I support Atlanticism, but this overestimates the US's need and relations with Europe (EU and non-EU) in the 21st century.
Our trade with APAC dwarfs total European trade, and America has ~150k armed personnel deployed in the Pacific versus ~65k in Europe.
Europe can and should be able to manage Russia and Africa for us - this is what they did well until the 2000s. Both Dem and Republican admins since the Bush admin have been pushing for Europe to regain it's strategic autonomy.
Trump is absolutely mismanaging this relationship, but a broken clock is right twice a day.
> this overestimates the US's need and relations with Europe (EU and non-EU) in the 21st century
If Europe goes to war America is in a higher state of defcon even if we try to pretend we’re uninvolved. Global trade would crash which means a lot of middle class jobs vanishing.
But the perception (even before Trump) was that our European allies can and should be able to hold down the fort in Europe, because it's increasingly looking like we cannot fight a two-continent war, and we at least have strategic depth in Europe, and not at all in the Pacific.
One way to avoid a two-continent war is to lend money to our European ally to buy weapons from us.
Another way is to sacrifice one continent.
I, and many others, can't stomach the second. Particularly when we built their security order, they certainly weren't managing Russia for us until the 2000s.
> One way to avoid a two-continent war is to lend money to our European ally to buy weapons from us.
I agree and prefer this method, but certain European states (looking at you Germany) will also have to drastically increase military spending as well.
The pot of military financial aid also needs to go to Asian allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, and Philippines along with aligned states like Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, and India.
> Another way is to sacrifice one continent
Which I dislike but is something the Trump admin has appeared to have chosen.
The idea Europe just needs to invest more is dated.
Yes, there's stuff in the news right now about Germany military spending - secretary of defense said they anticipated yet another increase package of 6.7B euros, and only got 1.2B.
Military spending is up dramatically from even 2 years ago, much less when you'd hear this argument from more dedicated hands, let's say, 2019, 2021.
It's a particularly poor timing to make the argument, because even if we elide every increase until Sunday, we're still left with Germany reacting to this by adding $100B over the next 4 years.
If if it wasn't out of date, I think it's important to state plainly the idea is: Europe needs to spend more in defense because the US decided to pull all support, even from things as simple as continuing to sell Europe defensive supplies as it fights Russia, and also hand chunks of Europe to Russia.
It's somewhat gut-wrenching to hear an out of date argument, in so many separate ways, as justification for rugging them completely. It causes nausea when its coupled to a shrug about broken clocks.
> It's a particularly poor timing to make the argument, because even if we elide every increase until Sunday, we're still left with Germany reacting to this by adding $100B over the next 4 years
And what stopped Germany from doing so in 2022, or 2019, or 2014?
And this is why there is resentment in the US - we've been telling Germany (and other European) states to do this for decades.
I'll reiterate this again - China is the primary threat against the US. Russia is bad as well, but China is the bigger bad.
American soldiers are directly in the line of fire in Taiwan, South Korea, and Okinawa. Yet South Korea and Japan have both worked on maintaining military capacity and spending after brushes in 2011 and 2016.
And it's been Germany that has constantly undermined French and British attempts at a Pan-European force because German leadership does not want expeditionary capabilities that France and the UK needs [0], and France is the only EU state left that has a true world class MIC.
> It's somewhat gut-wrenching to hear an out of date argument, in so many separate ways, as justification for rugging them completely
Because the "spend more" argument from the US has been coming for 15 years now. And it takes 3-4 years just to on-ramp manufacturing capacity.
Devoting funding alone is not enough to ramp up manufacturing overnight. We have been warning about this for decades, and now Germany (and even some of our other allies like France and UK) now have to contend with this on their own.
I worked as a Dem staffer in the early 2010s and even I am in agreement with Trump about this - because this is a policy that even Obama was driving.
We've been warning your leadership that something like this would happen for 15 years now. Yet your leadership did not listen. When even a Dem like me who worked in NatSec Policy is frustrated, you know much of Europe has burnt any goodwill that remains.
> I assume we have a shared understanding that more than just Europe was affected by WWII
Absolutely, but they were 2 different wars with entirely different personas and leadership.
For example, China and Japan treat WW2 as having started in 1936-37 and don't really view or care about WW1 or the European theaters of WW2
And European dependencies in Asia were already autonomous at that point (eg. British India had it's own autonomous military and political leadership after the 1920s era reforms independent of London, Dutch Indonesia and it 1930s era reforms, and French Indochina as well as they largely retained the pre-colonization era leadership).
> What does manage mean
Problems on the European and African continent should be dealt with by our European allies. Ideally, the US provides some amount of support and armament, but strategy within Europe and France should fall onto individual European allies.
You saw this in Ukraine pre-2022 with the UK and Turkiye helping Ukraine rebuild it's armed forces, and in much of the Sahel with French armed forces tamping down on Islamism and Russian/Chinese backed factions.
> Europe certainly has strategic autonomy, no
The issue is, what is "Europe".
There needs to be a much stronger unification of posture and strategy amongst our European allies, but you would often see France and Germany clash because France wants to ensure a unified European force has expeditionary capabilities (because of French dependencies in the Pacific and Africa), but Germany constantly pushes back because they want to remain Central Europe first.
On top of that, individual European MICs directly compete with each other and extremely furiously. For example, Dassault, Eurofighter GmBH, and Saab trying to undercut each other in global fighter jet sales.
And finally, individual European states do not see eye to eye. For example, France+Italy tends to have a very strong co-sell relationship with Israel (a direct competitor to Turkiye) and targets the India (a competitor to Pakistan) and UAE (a competitor to Saudi) market.
But Germany+Spain tends to have a very strong co-sell relationship with Turkiye (a direct competitor to Israel), who tends to sell to Pakistan (a direct competitor to India) and Saudi Arabia (a direct competitor to UAE)
While we would all want the EU to be a truly unified union, in it's present form, individual nation states will continue to zealously guard their soverignity.
And even on the economic front - to continue using the India example due to the plan to finalize the EU-India FTA this year [0] - countries like Germany+Spain directly compete with France+Italy, especially in the Automotive and Pharma sectors (two of Europe's largest and most globally competitive sectors).
For example, German+Spanish+Czech automotive manufacturers like Volkswagen AG (includes Spain's Seat and Czechia's Skoda) largely invested in China during the 2000s but French+Italian+Romanian manufacturers like Renault-Nissan, Citroen/Fiat/Stellantis, and Piaggo (scooters yes but THE scooter in India) invested heavily in India. An EU-India FTA doesn't impact French+Italian+Romanian manufacturers but directly undermines and harms German+Spanish+Czech manufacturers.
And Indian biopharma companies (the only manufacturing industry that India is competitive at globally) are largely partnerships with French (Sanofi), British (GSK, AstraZeneca), Swiss (Novartis), Israeli (Teva), and Japanese (Takeda) players that directly compete with German firms like Bayer and Boehringer Ingelheim that invested in China.
While at a macro-level a EU-India FTA is good for European autonomy from the US or China, it will undercut German+Spanish+Czech companies and benefit French+Italian+Romanian companies, and as such Germany has been lobbying against it (and India has retaliated by fining Volkswagen group $1.4B in back taxes and an additional $1.4B in interest [1] - an amount that will destroy VW Group's business in India [2] and maybe even globally depending on Chinese and NAM sales as it's an amount that's 17% of their net income).
And this is one of dozens of examples where individual European nation states do not have strategic alignment, and why when push comes to shove, they all ignore the EU and prioritize their own domestic needs.
UNPROFOR was primarily lead by French, Swedish, and Canadian military leadership. KFOR and IFOR was largely German and Italian.
Most of the blood, sweat, and tears of the UN and NATO intervention in Yugoslavia was European militaries like the Dutch, British, French, and Swedish.
The Clinton admin primarily provided air support and diplomatic cover, but most boots on the ground were European (and Canadian).
Lots of people forget that the UN was in Yugoslavia before the NATO intervention happened.
The EC monitors were first. UNPROFOR was there for Croatia initially. The Lisbon agreement in Bosnia in 1992 was supposed to have things like European judges on the constitutional court, which is something that people forget when they complain about Dayton. The national militaries famously had partiality to different sides of the conflict - French and Dutch vs Swedish and British.
Yep, yet nonetheless, it was an European initiative that helped solidify "Pan-Europeanism" as a doable initiative (it was also during the early stages of the EC turned EU).
I would argue that we did our bid for European stability, that everybody thought Ukraine would be quickly overrun. We don’t need to defend every inch of Ukrainian soil for us to consider it a success and a deterrent. We did far more here than Obama did to protect crimea.
Yes we raised the stakes considerably. Russia thought the Ukraine operation would be over in weeks.
Fast forward a few more years. Russia is encircling Kiev. Are we supposed to put American boots on the ground? Give them tactical nukes? Wouldn’t giving up then just “teach them” the same thing?
Is having a conflict in Ukraine somehow making Europe more stable? To be entirely honest, from realpolitik point of view what Trump is doing makes cold and calculated sense. He will sacrifice Ukraine so that it will become a rump buffer state between Europe and Russia, and then he can trade with both. That will satisfy Russia as well as their strategic goal (no NATO in Ukraine) was achieved and they can return to business as usual.
Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine Sweden and Finland have joined NATO, so now Russia has more, not less, border with NATO. How would a buffer on their southwestern border alleviate that?
It won't satisfy Russia, though. It will just give a thumbs up to them and anyone else wanting to make a land grab that they can go ahead and the US will look for appeasement. This is exactly the kind of thinking that lead to Chamberlain letting Hitler take the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia.
It had a rather pronounced affect on America. Some other countries too, I think.