You can set the context as narrow as you want (e.g., abstract reasoning specifically defines intelligence). That might make your ontology feel crisp, but it also doesn't make it correct; it's still arbitrary and a matter of convention.
Indeed, the only value of categories in how useful they are. It's clear there's a continuous spectrum of intelligence/complexity. I believe the main reason we're still arguing in circles about what is or isn't intelligent, is that we also have a distinct, ill-defined category called "intelligence" that carries ethical / moral connotations. We don't know how to handle a continuum of moral weight / personhood.
It's useful in many ways to put a thermostat, an LLM, a monkey and a human on the same "intelligence"/"complexity" scale - there are many interesting things to discuss other than moral weight. And then, for discussing personhood, it makes no sense to include a thermostat.
sure. but there is value in defining a useful working convention so that people can discuss, learn, and study.
Interjecting the perspective that words are meaningless constructs is rarely helpful. If someone wants directions, telling them that there is no concrete metaphysical concepts of north, south, left, or right, isnt constructive.
I agree on the usefulness piece and that words/ideas have meaning. But usefulness shouldn’t be conflated with the underlying truth and neither should classifications of convention. As the saying goes, all models are wrong, but some are useful. I can say that burying the dishes from a meal that made me sick may help avoid future food poisoning; while useful, it doesn’t get me closer to the underlying truth of germ theory.
I think the heart of these more philosophical debates is a desire for fundamental truth, not just a useful mental model.
You can set a definition and context so broad that everything and anything is intelligent.
The possibility of an outlandish alternative, does not does inform on if a consensus exists or not