An insider doesn’t make their bets known until they are certain they can take advantage of it. The whole point of the move is to predate on the rubes.
In all the cases of insider trading I have been aware of, I have never once heard this argument, until that interview with a prediction market CEO.
The whole point of insider trading is to ensure an unfair trade. The moment you enshrine unfairness as a core tenet of your market place, it loses price discovery capability, ensuring that the surplus is captured by manipulation not performance.
You are empirically correct, but one could likely design a prediction market that resolves this while still making insider trading an informational public good. Unfairness to counterparties is a different axis from non-monetary public forecasting signals.
Because it’s targeting gambling addicts as the rubes.
When you have shit like will the government attack X nation by 9:00 pm on Friday, it takes very little for the insiders with levers to decide if the event in question is going to happen, to make the event happen.
It’s beyond even regular corporate insider trading which was usually predicated on secret information, not the literal ability to decide if an event occurs.
An insider doesn’t make their bets known until they are certain they can take advantage of it. The whole point of the move is to predate on the rubes.
In all the cases of insider trading I have been aware of, I have never once heard this argument, until that interview with a prediction market CEO.
The whole point of insider trading is to ensure an unfair trade. The moment you enshrine unfairness as a core tenet of your market place, it loses price discovery capability, ensuring that the surplus is captured by manipulation not performance.