The question was what is “safe enough” threshold. If you say 3.9% isn’t, you need to define what is. The better way to count isn’t “what percent of crew” but “What percent of crew-events” because astronauts were often on multiple missions. That number is 1.64% (14 fatalities over 852 crew events) Maybe that meets your threshold, maybe not.
The point was that wasn’t explicitly defined up front…they seemed to have fallen into the same trap you did of “we’ll know it when we see it”. CCP has a loss of crew threshold requirement of 0.37%.
Fine. If you want an acceptable design parameter for expected deaths: 0%.
We do not design civilian, optional, exploratory space missions with a threshold for acceptable fatalities. There is no number of dead astronauts that we can accept as a design goal.
Unforeseeable fatalities can happen, but death rate should not be a predetermined design parameter.
For the record, at the start of the shuttle program engineers warned of a 1 in 100 failure rate implying an expected death rate.
That is a common knee-jerk reaction of people who have no domain experience. 0% is functionally impractical; if that is your spec you won’t have an aerospace program. It’s the same reason the FDA allowable amount of insects in your food is non-zero.
I didn’t ask about over road vehicles. I specifically asked about commercial air travel. You’ll note that every time there’s a plane crash, the NTSB investigates it and issues recommendations on how to avoid it in the future. That’s why commercial air travel is so safe today. They don’t just write off some percentage as the cost of doing business.
That said, I do understand what you’re saying, that we can’t insist that we never start human commercial space travel unless it can be perfectly safe, and we can’t stop it every time there’s an accident. But that’s not quite the same thing as having an expected fatality rate that we find acceptable.
Ok, I misunderstood your question and was trying to explicitly acknowledge NTSB covers more than air travel.
The linked reference does indeed give an acceptable rate. This doesn’t seem to be a curious discussion if you’re jumping to argue instead of engaging the answer provided.
Check the appendix. There an example table with the exact same method if you don’t want to read the pdf. Those probabilities are comparing the engineering reliability calcs to acceptable thresholds. That’s the method used in industry. If you want, I can also link you to NASA docs with similar methodology, but you specifically asked about commercial aircraft.
If you ask a question and are literally given the authoritative source but are too lazy to read it, maybe feed it into AI or something if you actually want the answer. But at least temper your confidence if don’t have domain experience and are just going off what you think the process is.
Well, I’m a pilot, and I follow NTSB investigations closely for major accidents. So not really domain expertise, but familiarity. And no, they’re not just letting some percentage of fatal commercial air travel accidents slide because they’re under your imagined threshold.
Commercial or private pilot? Whether you're a hobbyist or professional probably makes a difference on your level of familiarity.
My pilot license has long expired, but I did work as a reliability engineer in aerospace. I'm telling you, this is how the design work operates. You are either being deliberately obtuse or misunderstanding what I'm saying. Nobody is "letting accidents slide". If a mishap occurs, it will be investigated. But when they are designing aircraft/spacecraft, failure modes are categorized on severity and probability to determine risk. Something that may be "catastrophic" must have a lower probability of occurrence than something that is "hazardous" and so on. If that risk is above a specified threshold the system must be redesigned to fall within the acceptable risk limits or, in the case of some space operations, waived by those with the technical authority to do so.
Since you follow accidents, I'm sure you are aware of the MCAS issue with Boeing. The Seattle Times had some good early reporting on how they misapplied their hazard analysis and characterization of that system if you want a real-world example with some public information available.
> What rate of commercial air travel fatalities does the FAA and NTSB consider acceptable?
NTSB is an agency investigating accidents why would it define acceptable fatalities… Is it something like after an accident report they’d proclaim “enh, only 10 people died, we’re ok with that”? I just don’t see it. But sounds like you know more.
Maybe FAA has some cutoff before penalties kick in, but those are different agencies with different mandates (though NTSB is an appellate authority for FAA, maybe that’s what you meant…)
My comment is that a predetermined fatality rate is unacceptable. Not that unforeseen fatalities are unacceptable. Space programs playing Russian roulette is NOT the same thing as letting a few beetle parts into the Rice Krispies. If you can reasonably foresee that people WILL die (as happened on the space shuttle) you fix it.
EDIT: 1 in 270 (.37%) isn’t a design parameter from SpaceX. That’s a NASA number for the upper bound of risk for entire mission success. That covers, again, unforeseeable issues. The design number for foreseeable issues is 0. They do not intentionally design fatal hazards into the spacecraft.
I get that’s not the world you want, but that’s how these projects run in real life. E.g. SpaceX specs define a loss of crew rate of 0.37% as the upper threshold that is acceptable. 100% reliability is not a realistic goal in a world full of uncertainties. SpaceX would be out of business in a world that accepts zero risk.
EDIT: 0.37% is not a mission success spec, it is a loss of crew spec. Acceptable mission failure is ~2%. I can guarantee you SpaceX specs for safety critical components is not 100% reliability because those components do not exist. They know they can fail, but try to mitigate it to a reasonable level. “Intentional” is not the same as “acceptable”.
As an example, they originally designed a copv system with a check valve. All competent engineers know check valves leak. That ultimately caused the system to fail.
Then this is just a phrasing/terminology misunderstanding.
I thought you were claiming that they were designing for an intentional failure rate when you said this
> The point was that wasn’t explicitly defined up front…they seemed to have fallen into the same trap you did of “we’ll know it when we see it”. CCP has a loss of crew threshold requirement of 0.37%.
I read your statement of a “requirement” of a crew loss threshold as being required losses. You seem to keep ignoring that I’m saying that no one is designing for intentional losses, and asserting that they are designing to hit a certain number of failures as a “requirement”
From a reliability standpoint they are describing the same phenomenon. Failure = 1-reliability.
Ie, a reliability (survivability) requirement is functionally the same as an acceptable failure requirement. The confusion seems to be around whether that defines a maximum or a minimum.
No, I caught it. But since you didn’t answer the question I’ll assume that’s where you got the information. The problem is the “expected” rate differed depending on who was asked. Managers had a different expected failure rate than engineers. The latter point being, there wasn’t a rigorous reliability based probabilistic calculation everyone could agree on, so they all just had their own biased context.
It depends on whether you mean the full program or not. The engineer “expected” failure rate was 1/100. The post challenger failure rate was 1/110. Full program was about 1/70.
But those “expected” rates are just guesstimates and not scientific. Feynman put it at about 1% given the engineering data available in 1986.
I think we can say that it wasn’t safe.