In this case it was an own-goal. If the U.S. military hadn't jammed this flight's GPS it wouldn't have been jammed.
Worldwide, it's an issue that is going to require changes to the infrastructure of aviation: Training, procedures, equipment. That's what I mean when I say "they should have just used VORs and ILS" shows an unsophisticated understanding of aviation safety. "Just use the training you're already supposed to have" isn't enough. We need to make sure that crew and ATC aren't just improvising when there are GPS outages. Manufacturers need to ensure that equipment has been thoroughly tested against GNSS jamming and spoofing -- The Embraer Phenom used to start "UNEXPECTED ROLLING AND YAWING OSCILLATIONS (DUTCH ROLL) AT HIGH AIRSPEEDS,"[1] after it lost GPS; recently there have been many reports of inertial navigation systems becoming "contaminated" after GPS interference such that they give completely wrong positions for the rest of the flight, even after GPS returns.
You're right that just stopping the U.S. military from jamming civilian aircraft GPS doesn't solve the problem for the rest of the globe. That will take more effort, and it's why aviation authorities and industry have been looking at the problem for years. But it would mostly solve the problem for now, in the U.S., where significant GPS interference is rare outside of military exercises.
The accident flight descended into hostile terrain at night and had a CFIT.
That has less to do with GPS jamming than it does accepting a visual approach from 14 miles out with an enormous mountain they couldn't see between them and the airport.
The error as I see it is abandoning the safeguards of flying a standard instrument approach procure. RNAV or ILS, the terrain clearance is backed into the procedure. They descended below minimum safe altitude.
Worldwide, it's an issue that is going to require changes to the infrastructure of aviation: Training, procedures, equipment. That's what I mean when I say "they should have just used VORs and ILS" shows an unsophisticated understanding of aviation safety. "Just use the training you're already supposed to have" isn't enough. We need to make sure that crew and ATC aren't just improvising when there are GPS outages. Manufacturers need to ensure that equipment has been thoroughly tested against GNSS jamming and spoofing -- The Embraer Phenom used to start "UNEXPECTED ROLLING AND YAWING OSCILLATIONS (DUTCH ROLL) AT HIGH AIRSPEEDS,"[1] after it lost GPS; recently there have been many reports of inertial navigation systems becoming "contaminated" after GPS interference such that they give completely wrong positions for the rest of the flight, even after GPS returns.
You're right that just stopping the U.S. military from jamming civilian aircraft GPS doesn't solve the problem for the rest of the globe. That will take more effort, and it's why aviation authorities and industry have been looking at the problem for years. But it would mostly solve the problem for now, in the U.S., where significant GPS interference is rare outside of military exercises.
1. https://www.faa.gov/documentlibrary/media/notice/genot_7110_...