I'm not sure why you are continuing because it's impossible to defend against all Sybil attacks in an open network.
>If your counter-point to that is that users will waste money then clearly this attack is not sustainable
One simple scenario where it is sustainable is when you are a part of a competitor's network where the existence of the other network results you in making less money. If the attacker wants to destroy the other network to gain market share they may be willing to have a budget they spend each month to attack it.
>And if your concern is so extreme that a whole network around a user is locked down
It's not extreme if there is to defense to it.
>it would take a lot of work to even get into one of these states
As I mentioned it is easy to run multiple instances of the software to become the majority of the network.
>The same way it's unlikely you will keep buying bread from the guy that charges twice the market rate.
If you check 100 stores in your area and they all charge that rate you may think that's the market rate.
You seem to be concerned about censorship attacks -- attacks that necessarily involve orphaning work in some capacity -- either orphaning blocks produced by honest nodes, or orphaning (refusing to include) tx-embedded routing work being sent from honest users.
The payout lottery does make censorship costly for all attackers who orphan work, but you'd need to specify the exact attack method if you want a discussion of specific work-orphaning attack vectors. Even nodes with a majority of "routing work" do not have the ability to costlessly orphan work produced by other nodes, so it isn't clear what exact attack you have in mind or why you think controlling a bunch of first-hop routing nodes under different identifies somehow makes these costs go away.
I'm not personally attacking you by stating my disappointment in you continuing the same argument in two different threads.
I will, again, reiterate that a Sybil attack is about power, not about convincing people you hold multiple identities - that is simply the means - it is not an effective attack if it doesn't get you that power over the network. The proof in the post clearly demonstrates how Sybilling reduces power in that scheme.
Your attack is not a Sybil attack - you've simply surrounded a user with extremely uncooperative nodes who manipulate or censor the user (the former of which isn't even economically feasible in the scheme of the OP, but that's tangential). If the uncooperative nodes surrounding the user all authoritatively proved they were unique identities, well, it obviously wouldn't be a Sybil attack then.
Yet these *unique* uncooperative nodes can perform the equivalent attack you keep bringing up. If you've read carefully at all, then you know I've just proven it can't be a Sybil attack - because *it has nothing to do with node identity and is not reliant on duplicating.*
Furthermore, this attack you describe, which is not strictly reliant on Sybilling, is on a user and not the network. I go as far to argue that even this individual user has recourse, which is beyond the primary claim - and as far as I'm concerned, true.
So addressing that - your argument is that nodes can afford to attack users because they can budget in the expense and surround users. But you can't carry this through - it always involves ripping users off and getting more money from them, and there are various ways for users to escape, including getting a new ISP.
In fact, even traditional monopolistic strategies don't even work to drown competition - because the network is open and it cannot be 51% attacked, so no majority can ever exclude competing nodes from publishing to the chain and earning rewards.
If a user has a constrained network which only routes to one provider - that isn't a Sybil attack, and it certainly isn't an attack on the network itself. I took the liberty to go above and beyond and argue that even these practices become unsustainable when you have a network with these qualities.
But I do not concede that just because one way you can perform this attack is by Sybilling that it is actually a Sybil attack - as I proved by showing you can perform it without duplicating oneself - hell you can do it with a single presented node to the user; what you are describing is hoarding network traffic.
Anyone can declare they have a sybil proof network if they have the power to declare everything that invalidates the proof as being non-sybil.
It might be a productive discussion if there could be an agreed upon definition of Sybil. The "proof" requires Sybils to inject an excess hop but no rationale as to why they would do so.
Saito is as vulnerable to Sybil attacks as Bitcoin is to miner concentration. In an open network cooperating nodes will always have an advantage over independent nodes. You cannot distinguish between the two in a permissionless network.
>If your counter-point to that is that users will waste money then clearly this attack is not sustainable
One simple scenario where it is sustainable is when you are a part of a competitor's network where the existence of the other network results you in making less money. If the attacker wants to destroy the other network to gain market share they may be willing to have a budget they spend each month to attack it.
>And if your concern is so extreme that a whole network around a user is locked down
It's not extreme if there is to defense to it.
>it would take a lot of work to even get into one of these states
As I mentioned it is easy to run multiple instances of the software to become the majority of the network.
>The same way it's unlikely you will keep buying bread from the guy that charges twice the market rate.
If you check 100 stores in your area and they all charge that rate you may think that's the market rate.