That's a rather rose colored way of framing what Chevron was. It essentially removed the role of the judiciary in settling disputes. In cases where a regulator's action was deemed at least "reasonable", the judiciary was obligated to simply defer to the regulator's interpretation.
And due to widespread regulatory capture, this is hardly some social benefit. The original case Chevron Doctrine was based on [1] essentially came down to the EPA interpreting anti-pollution laws in a way enabling companies to expand pollution-causing constructions with no oversight. The EPA was then sued, and defeated, by an environmental activist group, but then that decision was overturned by the Supreme Court and Chevron Deference was born.
Other examples are the FCC deeming broadband internet as a "information service" instead of a "telecommunications service" (which would have meant common-carrier obligations would have applied), and so on. Another one [3] - Congress passed legislation deeming that power plants must use the "best technology available" to "minimize the adverse environmental impact" of their water intakes/processing. The EPA interpretation instead allowed companies to use a cost-benefit analysis and pick cheaper techs. And I could go on. Chevron Deference was an abomination.
> In cases where a regulator's action was deemed at least "reasonable", the judiciary was obligated to simply defer to the regulator's interpretation.
That is the way it _should_ be. Judges are not subject matter experts in all of human endeavors, but they are expected to make rulings over that domain. Relying on experts and career civil servants advice is generally good, unless they’re being unreasonable.
The role of a judge is not to give his own personal opinion on a topic. It's to listen to arguments between two different sides, who each may call upon experts, witnesses, present evidence, and so on. And they will then also argue how the other side's take is invalid or misleading. The role of the judge is to work to objectively determine which side has the law and evidence most on their side.
In cases where a judge is a domain expert, he may well end up even needing to recuse himself as that would generally entail opining on debatable topics one way or the other, which makes him unlikely to be able to effectively perform his role.
unfortunately civil servants are not perfect and not elected. If they 'take bribes' I don't want a judge to accept their word. They should have to justify their ruling before the court. The judge should defer to them only after finding their decision was good in the first place.
> If they 'take bribes' I don't want a judge to accept their word. They should have to justify their ruling before the court.
If they're taking bribes they should be tried under corruption laws such as 18 U.S.C. § 201
Meanwhile our SC justices can accept all kinds of gifts from industry and make whatever ruling they want without any repercussions. They're in charge of determining their own conflicts of interests and their own ethics violations. Which surprise, they never seem to have any!
Its far easier to remove a regulator, even one of a supposedly independent agency (we'll see how that goes), for doing something obviously corrupt than a Supreme Court judge, as evidenced by the current court.
bribes is in quotes. There are a lot of questionable ways to do things that are not illegal. As the other post said, commonly it is we will give you a good job in a few years.
Even when there is a bribe it is typically hidden in something that looks legal. Buy something you need anyway from my brother-in-law even though you can get a better deal elsewhere. Family charities are a popular way for politicians to do this - most of the money goes to the admins the politician is related to. In countries we think of as corrupt there are typically direct bribes, but in less corrupt countries the question is how can you hide them in ways that are legal - often by doing things that fully moral people are also doing.
The point he's making is that these things are not illegal. They're bribery, but carried out in a way designed to fall within the bounds of the law. Because actually outlawing every single way of bribing somebody is, in general, impossible. And it's difficult to make any progress even plugging the holes that do exist, because the people that could do that are the very ones taking advantage of those holes.
And removing a regulator is extremely difficult. For non-independent regulatory agencies it can only be done by the President (who generally is the same one that appointed him). For independent regulatory agencies it can again only be done by the President but this time only for just cause and in a process that can involve judicial appeal and involvement. Removing a judge, by contrast, is done by congress and requires impeachment/conviction. So rather than one being easier/harder, it's just that the process is different. Regulators are 'controlled' by the executive with judicial oversight, and the judiciary is 'controlled' by the legislative.
It's all a big game of rock, paper, scissors in many ways.
> And removing a regulator is extremely difficult.
This isn't based in reality in the slightest, or you just haven't been paying attention to the Trump administration. It seems like Trump has had little issue replacing a lot of key regulators in a heartbeat. And in a few months after we get the opinion from Trump v. Slaughter it'll probably be stupid simple for the President to remove anyone for any reason anytime regardless of if its an "independent" agency.
Meanwhile we've had Supreme Court justices openly receiving millions of dollars in bribes while deciding cases in favor of those who paid the bribes, and nothing is happening.
You have literally 1 person in the entire world capable of firing somebody, and then that results in a case being heard by the Supreme Court when that person tries to invoke that power, after lower courts immediately said Nope. That is, absolutely by definition, somebody who is extremely difficult to fire. Extremely difficult does not mean impossible.
And you calling something a bribe doesn't make it a bribe in the legal sense, which is the point. For instance big pharma "donated" hundreds of millions of dollars across Congress the President just in the midst of the pandemic. Those beneficiaries, in turn, passed laws and created unprecedented and controversial defacto mandates which directly drove tens of billions of dollars in profits for these "donors." Is this a bribe?
Given your likely ideological perspective, I assume you would vehemently insist it's not. Why?
You're comparing firing someone who serves a statutory term limt at the pleasure of a position that gets changed out every 4-8 years also with statutory term limits compared to trying to fire someone serving for life who takes 218 House members and 67 Senators to fire.
Yes, its far easier for that one person to make that decision to fire someone than have two hundred and eighty five people agree at the same time to fire someone. That person with a term limit will be replaced more often than the person with a lifetime appointment. I don't understand how you're even making that argument otherwise. Incredibly illogical.
And before you say "bUt I dIdn'T SaY tHaT!", yes you did make the argument its just as easy to fire a SC justice as a regulator.
> So rather than one being easier/harder, it's just that the process is different.
The process is different, yes, and that process makes it a hell of a lot harder.
> Given your likely ideological perspective, I assume you would vehemently insist it's not. Why?
Projecting an identity on to me and asking me to defend a position I have not taken. Really arguing in bad faith there. Depending on what exactly you're talking about I probably would say those are essentially bribes. Like a President receiving gold bars to have him change trade policy. Pretty extreme corruption wouldn't you say?
They don't overtly take bribes. It's a mixture of two things. The first is a corporate revolving door. Look at the head of a regulatory agency and he's often a corporate insider - regulatory capture. For instance many regulations that greatly expanded the reach and reduced requirements for GMOs passed under Michael R Taylor [1] as the head of the FDA.
He was a Vice President at Monsanto (and worked as part of their contracted legal team for 7 years prior) and some of his most well known publications involved arguing for an interpretation of a 1958 law, that forbid companies using carcinogens in products, to mean that they could only knowingly allow a 'small amount' of carcinogens. His Wiki page looks like it's been hit by a PR firm. Here [1] is an older version.
So you essentially have Monsanto, by proxy, in charge of the FDA. And this sort of stuff is much more the rule than the exception. Taylor was appointed by Obama. That's not to be partisan and suggest Obama was particularly bad here, but on the contrary I think many people have a positive view of him relative to more recent presidents, yet he continued on with these practices just like literally every other administration in modern history.
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The second thing is indirect payoffs. Massive companies like Monsanto have their tentacles in just about everything in any way remotely related to their domain. If you play ball with them, you're going to find doors and opportunities open for you everywhere. On the other hand if you turn against them they will similarly use all their resources to destroy you so much as possible.
A recent article on here discussed how key research published regarding the safety of Monsanto products was ghostwritten by Monsanto themselves and then handed off to some other 'scientists' to sign their name to it and publish. [2] Once that was indisputably revealed in court (only thanks to the really smart guys doing this literally talking about it, verbatim, in emails), it took some 8 years for the article to be retracted. People just don't want to go against Monsanto.
And due to widespread regulatory capture, this is hardly some social benefit. The original case Chevron Doctrine was based on [1] essentially came down to the EPA interpreting anti-pollution laws in a way enabling companies to expand pollution-causing constructions with no oversight. The EPA was then sued, and defeated, by an environmental activist group, but then that decision was overturned by the Supreme Court and Chevron Deference was born.
Other examples are the FCC deeming broadband internet as a "information service" instead of a "telecommunications service" (which would have meant common-carrier obligations would have applied), and so on. Another one [3] - Congress passed legislation deeming that power plants must use the "best technology available" to "minimize the adverse environmental impact" of their water intakes/processing. The EPA interpretation instead allowed companies to use a cost-benefit analysis and pick cheaper techs. And I could go on. Chevron Deference was an abomination.
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevron_U.S.A.,_Inc._v._Natura....
[2] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Cable_&_Telecommunica...
[3] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entergy_Corp._v._Riverkeeper_I....