> Don't get so vested in an argument that you stop sniff testing the things you yourself are saying.
If only your self awareness wasn't inversely proportional to your tenacity...
The irony of saying that in response to an exchange where I've observed that you've failed to understand the contents of a source you provided and corrected you about what it actually says! It's well established that home ownership is about 14 percentage points higher than it was in 1950 or about 20 points higher than the actual gold standard era, and that homeowner equity and free and clear home ownership is reached all time recorded highs recently. Trying to rescue your argument by looking at disaggregated data runs into the trouble that numbers of rooms and availability of running water and commutability to well paying jobs is not likely to be favourable to 1950s housing stock, never mind the glories of the deflationary period of the 1930s (other names for that era include National Mortgage Crisis!). It's almost like stuff like 50% deposit requirements and higher relative costs of basics like food and clothing, and needing to live within walking distance of workplaces were an obstacle to people obtaining houses in the gold standard era despite their low sticker prices! The 1940s and 1950s of course were the era of the Fannie Mac, Freddie Mae "funny money" and so started to look a little better. And yes, housing also costs more today than it does in the 1950s, or indeed during actual deflationary periods like the Great Depression and Panic of 1873. Nobody doubts that. Nobody with an adult level of understanding of how the world works argues that it's all about inflation without considering other factors affecting housing supply and demand, from population changes to rural-urban migration to the average person no longer spending a quarter of their income of food. Hint: if something grows significantly above the rate of inflation, it's probably not a primarily inflation-driven phenomenon.
The reason I refer to memes is your repeated failure to understand even basic terminology never mind the actual arguments indicates that you haven't obtained your confidence that you know how the economy should run from actually bothering to learn about it, or even attempting to understand the arguments you're responding to.
Taking an introductory course in economics would be a much better use of your time than responding to an argument about risk and base interest rates by repeating your assertion that risking $1000 to earn $1 is a good decision people should definitely make [in the context of high base interest rates, high credit risk and risk-free real wealth accumulation from not investing], and arguing against a tautology. Nope, deflation by definition means that the real wealth held as cash increases, just as inflation by definition means it decreases (a few posts ago, this was your objection to inflation!).
I've endeavored to completely read your messages. I would appreciate if you returned the courtesy to avoid needless repetition when our messages are already somewhat lengthy owing to the large number of simultaneous topics. And also please cite your numbers - you're now pulling a bunch of numbers/facts out of nowhere that seem largely hallucinated. Citations would go a long way here and take like 3 seconds. So here are the apples to apples base data for the most recent branch of discussion:
Percent of all housing units 'owned' by their occupants = 53% in 1950, 58% in 2025 [1].
Percent of 'owned' housing units without a mortgage = 56% in 1950, 39.4% in 2025. [2]
Approximate (max) rate of 'real ownership' (multiplying the two values) = 29.7% in 1950, 22.9% in 2025.
The first link also goes into detail on the demographic collapse I mentioned showing 'ownership' in people under 35 is at 36.8% and continuing to trend downwards. The local max is being driven by the elderly in non-urban low-income states, as already mentioned. I also have specifically focused on issues above and beyond inflation. Inflation is an effect, not a cause. The cause of these problems (of which inflation is but one) is money printing and the transition to becoming a debt driven society.
I 100% agree that things were awful in 1930. It was the worst economic event in 150 years of deflationary systems in the US that also came on the tail end a number of catastrophes setting up a perfect storm. But focusing on this time is like me arguing that the past was better than 2008. Well yeah, I'd certainly hope so! But in that case it'd say a whole lot less about the past than it would about 2008. I do agree 1950 isn't ideal in a perfect world but it's probably about as good as we can get on balance of the difference in the systems + reliable/impartial data we can obtain and it being a fairly 'normal' era during a time of world war and catastrophic plagues.
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The latter part of your post turned into an unhinged and incoherent jumble of ad hominem and strawmen. That, I will admit, I am skimming over. If you want to phrase things like an adult, and argue against what I'm actually saying, then I'll happily read it again.
> So here are the apples to apples base data for the most recent branch of discussion:
These are explicitly not apples to apples comparisons because the 1951 percentage is extremely restrictive about the housing units considered (i.e. most apartments are excluded, as are farms) and there's no reason to believe the ownership percentages are equivalent. I could (equally unfairly) point out that the 9.5 million "free and clear" homes in your paper is less than a quarter of the total recorded nonfarm housing stock which is a lot less than the 34 million (39.4%) owned free and clear today.
What is clear though is that no interpretation of the available data is compatible with your original statement that "In 1951 56% of people owned their home, free and clear", or your assertion that something your source claimed had grown massively recently was a "local low". Defending those basic misunderstandings with clumsy misuse of statistics two posts later whilst telling me not to get too vested in arguments is... pretty funny.
Also, as I keep pointing out and you keep pretending isn't the case, the 1950s were a time where inflation rates averaged their current level (but with more volatility) not a time of deflation (and for that matter were also a time of the Fannie Mae mortgage backing you blame for everything, rather than the good old days when you had to save up 50% of the cost of your house as a deposit and pay it off within 10 years). So it is completely irrelevant to your argument for deflation.
You have not addressed any of the other points in my last two posts. I am sorry, but if genuinely don't understand why nobody would invest for a 0.1% return [under a gold standard] even when the post you are responding to explicitly mentions things like interest rates and risk and the relationship between credit prices and money supply, it is not worth my time trying to educate you on what those very basic concepts entail. Especially given that you have made it extremely clear you have no interest in understanding.
There is no point phrasing things like an adult to someone that flat-out refuses to acknowledge very basic adult concepts like interest rates and risk and supply and demand whilst resorting to babyish memes like "money printer go whirrr" and "funny money"
I've already mentioned that the contemporary data are also restrictive. The (of total) maximum possible free and clear owned housing stock is 30% [1] since it's only 45 million units out of a total housing stock of 147. And it'd be even lower because we're only considering owner occupied, and corporations own about 10% of houses in modern times - yet another 'yay' for funny money driven inflation evasion and speculation. So the max would be in the 20s at the absolute most, yet we get 39.4% of homes being owned free and clear. How? By removing a lot of the housing stock from consideration. In any case, much of the stock removed in the 1950s data works against me. For instance farm units had even more favorable ownership rates than general housing stock. There is no 'trick' in the data here.
I've also already said I fully agree that the data we're using isn't ideal in terms of inflation. It was right after WW2 and so there was some serious localized inflation, as well as some early funny money stuff. But 1950 is pretty a pretty reasonable inflection point between 'the good ole days' and the inflation squeeze of modern times. If your argument is that inflation/money printing from the 40s was causing the positive outcomes, you end up with a logical contradiction because we engage in orders of magnitude greater inflation/money printing today, yet have worse outcomes by endless metrics. Furthermore, 1950 wasn't some local max. Most data there was significantly worse than the era prior to the wars, spanish flu, and so on.
As for investment, expected value [2] is a term you do not seem familiar with. It is a risk adjusted value of expected return on something. In modern times any potential venture needs an expected value greater than inflation to break even. That immediately leads to the scenario where you need infinite exponential growth or this economic system collapses. That infinite exponential growth briefly looked possible. Now the digital explosion is plateauing, there's a fertility collapse (which again is very possibly caused, at least in part, by this system's failures) and more. If LLMs or space don't restart the game of kick the can, this system will die. The only question is whether it will go out with a boom or a whimper.
Also, somebody else just submitted this [1]. The Fed just released a paper showing (or at least affirming) that the labor share of income in the US is at its lowest post-war level which is, more or less, equivalent to stating that it's at its lowest level ever. They're likely just using data starting at the 40s for the same reason I am.
But the really interesting thing? Go open their graphs and look where the inflection point is. It's, again, the funny money.
> I've also already said I fully agree that the data we're using isn't ideal in terms of inflation.
It's not a case of it being not ideal. It's the case of it being an example of literally the opposite phenomenon from the one you're arguing for. Arguing that the 1950s are a good example of how deflation helps people is like arguing that Barack Obama is a good example of how Republican candidates make good presidents.
> As for investment, expected value [2] is a term you do not seem familiar with. It is a risk adjusted value of expected return on something.
hahahahahahaha
Again, it's a basic definitional thing that EV isn't adjusted for the investor's risk tolerance (it's a probability weighted average, as your link and many better introductory economics and finance texts you should probably read will tell you.)
Not only am I familiar with what expected value actually means and its use as a synonym for risk-neutral return in investment parlance, I'm also apparently the only participant in the discussion aware that 0.1% expected return isn't likely to leave enough of a risk premium[1] and (ii) investors also have to consider opportunity cost, so even in a world filled with insane risk-neutral investors who'd in principle be comfortable betting their house on a fair coin flip, they still wouldn't touch an investment at a nominal 0.1% return in a gold standard world, because the opportunity cost would be giving up much higher returns on lending the money elsewhere. Because unlike you I know that market and base interest rates are a thing and why they're relevant to the argument. And also they're not the same thing as inflation and are in fact generally inversely related[2].
Once we've got past the basic definitional stuff and the "why doesn't this hypothetical gold standard economy where you're considering investing in a productive venture for a 0.1% return have anyone else that wants to borrow your money?", I could question what sort of venture would get a 0.1% nominal return when prices of stuff it might make are going down, and only get a 0.1% nominal return in an inflationary environment where the prices of stuff it might make are going up[3]. It's easier to make more than 0.1% making stuff to sell next year when prices of everything are going to be 2% higher, and harder when prices of everything are going to be 2% lower.
Again, if you don't have the basic grasp of the relevant terms you're quoting (some of them more high school than undergrad) never mind sufficient grasp to understand even an argument as simple as "risking money to earn 0.1% is not attractive when money is in short supply" have the decency to the possibility that you might not be in a position to know best about how the economy works. Also, if you don't like billionaire capital owners having too much money, maybe don't pin your hopes on the only policy prescription that hasn't trended towards the CATO institute, von Mises and Ayn Rand's[4] arguments in favour of letting billionaires keep more of their money since the 1950s...
[1]in any economy except, ironically, an economy with lots of money printing (seriously, go learn about QE. Hint: it's printing lots of money because printing lots of money is a way to get people interested in investing when interest rates are very low)
[2]and also why, and covering the relevant transmission mechanisms might take half a semester of undergrad macro, but even understanding that money isn't cheap to borrow when its in short supply would get you there.
[3]I mean, when I say wonder, I actually know that the most likely way of achieving that with actual goods and services is if it's an inferior good with negative income elasticity. I'm just not sure why anybody would want to base economic policy on incentivising the production of inferior goods with negative income elasticities, even if such a policy were feasible.
[4]weird how it's all these extremely rabidly pro-billionaire personalities and organizations and none of the pro-worker organizations that want the gold standard back, considering your conviction that it will be good for workers and bad for billionaires.
In the 40s the inflation was, in and of itself, liminal and driven by short-term actions in response to WW2, similar to what happened during the Civil War, WW1, and other such eras. The funny money took off as policy much later. It has very little to do with the current era of the routine 'printing' of trillions of dollars as a normal policy, let alone with a wealth of systems adapted to exploit that to this maximal. This is why the 40s, in terms of outcomes, looked more like previous eras then the current.
In investing, you seem to be trying to derive variance from expected value, which is impossible. And risk is not the same thing as variance. It's entirely possible for an investment with a 0.1% EV to have a lower variance than one with a 15% EV. The obvious example there would be hedges against black swans, contrasted against a government bond from a stable country.
In any case, this argument also works against you. Because the point is that anything with a real expected return of "x" in an inflationary system has a real return of e.g. "x+5" (or whatever the exact delta happens to be) in a non-inflationary system. You cannot, in good faith, try to argue that is a bad thing. Whatever 'x' happens to be, whether 0.1 or 50, it's going to be better in a non-inflationary system.
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As for social equalities, you likely missed the above note. I'll simply quote it here: "Somebody else just submitted this [1]. The Fed just released a paper showing (or at least affirming) that the labor share of income in the US is at its lowest post-war level which is, more or less, equivalent to stating that it's at its lowest level ever. They're likely just using data starting at the 40s for the same reason I am.
But the really interesting thing? Go open their graphs and look where the inflection point is. It's, again, the funny money."
> In investing, you seem to be trying to derive variance from expected value, which is impossible. And risk is not the same thing as variance.
It's funny, because two posts ago you wrote the words "expected value is a term you do not seem familiar with. It is a risk adjusted value of expected return on something". So you're really only arguing against yourself here
But variance is, in fact a way for investors to assess risk (again, if you had an adult-level of understanding of the subject matter or even a modicum of self awareness you wouldn't keep contesting definitions for no reason). And since investors care about risk adjusted returns, they do not think an expected 0.1% nominal return on productive activity is attractive, least of all in a deflationary environment. (Sure, you can't directly derive variance from expected return, but you don't need to do that to rule out ludicrous scenarios like a sub 10 basis point risk premium on investing in productive activity whilst prices fall, which means you don't invest at 0.1%)
> It's entirely possible for an investment with a 0.1% EV to have a lower variance than one with a 15% EV.
Sure. It is however entirely impossible for a productive venture with a 0.1% EV to have an attractive risk adjusted return under deflation. Nobody with an adult level understanding of finance would make this argument, let alone still be trying to defend it by arguing against their own attempted gotcha multiple posts later. Because they understand basics like "deflation causes debt to be more expensive" (remember a week ago when you wrote that, apparently without understanding what it means), and 0.1% is not a high return on risky activity when debt is expensive. And also, they understand that the risk-adjusted return will be negative, particularly as risks to commercial activity increase under deflation caused by monetary policy intentionally starving the economy of capital).
> Because the point is that anything with a real expected return of "x" in an inflationary system has a real return of e.g. "x+5" (or whatever the exact delta happens to be) in a non-inflationary system
Again, this is just an assertion that only somebody with no understanding of basic stuff like how inflation/deflation affects sales prices and interest rates would make. It is very easy to argue that the price somebody has to pay a wealthier person to borrow money being x+5 rather than x is a bad thing, if you believe that it is better for economies to reward people that make stuff rather than people that have stuff.
The actual point was that it's harder to make a positive money return producing stuff to sell when next year's price is y-2 rather than y+2, and in those circumstances also easy to make a small real return doing nothing or a big real return lending to cover short term debts instead.
Again, I'm sorry you don't understand this, but it's really, really not possible to contest the fact that deflation does not incentivise investment if you understand supply and demand to high school level (never mind the actual nuances of interest rates and transmission mechanisms). I guess I can look forward to you eventually accepting that it doesn't whilst attempting to attribute your current position to me in five days time.
If only you could trade some of your unmatched reserves of persistence for a little actual knowledge...
(you could, for example,read a book instead of doubling down on being wrong by Googling more economic terms to insinuate I'm missing whilst not even being able to define them without making mistakes)
> But the really interesting thing? Go open their graphs and look where the inflection point is. It's, again, the funny money
The really interesting thing is that you've actually managed to find an economic chart without an inflection point to make argument about inflection points, which is quite an achievement! The trend line over the period displayed appears to be a noisy concave function with the noise attributable to economic cycles.
Although if you put a gun to my head any asked me to point to what looks most like an inflection point in this graph without an actual inflection point, I'd probably point to the steepening of the downslope of the curve around the millennium which doesn't seem to have much to do with leaving the gold standard or inflation being high....
I'm not the one arguing about definitions. You chose to take us down that path, adding a bunch of ad hominem while simultaneously misusing the terminology you were trying to be patronizing with. I 100% agree that it's completely inconsequential so long as we both understand what the other is saying, but I'm also trying to, within reason, respond to each thing you're stating.
One major thing I'd emphasize here is that you're acting like the consequences of non-inflationary systems are speculative. The entire point of this discussion is we have a wealth of data to draw from, from both systems. With a non-inflationary system we have a system that was, more or less, stable over nearly 200 years through numerous catastrophic events. With the modern inflationary system we have something that already not only seems unsustainable, but is causing major societal issues after just 50 years of relative super-utopia. I say super-utopia because not only have we avoided anything on the scale of e.g. WW2, but it kicked off alongside the once-in-a-civilization super-economic boom of mass digitization that is now plateauing.
So on the data issue - the way you determine an inflection point on a noisy graph is just to look at the midpoints of the noise and graph them. On the Fed's graph look at the slope of the midpoints from start to mid 70s, and then from the mid 70s to present. The brief spike at the dotcom bubble is just noise that gets smoothed out. For a comparable graph, with less noise, here [1] is a graph on labor's shares of gross domestic income. Again, you seriously can't miss the inflection point.
For specific item prices, this [2] site is extremely interesting. I'm not fond of the author's overt partisanship, but his data is sound and eye opening. He's collected the price of Campbell's tomato soup over more than a century and graphed them. The fun thing about that is that they've been selling the same product in the same quantity, to a generally price sensitive customer, for well over a century. And so it helps give an image of raw price data over time in a way that aggregate measurements like CPI are often unable to do so. And again we see the exact same inflection point. It also gives some context of 40s inflation versus the modern system that we've created.
> I'm not the one arguing about definitions. You chose to take us down that path, adding a bunch of ad hominem while simultaneously misusing the terminology you were trying to be patronizing with. I 100% agree that it's completely inconsequential
Technically I suppose it is me that keeps insisting you can't just redefine terms to make them mean the opposite of what they mean because that would be convenient to your argument. I didn't realise you considered making up new definitions of words "completely inconsequential", but it explains a lot.
But one of the things about posting complete nonsense like "expected value [2] is a term you do not seem familiar with. It is a risk adjusted value of expected return on something" is that I'm going to patronise you for responding by posting incorrect definitions in a ill-advised attempt to patronise the person who knows what the words actually mean.
> I'm also trying to, within reason, respond to each thing you're stating
And yet your latest response to me continues to ignores all my points about risk, base interest rates, opportunity costs and the relative unprofitability of investing in productive ventures when average prices are falling and instead links to a trend line for Campbell's soup prices. I realise it's easier for you to triumphantly assert that inflation is correlated with the price of Campbell's soup to rise (well done, you managed to not get a basic economic relation the wrong way round for once!) than to learn why interest rates have an inverse relationship with money supply and why that might be relevant to the return on productive ventures, but it's a whole lot less relevant to anything I've said. Because, funnily enough, I never expected anything other than Campbell's soup increasing their prices in the last 50 years. Still, the proportion of budget spent on food, which matters a lot more, has gone down a lot since the gold standard era[1][2] and it's not like that's because Americans are getting skinnier!
> One major thing I'd emphasize here is that you're acting like the consequences of non-inflationary systems are speculative. The entire point of this discussion is we have a wealth of data to draw from, from both systems. With a non-inflationary system we have a system that was, more or less, stable over nearly 200 years through numerous catastrophic events. With the modern inflationary system we have something that already not only seems unsustainable, but is causing major societal issues after just 50 years of relative super-utopia. I say super-utopia because not only have we avoided anything on the scale of e.g. WW2, but it kicked off alongside the once-in-a-civilization super-economic boom of mass digitization that is now plateauing.
If we want to talk about stability verus "catastrophic events", the most notable periods of of sustained deflation (the thing you kicked off this exchange by praising) were called the Great Depression, Panic of 1893, Panic of 1873, the Panic of 1837 and the 1818-21 depression. So yeah, economists' alarm about deflationary spirals are not speculation but backed by a lot of data. If we're doing a natural experiment between deflation and steady 2% inflation even the names are a hint that the former state of affairs might be more problematic.
It's funny that you think there was a single monetary system over that 200 year period (again, you're disputing a universally agreed historical fact rather than making a defensible theoretical argument about causation here) and perhaps funnier still that you believe there were no societal issues over that period and that "mass digitization" has been more transformational than the Industrial Revolution was. Disruptions like the Civil War and WWII were dealt with by completely disregarding convertibility to gold and the growth of 1950-1970 was sustained by the US giving away quarter of the entire world's gold supply, a luxury it can no longer afford. The Bretton Woods trade arrangement that made everyone need dollars largely worked for the US; the attempt to link it to gold was what killed it. And it would have died much earlier if FDR hadn't already suspended the ability of anybody that wasn't a foreign central bank to demand gold in exchange for dollars...
> So on the data issue - the way you determine an inflection point on a noisy graph is just to look at the midpoints of the noise and graph them.
The way you determine an inflection point is to determine the breakpoint between upward and downward trends or concavity or convexity. Neither of the graphs of labour share of income you have linked to have that functional form, irrespective of what averaging method you use to remove the economic cycles.
I laughed mostly because it's actually really easy to find similar time series that do appear to have an inflection point some time around 1971, or at least between 1965 and 1990[3]. Here's one[4]. The trouble for you is that although it shows a fall in employee compensation as a proportion of GDI in the last 50 years, it also shows that it was lower still in the gold standard era's heyday back in 1929 (the 1920s were also the peak of post-industrial wealth concentration)... and that wage growth happened when the Fed inflated its way out of that mess...
It's almost like those billionaire funded think tanks promising that a return to the monetary economics of 1931 (but keeping the tax cuts of the 1980s and other policy and technology shifts you're furiously pretending didn't affect anything) would make ordinary people get paid a higher share of income aren't telling the truth.
[2]fun aside: there probably is an inflection point in this time series at 1932, the last full year in which people could redeem their USD for gold with food becoming relatively more affordable afterwards. Although you'd probably want to see the trend for the 1920s and earlier to be sure, and since I'm not as monomanically currency obsessed as you I would never make the mistake of arguing that decoupling from gold is the only reason why food is much more affordable to the average person today than it was at any point during the gold standard era...
[3]I mean, the silly website on that theme manages to find a graph to blame the end of Bretton Woods for divorce rates...
From the founding of this country until 1971, with a handful of brief pauses during genuine emergencies, government spending was constrained by the USD being backed by various metals. You are right that this does not guarantee deflation for a variety of reasons. That's a part of the reason I swapped my terminology away from deflationary to non-inflationary. When I speak of non-inflationary systems I am speaking of ones where the government's ability to 'print' money is externally constrained. If you want to play No True Scotsman with the overwhelming majority of this time period and insist that this wasn't 'real deflation', awesome! Feel free to. Because it's exactly these eras that I believe we ought endeavor to return to. I'm not appealing to some past that did not exist, but the rather real one that we had.
I have not ignored your claims of interest and such. I have responded to them with real data repeatedly. If you want to argue that landing on the Moon is impossible because of the Van Allen Belts, why bothering digging into the issues with such a claim instead of simply pointing out the numerous times that we have successfully traversed such, repeatedly? This is what I was talking about when I said that you are largely ignoring data in favor of hypothetical arguments.
And again you are being goofy with terminology, literally right after complaining about such. The mathematical definition of inflection point is useless outside of mathematics, and even specific subdomains within such. With the mathematical definition of inflection point a system that goes from linear to hyper-exponential would have no inflection point, which would be wholly nonsensical for our discussion. This is yet another argument you've made in bad faith.
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As for the socioeconomic side of things, again I'd just appeal to the data. The current system is driving inequality that completely dwarfs times past. Elon is worth more than Carnegie and Rockefeller combined, inflation adjusted. US median wage is about $43k [1] so Elon's worth about 22 million years of median wages. Rockefeller was worth about $900 million in 1913 when the median income was around $600, so he was "only" worth about 1.5 million years of median wages.
Beyond the excesses of inequality this system creates, do you not see this as, at least possibly, being the mother of all bubbles that we're pumping up? What happens when the funny money is no longer enough to keep everything from blowing up at the seams? That's going to have a catastrophic impact on the wealth and power of every single billionaire. And I think those that can see the forest through all those trees would certainly be looking to move away from this system before an event that may well end up making 1929 look like the 'good ole days.'
I would also add on this point that it's also not just the issue of the super-bubble, but also social responses to such. The DNC is getting overrun by literal socialist candidates starting to accumulate seats and influence everywhere. I assume you're the sort to realize that their thinking of socialism is much more sickle and hammer than it is Norway, which isn't socialist in the least. And that's again largely a consequence of our current system which is drowning the lower classes and taking the upper to unprecedented highs.
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One final note. I quite like Our World in Data. I think they generally provide some good info. But in their food graph they literally start it at 1929. I'm going to assume that was accidental, because it's complete misinformation. I'd be quite curious to see what it was prior, but saying that we spend less on food now than we did during the Great Depression is rather less than informative.
> If you want to play No True Scotsman with the overwhelming majority of this time period and insist that this wasn't 'real deflation', awesome! Feel free to. Because it's exactly these eras that I believe we ought endeavor to return to. I'm not appealing to some past that did not exist, but the rather real one that we had.
It's hardly "no true Scotsman" to point out that a period where inflation was at current target levels is not an example of the benefits of deflation. "No true Scotsman" would be arguing that the Great Depression didn't count as an example of deflation under the gold standard, despite it being the US's last sustained deflation, the last period in which ordinary people and banks could redeem dollars for gold, and also a Depression which is widely agreed by people (with otherwise widely divergent views) to have been caused primarily by attempts to preserve the gold standard. The fact that it was so bad the US gave up on the standard isn't a reason for it not to be a true example of stuff that can happen under gold standards.
But great, you've moved away from arguing deflation's a good thing and that goods prices going down each year makes investment more attractive to merely advocating metallic standards. Let's talk about how great living under gold standards was socioeconomically during periods the US wasn't giving away their gold reserves to try to maintain them:
> As for the socioeconomic side of things, again I'd just appeal to the data.
> I'm going to assume that was accidental, because it's complete misinformation.
Imagine insisting you wanted to argue about data and then crying "complete misinformation" because the data shows the opposite of what you want it to show; a pretty consistent downward trend in relative expenditure of food bar the WWII spike.
If you're curious about what it was like prior there are lots of graphs and data points here showing things like food prices being as high as 40% of household budgets at the beginning of the 20th century! For related reasons - even though house prices were low - 81% of families rented! Some nice steep downslopes on those graphs showing proportions of budget spent on necessities too.
https://www.bls.gov/opub/100-years-of-u-s-consumer-spending.... .
Honestly, I'm a bit surprised you didn't already know that: "ordinary people used to spend most of their money on basics" feels like something I first learned in primary school history classes rather than undergrad, and there are plenty of reasons why this trend exists. But what's more surprising is that you're making these very, very confident claims about how much easier it was to afford basics in that era than this era, making very strong causal claims about the form of money being the root of all economic ills and the need to revert to the monetary systems of a status quo ante bellum, and yet you don't even seem to think that it might be relevant to check what people were spending all their money on (80% on necessities earlier in the century...)
> I would also add on this point that it's also not just the issue of the super-bubble, but also social responses to such. The DNC is getting overrun by literal socialist candidates starting to accumulate seats and influence everywhere. I assume you're the sort to realize that their thinking of socialism is much more sickle and hammer than it is Norway, which isn't socialist in the least. And that's again largely a consequence of our current system which is drowning the lower classes and taking the upper to unprecedented highs.
History has always had radicals. In the 1890s the DNC got fully taken over by a populist whose entire mission was to abolish the gold standard[1], to the enthusiasm of the rural poor who blamed it for their poverty and disdain of the wealthy. By contrast the last significant politician to campaign for a return to the gold standard was an entirely different form of radical in Herman "Don't Blame Wall Street! Blame Yourself" Cain...
And today... well the hammer and sickle types aren't really to my taste either, but they've still got a better idea of cause and effect than the people whose proposed answer to inequality comes straight out of billionaire funded think tanks recommending reductions in regulations, taxes on corporations, investors and the rich, dismantling of the welfare state and the reintroduction of the gold standard.
As for the European socialist types, well several of them have successfully reduced inequality to much lower levels than existed in their countries during the early 20th century. None of them have done so by bringing back a gold standard.
[1]admittedly he wasn't sophisticated enough to imagine a monetary system linked to credit rather than metal, but the whole point of populist arguments for bimetallism was that the standard was "crucifying us on a cross of gold" by causing acute shortages of money
P.S. a linear trend which at turns into an exponential growth curve absolutely does have an inflection point, as do rising logistic curves more commonly found in economic data.(the second derivative of an exponential growth phase of a curve is an increasing function and the second derivative of a linear trend is 0). Graphs which smooth into a simple decreasing concave function do not, however, which is why I found it amusing why you were so determined to find one around the point the gold bugs tell you it should exist.
I haven't moved my argument at all. What I have said, from the very beginning, is that the excessive printing of money distorts the economy and causes perverse incentives. So that printing needs to be hard constrained. I've indulged tangents outside of this because I think the topic is fascinating and I always learn a bit during these sort of discussions, so why not?
The food argument is weak. Thinking about it more - household sizes were larger, household labor distribution was very different (far more single income families), agricultural and other advances have driven down prices independent of economic systems, and so on. Using your baseline value as the start of the Great Depression is just the start of problems there. Reasonably controlled data would look quite different.
You are also repeating a fallacy that you seem to believe. The US did not drop the gold standard after the Great Depression. We remained on it until 1971. The reason we dropped it in 1971 is because we defaulted. As the government began increasingly reckless money printing in the 60s, we began unable to keep up the facade of the dollar being based on anything. The French made a large gold call, and we chose to default on our obligations.
In the 150 years from 1800 to 1950 (if you want to claim the inflationary trend had already began then) there was a total inflation of 44%. In the 75 years since 1950, there's been total inflation of 1347%. It looks a bit better if we use 1971 as the date, but not dramatically so. In general I could not care less about what causes the constraints, but the government themselves getting to decide how much they print is increasingly obviously unsustainable.
If you didn't get the point in my previous message regarding the socioeconomic issues - I am saying that all of these things are going to be entirely evident to billionaires as well. They'll get rich in either system since capitalism itself will always have a tendency towards the rich getting richer. But the big question is what happens to the other 90% (and in particular the ~70%) which, in turn, plays a large role in what happens to the 0.01%.
And in there, inflation is most certainly not working the overwhelming majority's favor. The invisible wage depression alone is going to result in the end of capitalism if it's not fixed, which is going to leave everybody way worse off. And requiring wages be adjusted to inflation is just going to trend towards hyper-inflation. There's only one solution, so far as I can see - money printing needs to be restrained.
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Jennings did not want to abolish the gold standard. What started the entire issue was funny money printing during the Civil War which heavily distorted the economy. This eventually led to the government returning to the gold standard for that funny money, which turned it immediately into real money. But the teasing of unlimited money struck up a debate as to whether the monetary supply should be further expanded and, if so, then how. And there was already a faction of 'greenbackers' that wanted it expanded with unbacked greenbacks - funny money. Jennings wanted controlled expansion with silver. That's mostly just kicking the can, but still much more reasonable than funny money.
And no, a linear function that becomes exponential does not have a mathematical inflection point. I don't know if you understand what you're saying because you are actually saying completely correct things and then contradicting yourself. As you already said, a mathematical inflection point is when a system changes from concave to convex or vice versa. Going from linear growth to exponential is a purely convex system in the context that we're discussing - there is no mathematical inflection point, but a rather obvious inflection point in the colloquial speak that we were obviously using.
If only your self awareness wasn't inversely proportional to your tenacity...
The irony of saying that in response to an exchange where I've observed that you've failed to understand the contents of a source you provided and corrected you about what it actually says! It's well established that home ownership is about 14 percentage points higher than it was in 1950 or about 20 points higher than the actual gold standard era, and that homeowner equity and free and clear home ownership is reached all time recorded highs recently. Trying to rescue your argument by looking at disaggregated data runs into the trouble that numbers of rooms and availability of running water and commutability to well paying jobs is not likely to be favourable to 1950s housing stock, never mind the glories of the deflationary period of the 1930s (other names for that era include National Mortgage Crisis!). It's almost like stuff like 50% deposit requirements and higher relative costs of basics like food and clothing, and needing to live within walking distance of workplaces were an obstacle to people obtaining houses in the gold standard era despite their low sticker prices! The 1940s and 1950s of course were the era of the Fannie Mac, Freddie Mae "funny money" and so started to look a little better. And yes, housing also costs more today than it does in the 1950s, or indeed during actual deflationary periods like the Great Depression and Panic of 1873. Nobody doubts that. Nobody with an adult level of understanding of how the world works argues that it's all about inflation without considering other factors affecting housing supply and demand, from population changes to rural-urban migration to the average person no longer spending a quarter of their income of food. Hint: if something grows significantly above the rate of inflation, it's probably not a primarily inflation-driven phenomenon.
The reason I refer to memes is your repeated failure to understand even basic terminology never mind the actual arguments indicates that you haven't obtained your confidence that you know how the economy should run from actually bothering to learn about it, or even attempting to understand the arguments you're responding to.
Taking an introductory course in economics would be a much better use of your time than responding to an argument about risk and base interest rates by repeating your assertion that risking $1000 to earn $1 is a good decision people should definitely make [in the context of high base interest rates, high credit risk and risk-free real wealth accumulation from not investing], and arguing against a tautology. Nope, deflation by definition means that the real wealth held as cash increases, just as inflation by definition means it decreases (a few posts ago, this was your objection to inflation!).