... Then you would have OpenIDs for those email accounts. Or you could just as trivially make throw away subdomains to use as OpenIDs with free providers. (There are several DNS providers with hundreds of free second-level domains that you can make as many subdomains as you like for free in 45 seconds.
Between this and your comments on G+, you seem really interested in villianizing your service providers when there are obvious ways to avoid their naive account associations [1], as you even take advantage of.
[1] I say naive because I would be willing to be a large amount of money that I could track you between accounts unless you're taking some insane precautions against it, even without an email address or OpenID url.
I suspect you could, or an entity with sufficient motivation could.
For casual purposes, which encompasses much of my present threat model, the measures I'm taking should be reasonably sufficient.
The point I and others are making is that:
0. There's a growing default assumption that individuals have no privacy, that privacy is dead, and that we should all just roll over and forget about it.
1. Even if you trust your service provider today, you may not trust them tomorrow.
2. Even if you trust your service provider, you may not trust those who have access to your data through your service provider. Intentionally or otherwise.
I'm well aware that roughly 32 bits of leaked information should be sufficient to identify me, if not precisely, then with reasonable accuracy. This doesn't mean I'm going to hand over my SSN and DOB to anyone who asks.
It may also be the case that I'm deliberately trying to create various associated identities.
That said: if you're interested in trying to link this identity to others, you can GMail me any of your prospective linkings.
