The argument against security through obscurity isn't that it doesn't work at all. It does to a degree, only it is not as strong as people think.
An example from the meat world: not publishing your vacation dates well in advance for the world to see somewhat reduces your chance of being burglarized. That is security by obscurity; not reliable, but not completely inefficient either.
But if you live in a fortress (security by key material), you can well declare your vacation dates without running the risk.
It is an access issue. If you could get step by step instructions on how to modify a virus so it kills all people over 6ft you bet your ass there would be people attempting it.
Column A, Column B. Building a small explosive device isn't hard. Building a million is very difficult, doing it covertly virtually impossible without the resources of a nation-state.
The problem with biologics is the self-assembly and replication machinery comes for "free." So the numpties who might otherwise blow up a trash can [1] now have a real chance of taking out a million people.
They would still have to procure things that would (I hope) light up many screens before they're able to. And such numpties are probably already monitored, or in prison for some other stupid life decision.
I also would like to hope that people that are likely to do such things are probably:
A) don't know how to break even the most basic guardrails of models
> They would still have to procure things that would (I hope) light up many screens before they're able to
“Many of the largest and most responsible providers in the industry already screen and record orders voluntarily,” but there is no requirement to do so [1].
I don’t know if you’re being silly but it is orders of magnitudes easier to modify an existing virus to selectively target certain snps than make “antiviral nanobots”
Claude, modify the existing 6ft killer virus so that it only makes my balls itch slightly for a day and gives me lifetime immunity to all further stamms of the 6ft killer virus. Make no mistakes, double check so the virus causes no unforseen complications.
If that were possible, they would already be attempting it with the same level of ability as if they didn’t have access to a text file generator app. It is not about access to the information.
All of this “guardrails” handwringing is nonsense. These things output text. Are you for censorship of a book written by a biotechnology expert that gives out the exact same information?
It's inevitable. Also, it's not like I get to vet who does or doesn't have access. Blind trust in the current selection made by an unregulated corporation just makes me anxious.
Security in the form of "pay to play" is just kicking the bigger issue down the road.
It the tool was made available to anyone to build a virus, anyone would be able to build counter measures, if only a select few people have access they get to build the virus and everyone else is at a disadvantage. So, yes, I am leaning towards making these tools open rather than gated behind some priesthood and government that gets to wield exclusive power.
Compare the cost/ease of attacker vs defender if one person is given a virus to unleash anywhere in the world and another person is given a vaccine to distribute to the whole world. Or compare building a large bridge to someone disabling that bridge, etc. Prevention and repair is almost always more expensive than vandalism.
I don't think there's an ideal solution here, but giving trusted people access to fix security issues before giving it to the wider public seems like a reasonable compromise. They're letting you use the model for all other uses.
you need a lot more than the nucleotide sequence to make a virus. you need the DNA or RNA to be synthesized, assembled, packaged properly. and long sequences are pretty hard to do. you need a lot of equipment, or you need to order from services. the oligo synth services can harden their KYC and/or screen for suspicious sequences.
sure, a malevolent state actor could swing it, but they could make a bioweapon without Mythos's help already.
also, vaccine production and disease surveillance have ramped up very quickly. they will ramp up further, despite political setbacks. it's a cat and mouse game that favors the defenders IMO.
but the bioterrorism narrative is useful FUD to spin open-weight models as existentially dangerous. I am far more worried about Anthropic's own goals than the goals of some crackpot in a shed.
> it's a cat and mouse game that favors the defenders IMO
How so? I'm actually against most of the "safety-tuning" that anthropic does, but this seems fundamentally untrue, a close analogue being video game cheat development. I think in general the cheat developer has an advantage and the cheats generally proliferate for quite a while before being patched.
Video games are an interesting analogy since they often trade security for performance, trusting clients about world state quite a bit.
Finance and biology do come across as two similar high level systems. But while we can employ KYC, fraud detection, and various auditing techniques to finance, I don’t know what you do for biology. You can easily run an algorithm over every transaction a person makes in their account but there’s no equivalent for every cell, every bacteria strain, every virus in the human body.
(disclaimer: layperson remembering how the immune system works.)
the adaptive immune system effectively does KYC by checking the antigens presented on the surfaces of cells. the thymus selects for B-cells (iirc?) which don't react to a corpus of the body's own antigens, but cover a wide library of everything else. when it sees something it doesn't recognize, it reproduces, warns the rest of the immune system and marks targets. that's why our immune systems can eventually conquer almost every pathogen we encounter, if we can survive long enough for it to do its work.
but the KYC I was referring to was KYC that vendors of oligonucleotides (should) be doing, to keep people from ordering nefarious sequences.
I'm bullish on mRNA vaccine technology to release the "patches" much more quickly. there was widespread resistance to this during covid, but covid wasn't horribly lethal. if airborne Ebola spread as productively as covid, for example, I doubt there'd be many anti-vaxxers left (one way or another!) the acceleration of biology research that might accelerate pathogen development should also accelerate the development of broad-spectrum mRNA vaccines with high persistence.
also, afaik the most effective way of developing pathogens is through serial passage through humanized mice or something like that - directed evolution at a small scale, selecting for traits. AI simply isn't needed for that. I don't think information or intelligence has been the bottleneck for bioterrorism, it's motivation and resources - same as for any other kind of biology research program.
