Good observation about the threat model. The verification system actually serves multiple purposes:
1. Hardware integrity: Yes, it helps detect hardware faults, but that's not the primary focus.
2. Attack detection and auditing: The system creates an un-forgeable chain of evidence for all operations. An attacker with RCE could indeed create "legitimate" operations, but:
- Each operation is cryptographically signed and chained
- Operations must maintain valid state transitions
- The Merkle tree structure makes it impossible to modify past operations
- Anomaly detection can flag suspicious operation patterns
3. Runtime verification: The system enforces invariants at runtime. For example:
- Memory operations must maintain zone integrity
- File operations must preserve filesystem consistency
- Process transitions must follow valid state changes
It's technically true that the attacked could theoretically use the verification subsystem itself, but this creates what we call "high-fidelity forensics" - every action leaves cryptographic evidence. Think of it like a tamper-evident seal - you can't break in without leaving proof.
The code in verification.rs and operation_proofs.rs demonstrates these security mechanisms if you're interested in the implementation details of the verification as a whole.
1. Hardware integrity: Yes, it helps detect hardware faults, but that's not the primary focus.
2. Attack detection and auditing: The system creates an un-forgeable chain of evidence for all operations. An attacker with RCE could indeed create "legitimate" operations, but:
- Each operation is cryptographically signed and chained
- Operations must maintain valid state transitions
- The Merkle tree structure makes it impossible to modify past operations
- Anomaly detection can flag suspicious operation patterns
3. Runtime verification: The system enforces invariants at runtime. For example:
- Memory operations must maintain zone integrity
- File operations must preserve filesystem consistency
- Process transitions must follow valid state changes
It's technically true that the attacked could theoretically use the verification subsystem itself, but this creates what we call "high-fidelity forensics" - every action leaves cryptographic evidence. Think of it like a tamper-evident seal - you can't break in without leaving proof.
The code in verification.rs and operation_proofs.rs demonstrates these security mechanisms if you're interested in the implementation details of the verification as a whole.