Yet you observe them and don't put down their pretense to your flawed senses. Which suggests that something fundamental is impinging on your senses, however flawed your understanding of the underlying fundamentals may be.
> Yet you observe them and don't put down their pretense to your flawed senses.
I do actually. I think this internal sense of subjective awareness is just as if not more flawed than our other senses, and it has yielded all sorts of false conclusions because people consider it more reliable. I liken it to the illusion of multitasking on single CPU computers. I think Graziano is on the right track:
Having read the paper he's rapidly on his way to materialistic solipsism - which is fine as a circle of hell, but it doesn't have any bearing on reality.
Otherwise, he really isn't saying anything new from a philosophical perspective. Both Aristotle and St. Thomas long ago had a distinction between the act of sensing something and the act of naming (that is knowing) it. And noted that we can reflect on both of them.
As he says:
> Third, an attention schema cannot explain how a [non-empirically verifiable, non-material phenomena] emerges from the brain ... It explains how we believe, think, and claim to have such things, but it does not posit that we actually have [non-material phenomena] inside us.
Having limited himself to only material things, he is necessarily constrained to only talk about epiphenomena if there is a non-material formal cause for the material phenomena.
But empiricism is not all that is - there is no empirical proof for empiricism, it requires something outside of itself to support itself.
