The distinction between "statements about X" and "statements about statements about X" doesn't resolve the contradiction here, because the original claim makes a universal assertion about all possible true statements about God. By its own terms, it must encompass both:
1. First-order statements about God
2. Second-order statements about statements about God
3. All higher-order statements as well
Put differently: The claim "Nothing true can be said about God from a posture of defense" is asserting that there exists no level at which defensive truth claims about God are valid. But this assertion itself constitutes a defensive truth claim about God—whether at first, second, or any other order.
The attempt to escape via orders of statements fails because the original statement's scope explicitly covers all truth claims regarding God, regardless of their logical level. If it didn't cover all levels, then it would no longer be claiming that "nothing true can be said"—it would instead be claiming "some things true can be said, just not first-order things," which is a fundamentally different claim than the original.
So by attempting to exempt itself based on being "meta-level," the statement has already conceded that some true things can be said about God from a posture of defense (namely, meta-level things)—which directly contradicts its own absolute claim that nothing true can be said.
This is why universal claims about the impossibility of certain types of statements are often self-defeating—they cannot consistently exempt themselves from their own scope without undermining their universality.
> But this assertion itself constitutes a defensive truth claim about God
You seem to be asserting this without any proof, or at least none that I can follow. The assertion itself is a "defensive truth" about "truths about God," not about "God." I'm not sure how you are justifying considering "truth about [truth about [truth about [... X]]]" as the same thing as "statement about X".
Is it possible that you're considering the properties of the truths about X to be properties of X as well? I don't think this is justified. Properties of truths about X come from properties of X. For example, statements about the color of X are not statements about X itself, despite coming from properties of X. E.g. color(X) = color(Y) -/> X = Y.
Recursion doesn't complicate the case here. The original statement made assertions about "statements about God", not about God. For example, the statement "All statements about God are false" is not paradoxical, it is simply false (if we accept the law of the excluded middle). A statement like "Everything I've said about God is false" could very well be true, it's not paradoxical, despite also being part of the set "Everything I've said;" it's just not "about God."
Thinking about your argument a little more, it seems like our disagreement comes from your belief that "about X" is 'infectious' to all higher order statements, whereas I don't believe this is the case. The best way I can think to argue my point right now is from examples.
Suppose we had many books about movies on one hand, each book containing movie reviews or something, and then we have one book about [books about movies] on the other hand, call it B. The book B, which is about [books about movies], simply contains the number of words that each book about movies has written in it. Is B "about movies"? I would argue that it is not, it contains nothing about movies in it at all, just numbers describing other books. I can say "all books about movies are wrong" without meaning to refer to B, as B is not wrong (as long as the word-counting is correct).
Your examples attempt to break the chain of "aboutness" between meta-levels of statements. But there's a crucial distinction your argument misses:
"Nothing true can be said about God from a posture of defense" isn't merely describing properties of statements like your examples do (word counts, colors). Instead, it's making a universal claim about POSSIBILITY itself, specifically, the impossibility of defensive true statements about God.
This raises a key question: What makes defensive truth claims about God impossible? This impossibility must stem from something about God's nature itself. Otherwise, what grounds the impossibility?
Your examples all involve contingent properties:
1) Book word counts are contingent features of books
2) color(X) = color(Y) involves contingent properties of objects
But the original statement makes a necessary claim about what kinds of truth claims about God are possible at all. This is fundamentally different because:
1) It rules out ALL possible defensive true statements about God
2) The basis for this universal impossibility must lie in God's nature
3) Therefore it necessarily makes a claim about God, not just about statements
This is why property inheritance examples don't apply here. The statement isn't claiming properties transfer between levels, it's making a universal claim about possibility itself that necessarily involves both statements about God AND God's nature.
While you've shown that descriptive properties don't transfer between meta-levels, this doesn't address the key issue: a claim about what statements about God are possible must ultimately be grounded in God's nature itself.
> a claim about what statements about God are possible must ultimately be grounded in God's nature itself
Ah, so you're saying that the original statement "Nothing true can be said about God from a posture of defense" (call this statement "O") is self-defeating not because it applies to itself, but because it applies to one of its (lower-order) premises (call it "P"), which is itself about God? This is different than your original argument "The statement itself is a claim about God" but we can go with this as well.
I think your new argument relies on that premise P being made "from a posture of defense," otherwise O doesn't apply. I don't see any evidence of this being the case, so I don't think your argument is correct.
In other words, two conditions need to be satisifed for P to apply to a given assertion:
1) The statement must be about God.
2) The statement must be made from a posture of defense.
P doesn't satisfy (1) and O doesn't (have to) satisfy (2). Am I wrong, or what am I missing here?
1. First-order statements about God
2. Second-order statements about statements about God
3. All higher-order statements as well
Put differently: The claim "Nothing true can be said about God from a posture of defense" is asserting that there exists no level at which defensive truth claims about God are valid. But this assertion itself constitutes a defensive truth claim about God—whether at first, second, or any other order.
The attempt to escape via orders of statements fails because the original statement's scope explicitly covers all truth claims regarding God, regardless of their logical level. If it didn't cover all levels, then it would no longer be claiming that "nothing true can be said"—it would instead be claiming "some things true can be said, just not first-order things," which is a fundamentally different claim than the original.
So by attempting to exempt itself based on being "meta-level," the statement has already conceded that some true things can be said about God from a posture of defense (namely, meta-level things)—which directly contradicts its own absolute claim that nothing true can be said.
This is why universal claims about the impossibility of certain types of statements are often self-defeating—they cannot consistently exempt themselves from their own scope without undermining their universality.