> You can't "stimulate" a country's representatives to care about something unless you give them an equally important incentive, carrot or stick.
I agree with this statement, and the reasons why they don't work, but also see it as lacking a systems perspective. Incentives are the result of system dynamics and, regardless of how they are wielded, do little to affect the protocols and structures that formed them in the first place.
My suggestion is that, by redefining the structures within which such discussions take place, new incentives will appear. This is anything but trivial and requires a solid understanding of both social psychology and international relations, but it is also not impossible.
If we consider consensus to be counterproductive, we must seek alternatives. Of the top of my head, one route could be to leverage the tendency for friend-shoring. This could involve grouping countries such that immediate impacts to profits are no longer shouldered by single interests. Those countries who possess both wealth and a greater sense of urgency could make side-agreements that allow for a kind of liquid-democracy within the final vote, similar to the way that coalitions form in countries that use proportional representation.
Another options might be to structure trade agreement such that externalities are re-internalised, forcing countries engaged in extractive processes to confront the impact that their activies make. Carbon credits have worked to do the opposite, acting as a lubricant that allow emission to be easily localised elsewhere and enabling an "out of sight, out of mind" mentality.
I agree with this statement, and the reasons why they don't work, but also see it as lacking a systems perspective. Incentives are the result of system dynamics and, regardless of how they are wielded, do little to affect the protocols and structures that formed them in the first place.
My suggestion is that, by redefining the structures within which such discussions take place, new incentives will appear. This is anything but trivial and requires a solid understanding of both social psychology and international relations, but it is also not impossible.
If we consider consensus to be counterproductive, we must seek alternatives. Of the top of my head, one route could be to leverage the tendency for friend-shoring. This could involve grouping countries such that immediate impacts to profits are no longer shouldered by single interests. Those countries who possess both wealth and a greater sense of urgency could make side-agreements that allow for a kind of liquid-democracy within the final vote, similar to the way that coalitions form in countries that use proportional representation.
Another options might be to structure trade agreement such that externalities are re-internalised, forcing countries engaged in extractive processes to confront the impact that their activies make. Carbon credits have worked to do the opposite, acting as a lubricant that allow emission to be easily localised elsewhere and enabling an "out of sight, out of mind" mentality.