> Deng Xiaoping was a great leader and massively grew china, but he was a dictator too
Deng was a classical dictator, à la Sulla. The point is he stepped down and continued the peaceful transfer of power that characterised the CCP since Mao. That transfer not only provides face-saving flexibility. It also promotes introspection through intraparty competition.
Xi, on the other hand, is dictator for life. He can't flag much less correct past fuck-ups because they were his fuck-ups. His treatment of his predecessor takes passing the torch off the table. And his corruption purges have routed out the political competition that could have given Beijing more options. It's thus much more difficult for China under Xi yesterday, today and tomorrow, to e.g. tell India it's changed than it was for Biden or Trump to say they're different from Obama.
I can't even get myself to write anything about China, because I don't want to sound like a China-shill. But, my entire point is, they course correct. A lot actually. They publish literal documents that can be read as course corrections (Government Work Report). They've shown they're willing to take big risks to achieve their written and published goals. And given the recent developments and their achievements in tech/improving QoL of locals, they deserve respect for accomplishments.
They're obviously trying to go ahead with their dominance-through-tech plan, and not taking them seriously isn't going to help us in a long run.
Ok, I understand the consideration and even a certain level of admiration for the capability of such a large population to govern themselves so effectively and shrewdly over time as to implement a new 5 year economic plan, every 5 years, successfully - that's an accomplishment...
There are quite actually empty skyscraper cities - with likewise massive corresponding infrastructural investments - this failure of central planning as an issue isn't always city sized but is widespread. It's a human thing... so it makes mistakes.
Like China's Navy specifically designed to insure dominion over the South China Sea... what's the point of that? To insure dominion? Now everyone is convinced China is going to be making moves for the top spot - bc that's what they signalled with such a Navel buildup.
They are rejecting the US Global Order and suggesting that China may be an increasingly better alternative for international Leadership... but they only have a mere couple decades left of economic growth before their entire economy will experience a population (and thearby economic growth) contraction like no peaceful society in history has before.
Who wants to sign up behind that wannabe Great Power?
Had China contented themselves with #2, we could have propped up an "adversarial" relationship political to seemingly dampen US Hegemony but in reality be each other's largest trading partners and whatnot - you know, like it used to be ;)
Now everyone knows tho - China's got a timer on it.
> obviously trying to go ahead with their dominance-through-tech plan, and not taking them seriously isn't going to help us in a long run
They should absolutely be taken seriously. But nothing you put forward suggests pivots, but minor course corrections. (Granted, that puts them a rung above most of the world's dictatorships.)
What's holding Beijing back is the wolf warrior nonsense from before Covid. China has the best industrial supply chains on the planet within any single border, but their neighbors don't trust them. As a result, America can scale using European, Japanese and Korean (and now Indian and Middle Eastern) assets while China has to rely on itself. (And Russia and Iran, the new sick dogs of Europe and Asia, respectively.)
Contrast that with e.g. the Trump-Biden-Trump pivots. A lot of that was and will be chaos. But some of it was fruitful policyspace exploration. (A lot of it was course correcting from previous mistakes.) Like, imagine if we replaced Obama's presidency with W. Bush. That is the handicap Beijing is forced to play with.
Again, I've been hearing it since 2000s, how China is going to fall. So far, no predictions, especially the forced RE market collapse ones have panned out. I think a lot of people want China to fall, so they can point at the political ideology that's not compatible with ours and say "ha, we told you so!". But it just hasn't happened yet. They're smoking the west in a good chunk sectors as well.
Also, I think you're underestimating how quickly public perception can turn if the leader becomes disliked. People will flock to be friendly with China, if there's any need.
> I've been hearing it since 2000s, how China is going to fall
Where am I predicting failure? Inflexibility doesn't mean failure, it means just that.
> underestimating how quickly public perception can turn if the leader becomes disliked. People will flock to be friendly with China, if there's any need
Possible. But public perception has nothing to do with it. To date, America has wielded its superpower status in a way that defied containment. If we misbehave, yes, countries will work to contain America, but that doesn't naturally mean they'll work to benefit China. Geostrategically, the best thing that could happen to China is Xi goes away and someone who can softly engage with its neighbours comes in so they can integrate supply chains and cultures more effectively. (Again, the way America has historically done.)
Fair points. I highly doubt anyone is going to softly engage with China while China is trying to become the world leader. My guess is US won't like the loss of soft power, thus will intimidate any country that signs deals with China even further. It's in China's best interest to go full steam ahead without caring about the neighbours until they become the political super power in the world.
> It's in China's best interest to go full steam ahead without caring about the neighbours until they become the political super power in the world
This worked, because in the post-Cold War high realpolitik took a break. Unfortunately, now, it will do the same thing every other rising power trying to steamroll its way to superpower status does: inspire balancing alliances.
Sort of like how Xi being impatient with Hong Kong not only pushed Taiwan away, it also nudged various nations around the South China Sea together and towards the U.S.
To the extent the history of great powers has been written, it's that superpower status cannot be claimed. Simply relinquished. An emerging power trying to steamroll to the top tends to preserve the status quo more than bring about its demise; unfortunately, while waiting for America to next stumble is something an immortal China can wait for, it's not something a mortal dictator can afford. Hence, America's luck. (And again, not forecasting downfall. Just not inevitable rise.)
Really?? 70 years from now that county is going to be an abysmally desperate place to be if the World is upset with China for trying to I don't kno, be a Dragon "one more time" and sets off a cataclysmic war in the process.
Now that China, and all of us are aware of what has quite literally already happened, massive population decline would still be incurred even if Gen Z pops out an insane amount - just pretending that all statistical evidence is suggesting the exact opposite likelihood.
Again, this is not an opening, this is reality, you can see the math of it - you can understand also if you want to... just look into it all, everyone that writes of from journalists, scientist, population demographers - they are all shocked also.
The World Bank projected China to overtake the US economy in 2028, last year revised to 2036 and now there are Economists stating that will never occur.
Now is the time to befriend everyone - help everyone you can now, so they all owe favors and hold no animosity to kick when down.
there's a conspiracy theory that this was due to Mao having no suitable heirs. More generally, there's a theory that autocracies "liberalize" when there is no clear successor or a succession conflict involving the autocrat, see: martial law Taiwan
Notice the pre-Ukraine-war dates, especially on the former.
Quote from the latter: "The aim of just about every Greek tyrant in the long term was to consolidate power into their family in a durable way, which is to say, convert a tyranny into a kingship. [To a first approximation] they all failed."
Liberalization while the autocrat is still alive (if at all). Civil war once he's dead, unless the liberalization has time to take root before the autocrat dies.
If you have sources for this theory, I'd love to see them.
From what I've seen, autocracies in developing countries are "more prone to political instability because oppressed citizenries and displaced groups have no other mechanism to voice dissent other than active mobilization in the streets or subversive activities against the state" [1].
Autocracies are only more stable if they can promote "Rentier-state economic systems," like in North Korea, though that comes at the cost of putting that society further and further behind its international peers.
No, no sources. I was just saying that, if there was a trend of autocrats trying to liberalize, it was not necessarily inconsistent with a trend of civil war.
Deng was a classical dictator, à la Sulla. The point is he stepped down and continued the peaceful transfer of power that characterised the CCP since Mao. That transfer not only provides face-saving flexibility. It also promotes introspection through intraparty competition.
Xi, on the other hand, is dictator for life. He can't flag much less correct past fuck-ups because they were his fuck-ups. His treatment of his predecessor takes passing the torch off the table. And his corruption purges have routed out the political competition that could have given Beijing more options. It's thus much more difficult for China under Xi yesterday, today and tomorrow, to e.g. tell India it's changed than it was for Biden or Trump to say they're different from Obama.