You misunderstand me. The issue is that Apple is theoretically being retaliated against, by the state, if they were to publish non-backdoored e2ee software.
Apple does indeed in theory have a right to release whatever iOS features they like. In practice, they do not.
Everyone kind of tacitly acknowledged this, when it was generally agreed upon that Apple was doing the on-device scanning thing "so they can deploy e2ee". The quiet part is that if they didn't do the on-device scanning and released e2ee software without this backdoor (which would then thwart wiretaps), the FBI et al would make problems for them.
The same reason they made iMessage e2ee, which happened many years before CSAM detection was even a thing.
User privacy. Almost nobody trades in CSAM, but everyone deserves privacy.
Honestly, this isn’t about CSAM at all. It’s about government surveillance. If strong crypto e2ee is the hundreds-of-millions-of-citizens device default, and there is no backdoor, the feds will be upset with Apple.
This is why iCloud Backup (which is a backdoor in iMessage e2ee) is not e2ee by default and why Apple (and the state by extension) can read all of the iMessages.
I didn't ask why they would want E2EE. I asked why they would want E2EE without CSAM detection when they literally developed a method to have both. It's entirely reasonable to want privacy for your users AND not want CSAM on your servers.
> Honestly, this isn't about CSAM at all.
It literally is the only thing the technology is any good for.
