human players that are measurably better (in a statistically significant way) than the best AI players, heads up?
So I maintain everything i said before; HU games are far from solved. Much the same that chess is far from solved.]
The game of poker is symmetrical and zero-sum (ignoring rake).
As you say, "Nash is a strategy where no individual has a motivation to change from the equilibrium." If I were playing a GT optimal strategy, the best you can do yourself is play the same strategy - you are not motivated to deviate. This will be EV neutral to both of us in a symmetric, zero-sum game.
Any deviation you make will either be EV neutral and therefore indifferent, or EV negative. If it is EV negative to you, I gain.
Of course none of this applies to multiway games, we're talking heads up.