Enclaves and remote attestations aren't bad per-se, it's just those where the user of the device is considered an "untrusted party".
It makes more sense to consider your cloud provider an untrusted party, however I'd not rely on these technologies anyway, in practice they might not be as secure as advertised.
In line with my second point, we can always see "legitimate" uses for more power. But novel centralized power generally accrues to those who already have power - hence your hedging about cloud providers ("however I'd not rely on these technologies anyway").
But yes, I've also put forth the argument that RA could be a neutral feature if it were under the control of the owner of the computer. Either prohibit manufacturers from bundling privileged keys with devices, or require that the chip be able to import and export all attestation keys through an appropriate maintenance mode. Then an end user would always be free to generate new keys or export bundled ones and run the attestation protocols in software, thus preserving their freedom to run whatever software they'd like.
But the above dynamic would not result in widely used protocols for doing attestations, rather they would be a bespoke thing for specific use cases - like say an internal corporate website that can only be accessed by corporate laptops. Hence why I think it's correct to judge every attempt at remote attestation for the general web and/or consumer machines as "evil".
Furthermore, the funny thing that wasn't part of these debates when both secure attestation and secure boot were only abstract threats - secure boot already covers most of the legitimate desires for secure attestation. For example deploying a server at a datacenter - secure attestation would be nice for knowing it's not been tampered with. But secure boot already provides that assurance. The main difference would seem to be that if a software bug allows arbitrary code execution, secure boot falls down immediately while secure attestation is supposed to catch that (although who knows if implementations would actually live up to that).
It makes more sense to consider your cloud provider an untrusted party, however I'd not rely on these technologies anyway, in practice they might not be as secure as advertised.