that's the chart i was looking at. you're cherry-picking years as well to get that answer. looking at all the years instead, the usa starts out at 94, peaks at 104, dips down to 87, and then rises back up to 97, with lots of wiggles in between. that isn't a picture of a secular decline in energy use, it's a picture of random fluctuation around an average. the others are largely similar. the main outlier among 'developed' countries is not south korea but the people's republic of china, though slovenia deserves a mention for falling 40%
why? what holds the usa line so steady? probably partly the usa has lost the ability to build not only high-speed trains, subway tunnels, highways, and leading semiconductor fabs, but also electrical infrastructure, but two thirds of energy use is non-electric, and other countries are succeeding in building trains and whatnot
the price of energy has not been holding steady during this time but rather going up, although in the last decade that is starting to reverse. perhaps the reason consumption-oriented energy use has gone slightly up rather than way down is the efficiency improvements you mention
[the following paragraph is completely wrong, and i appreciate the correction from h0l0cube. therefore so is my claim that the measure itself is cherry-picked. i had just misunderstood it]
this measure, incidentally, doesn't count energy used for exports at all. so if the us and japan are producing an energy-intensive good independently at the beginning of the chart, and then in the middle the us starts importing it from japan, the usa's line will go down while japan's remains steady, because japan's added energy use is for export rather than for consumption. that's what i mean about it being a cherry-picked measure even for those cherry-picked countries
> this measure, incidentally, doesn't count energy used for exports at all
Literally, it does. It's consumption-based energy usage. It's trade adjusted
> the usa starts out at 94, peaks at 104, dips down to 87, and then rises back up to 97, with lots of wiggles in between. that isn't a picture of a secular decline in energy use, it's a picture of random fluctuation around an average
The trend line is at best a flat line. Here's a picture of energy usage per capita over a longer timespan (inc. prior to the 80s when offshoring of manufacturing and cheap shipping came into play)
> the main outlier among 'developed' countries is not south korea but the people's republic of china
As I mentioned this is due to it's growing wealth, not the greater economy of power. Even though China has been growing phenomenally in GDP, it's GDP per capita vs consumption-based energy usage is going down (or yet to exceed 2011 levels):
> Literally, it does. It's consumption-based energy usage. It's trade adjusted
thank you for the correction; i had misunderstood what the trade adjustment was
> The trend line is at best a flat line
i think that is an excellent description of it, as well as of the expanded and less debatable chart you link here, at least over the last 50 years, since the energy crisis began. before that we were seeing a much different trend
i agree about wealth being the primary driver of energy use. but that's precisely the story jevons tells: you improve your steam engine to use less coal, so now you can build a railroad, which is a form of wealth. previously a tonne of coal cost £100, say, and produced 30 megajoules of work, which had a value of £200 in pumping out a mine or £50 hauling goods on the railroad. with your new engine you improve efficiency to 0.3,% and get 100 megajoules, so pumping out the mine now costs £30 per £200 produced, but now the railroad is viable because it produces £50 - £30 = £20 net. the railroad consumes much more coal than the mine did, so you're using more energy more efficiently at the level of the machine, raising your gdp, but producing less value per tonne of coal
well, i got the numbers a bit wrong, but hopefully you can see what i mean
> i agree about wealth being the primary driver of energy use
That's not what I meant. I was referring to the development of populations. Populations that didn't have what the global north would call 'the basics', electricity, household water/sanitation, lighting, adequate heating/cooling, refrigeration, as well as 'basic luxuries' like television/computing/internet and personal transport, increasingly now have access to these technologies (even in 'underdeveloped' countries). This is going to increase energy (not just electricity) usage. But once 'the basics' have been met, they will already be in line with the efficiency standards adopted by the west (maybe even moreso because energy is more expensive in the global south)
So, a counterargument might be that AI will become part of our 'basic' lifestyle, and that we will see a resurgence of demand again, but we're seeing that cloud based compute is acceptable for the vast majority. So even though, say, internet search was energy intensive at its inception, it has largely been amortized and itself energy optimized to not really raise the bar of energy usage. Custom silicon, tighter semiconductor nodes, newer algorithms, photonics, and eventually yet-to-be-discovered technologies like room temperature super conductors can again bring the energy usage down for compute, increasing efficiency not just for AI, but across the board.
that's what i'm talking about too, but yeah, i don't agree that there's a finite set of 'basics'; i think it's dependent on how much you can afford. for 50 years that's changed only very slowly in rich countries, and now it's about to change faster than it did 200 years ago, not because of the kinds of slow efficiency improvement at the point of energy consumption, but because of photovoltaic panels
things that already exist but could get much cheaper due to cheaper energy might include
ai, as you suggest, but also personal computers, oocyte cryopreservation, ecm machining, space travel, weekly air travel, personal helicopters, atmospheric carbon capture, caribbean cruises, making things out of aluminum or titanium instead of plastic, cnc machining rather than casting or stamping, cars, buildings, photovoltaic panels themselves, etc. and presumably there are other things that haven't been invented yet because they'd be uneconomic
that's the chart i was looking at. you're cherry-picking years as well to get that answer. looking at all the years instead, the usa starts out at 94, peaks at 104, dips down to 87, and then rises back up to 97, with lots of wiggles in between. that isn't a picture of a secular decline in energy use, it's a picture of random fluctuation around an average. the others are largely similar. the main outlier among 'developed' countries is not south korea but the people's republic of china, though slovenia deserves a mention for falling 40%
why? what holds the usa line so steady? probably partly the usa has lost the ability to build not only high-speed trains, subway tunnels, highways, and leading semiconductor fabs, but also electrical infrastructure, but two thirds of energy use is non-electric, and other countries are succeeding in building trains and whatnot
the price of energy has not been holding steady during this time but rather going up, although in the last decade that is starting to reverse. perhaps the reason consumption-oriented energy use has gone slightly up rather than way down is the efficiency improvements you mention
[the following paragraph is completely wrong, and i appreciate the correction from h0l0cube. therefore so is my claim that the measure itself is cherry-picked. i had just misunderstood it]
this measure, incidentally, doesn't count energy used for exports at all. so if the us and japan are producing an energy-intensive good independently at the beginning of the chart, and then in the middle the us starts importing it from japan, the usa's line will go down while japan's remains steady, because japan's added energy use is for export rather than for consumption. that's what i mean about it being a cherry-picked measure even for those cherry-picked countries