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Affected customer here, if you're curious on our original NANOG post on the whole situation:

Hey NANOG,

After receiving a BGPAlerter notification that one of our subnets (23.150.164.0/24) had been hijacked, I checked and noticed the prefix in question was missing RPKI. Assuming I had fat fingered something and butchered the ROA, I logged into ARIN and found that the prefix was missing from our resource list entirely, and had been reallocated to another organization and announced from their network. I created a ticket in ARIN and called immediately.

They confirmed that our subnet had been accidentally reallocated to another customer, and that they are currently working on returning it to us. After a couple hours, they told us the other organization will stop announcing the prefix, and WHOIS will be returned shortly.

I’m guessing there’s no way to prevent this kind of thing on our side if the RPKI ROA itself is removed along with the allocation? I’m planning on adding checks to look for missing ROAs (in addition to invalid/expiring ones), which I'm guessing would've caught this earlier.

Have any of you had anything like this happen with ARIN or another RIR? I’m especially curious what might have happened if we’d only noticed and reached out a few weeks later instead of within a few minutes.





The original report says

> The incorrect state persisted for approximately seven days before detection

However you're saying you've reached out "within a few minutes" ?


The "incorrect state" being talked about is the IP prefix being misregistered in ARIN's database.

The "hijacking" happened later, when the IP prefix was announced via BGP by the registrant who it was incorrectly assigned to. Those are two different events.


It was re-allocated to the new/wrong ARIN customer for seven days before they started announcing it, at which point the OP detected the issue. Prior to that their prefix was routing to them just fine, just without RPKI protection.

[flagged]


> Unless you've got a regular HN account and just set up a new business-facing one for this?

This is likely; I can't imagine a regular HN user would appreciate having their subnet publicly available in their comment history.


Yup, another engineer that works on our team mentioned seeing the report here, I figured I'd make an account to add some further context

Maybe some college of theirs on HN recognized the story and shared it with them.



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