wow excellent piece. Gary Marcus had a long post about this article on his substack.
scary stuff
"And look at what this implies about OpenAI’s valuation as it moves toward an IPO:
OpenAI’s equity - valued north of $850 billion - is functionally the junior tranche of a capital structure whose senior claims, the take-or-pay compute obligations, exceed any revenue path management itself has articulated.
On those numbers, the equity is effectively underwater, and the market has not priced it that way because it still treats those obligations as service agreements rather than what they are economically: debt.
Even if OpenAI can meet those obligations, OpenAI’s unaudited financial statements - as of March 31, 2026 - disclose $665 billion in non-cancellable compute commitments (management’s more recent plan runs to $750 billion). These commitments are take-or-pay in structure - which, as established above, is debt.
Carry the net present value of those obligations as senior debt - roughly $450–500 billion, the same methodology rating agencies have used for decades to capitalize take-or-pay contracts as debt - and a company the market prices as debt-free carries a senior claim worth more than half its entire equity value."
and the 2008 analog
"Millions of subprime borrowers were, at that moment, paying the low introductory rate on a two-year adjustable rate mortgage - the 2/28 ARM. A low fixed-rate for two years, then the rate reset to a payment 30% to 50% higher. During those first two years the loan performed beautifully: the borrower paid, the servicer collected, and the bond paid its coupon. Nothing looked wrong because the whole complex - housing, mortgages, securitization - was sitting inside the teaser period.
The AI boom has rebuilt this exact structure, and the market is once again underwriting the teaser.
It has a reset wall of its own - a schedule of dated, contractual, non-negotiable payment shocks - hiding inside the trillions of dollars of compute contracts signed by OpenAI and other frontier labs since 2024."
Marcus believes that the underlying technology doesn't work. If that's true, then of course the whole thing will crash as soon as everyone realizes this.
This article is mostly making a different argument (though it contradicts itself in some places), which is that even if the underlying technology does work, and is ultimately going to create quadrillions of dollars of value and transform society, if it takes more than another 1–2 years for that to happen, then there'll still be a crash, because that's when the data center construction bills come due and the labs (especially OpenAI) don't yet have the money to pay them.
It argues primarily against a hypothetical optimist who believes that everything is fine because the cash flow numbers currently work out, on the grounds that this hypothetical optimist hasn't realized that the labs' recurring expenses are scheduled to spike in 1–2 years when the data centers come online and the labs have to start paying for them. It also spends a lot of words comparing the situation to the 2008 financial crisis, because that's everyone's favorite morality tale.
I am not sure that anyone is actually making this mistake (i.e., trying to predict the future by looking at labs' present cash flows). The better counterargument is what Matt Levine used to call "Netflix Theory": if the large capital investors who own stakes in the labs still believe in their valuations (which they should, if the technology works and the quadrillions are coming, which we're assuming here for the sake of argument), then they will be very highly motivated not to let their investment be seized by the labs' creditors. So the labs will not have too much difficulty raising or borrowing enough money to pay the bills.
There's a third possibility between works and doesn't work:
Works but not quite good enough to make the case against commoditization.
If open source or on-device AI gets good enough for 80% of consumers, then this stops being a consumer product and the only real market is people who need the high-end models. If those models are slow and expensive, certain tasks like scientific and math research can tolerate slowness, but they run up against the costs. If they're expensive, the tech industry can afford them but runs up against their inefficiencies.
We need to talk about how well these improving models work in multiple dimensions: Accuracy, performance and cost. All three have to improve considerably before the debate dies down.
Yes, if the tech works but in a way that doesn't let the labs command premium prices for inference, then that also means a crash. But that's a fundamentals-based argument like Marcus's (despite being based in economics rather than ML science), so distinct from the one the article's mostly making.
> large capital investors [...] will be very highly motivated not to let their investment be seized [...] So the labs will not have too much difficulty raising or borrowing enough money to pay the bills
So: sunk costs of large investors mean they'd be willing to pay high interest costs? Thus small investors can rely on this dynamic, shielded by big ones?
Remember, the large investors got large in a near-zero interest rate environment (where exact timing doesn't matter as much), but those days are not coming back. Soon margins will matter most, and while NVDA and Apple have the internal discipline for that, OpenAI et al do not.
Yes, the labs will be fine as long as investors believe in them, and they overwhelmingly do, trying to draw comparisons based on traditional market wisdom will fail because none of this is precedented.
scary stuff
"And look at what this implies about OpenAI’s valuation as it moves toward an IPO:
OpenAI’s equity - valued north of $850 billion - is functionally the junior tranche of a capital structure whose senior claims, the take-or-pay compute obligations, exceed any revenue path management itself has articulated.
On those numbers, the equity is effectively underwater, and the market has not priced it that way because it still treats those obligations as service agreements rather than what they are economically: debt.
Even if OpenAI can meet those obligations, OpenAI’s unaudited financial statements - as of March 31, 2026 - disclose $665 billion in non-cancellable compute commitments (management’s more recent plan runs to $750 billion). These commitments are take-or-pay in structure - which, as established above, is debt.
Carry the net present value of those obligations as senior debt - roughly $450–500 billion, the same methodology rating agencies have used for decades to capitalize take-or-pay contracts as debt - and a company the market prices as debt-free carries a senior claim worth more than half its entire equity value."
and the 2008 analog
"Millions of subprime borrowers were, at that moment, paying the low introductory rate on a two-year adjustable rate mortgage - the 2/28 ARM. A low fixed-rate for two years, then the rate reset to a payment 30% to 50% higher. During those first two years the loan performed beautifully: the borrower paid, the servicer collected, and the bond paid its coupon. Nothing looked wrong because the whole complex - housing, mortgages, securitization - was sitting inside the teaser period.
The AI boom has rebuilt this exact structure, and the market is once again underwriting the teaser.
It has a reset wall of its own - a schedule of dated, contractual, non-negotiable payment shocks - hiding inside the trillions of dollars of compute contracts signed by OpenAI and other frontier labs since 2024."