I think he's wrong with the same logic. If sound, visual and meaning aren't correlated, what can language be? This looks like an elegant insight by Mr Hamilton and very much in line with my personal prediction that we're going to start encroaching on a lot of human-like AI abilities when it is usual practice to feed them video data.
There is a chance that abstract concepts can't be figured out visually ... although that seems outrageously unlikely since all mathematical concepts we know of are communicated visually and audibly. If it gets more abstract than math that'll be a big shock.
> The idea of linguistic relativity, known also as the Whorf hypothesis, [the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis], or Whorfianism, is a principle suggesting that the structure of a language influences its speakers' worldview or cognition, and thus individuals' languages determine or influence their perceptions of the world.
Does language fail to describe the quantum regime with which we could have little intuition?
Verbally and/or visually, sufficiently describe the outcome of a double-slit photonic experiment onto a fluid?
Describe the operator product of (qubit) wave probability distributions and also fluid boundary waves with words? Verbally or visually?
I'll try: "There is diffraction in the light off of it and it's wavy, like <metaphor> but also like a <metaphor>"
> If it gets more abstract than math
There is a symbolic mathematical description of a [double slit experiment onto a fluid], but then sample each point in a CFD simulation and we're back to a frequentist sampling (and not yet a sufficiently predictive description of a continuum of complex reals)
Even without quantum or fluids to challenge language as a sufficient abstraction, mathematical syntax is already known to be insufficient to describe all Church-Turing programs even.
Church-Turing-Deutsch extends Church-Turing to cover quantum logical computers just: any qubit/qudit/qutrit/qnbit system is sufficient to simulate any other such system; but there is no claim to sufficiency for universal quantum simulation. When we restrict ourselves to the operators defined in modern day quantum logic, such devices are sufficient to simulate (or emulate) any other such devices; but observed that real quantum physical systems do not operate as closed systems with intentional reversibility like QC.
For example, there is a continuum of random in the quantum foam that is not predictable with and thus is not describeable by any Church-Turing-Deutsch program.
> Gödel's incompleteness theorems are two theorems of mathematical logic that are concerned with the limits of provability in formal axiomatic theories. These results, published by Kurt Gödel in 1931, are important both in mathematical logic and in the philosophy of mathematics. The theorems are widely, but not universally, interpreted as showing that Hilbert's program to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all mathematics is impossible.
ASM (Assembly Language) is still not the lowest level representation of code before electrons that don't split 0.5/0.5 at a junction without diode(s) and error correction; translate ASM to mathematical syntax (LaTeX and ACM algorithmic publishing style) and see if there's added value
> Even without quantum or fluids to challenge language as a sufficient abstraction, mathematical syntax is already known to be insufficient to describe all Church-Turing programs even.
> In practice, this [complex analytic continuation of arbitary ~wave functions] is often done by first establishing some functional equation on the small domain and then using this equation to extend the domain. Examples are the Riemann zeta function and the gamma function.
> The concept of a universal cover was first developed to define a natural domain for the analytic continuation of an analytic function. The idea of finding the maximal analytic continuation of a function in turn led to the development of the idea of Riemann surfaces.
> Analytic continuation is used in Riemannian manifolds, solutions of Einstein's [GR] equations. For example, the analytic continuation of Schwarzschild coordinates into Kruskal–Szekeres coordinates. [1]
But Schwarzschild's regular boundary does not appear to correlate to limited modern observations of such "Planc relics in the quantum foam"; which could have [stable flow through braided convergencies in an attractor system and/or] superfluidic vortical dynamics in a superhydrodynamic thoery. (Also note: Dirac sea (with no antimatter); Godel's dust solutions; Fedi's unified SQS (superfluid quantum space): "Fluid quantum gravity and relativity" with Bernoulli, Navier-Stokes, and Gross-Pitaevskii to model vortical dynamics)
> The theorems are widely, but not universally, interpreted as showing that Hilbert's program to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all mathematics is impossible.
If there cannot be a sufficient set of axioms for all mathematics,
can there be a Unified field theory?
What’s bizarre to me is that the entire field of “AI” research, including the LLM space, seem to be repeating the exact same mistakes of the ecosystem models of the 1920’s and later. Gross oversimplifications of reality not because that’s what is actually observed but because that’s the only way to make reality fit with the desired outcome models.
It’s science done backwards which isn’t really science at all. Not that I think these models have no use cases, they’re simply being used too broadly because the people obsessed with them don’t want to admit their limitations.
